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ntil too late to have it follow a better concealed route. Early Saturday morning the movement was discovered by the Third corps, and a reconnoisance was pushed out to embarrass its advance. After some trouble and a slight and successful attack, Birney ascertained and reported that Jackson was moving over to our right. The conclusion which Hooker drew from this fact was, apparently, that Lee was retreating. Jackson, meanwhile keeping Sickles busy with a small rear-guard, advanced along the Brast and in the rear of our right flank. While he was thus massing his men to take the Army of the Potomac in reverse, Hooker continued to authorize Sickles to deplete the threatened wing by sending a large part of its available strength (Barlow, Birney, Whipple, and Geary in part—some 15,000 men) out into the woods in the hope of capturing the force which had long ago eluded his grasp and was ready to fall upon our rear. Hooker's right flank, of barely 10,000 men, was completely isolated. And
s had to be halted and reformed, his three lines having become inextricably mixed. Anderson had made a serious attack on our centre so soon as the guns of Jackson's corps were heard, so that Hooker had nothing at hand to throw into the gap but Berry's division of the old Third corps. Other troops were too far away. This division was now hurried into position across the pike. The artillery of the Third corps and many guns of the Eleventh corps were assembled on the Fairview crest. Sicklesousand men he had led into the woods, and disposed himself to attack Jackson in more practical fashion. Between good use of several batteries, and a gallant charge by a handful of cavalry, a diversion upon his flank was created, which coupled to Berry's desperate resistance and the heavy artillery fire from Fairview, arrested Jackson's onset. It was after this check, while reconnoitering in front of his troops, that this noted soldier received, from his own lines, the volley which inflicted o
roops to warrant an assault, day broke. Brooks still held the left of the line, Howe the centre, and Newton the right. Gibbon, who had been left in Falmouth, threwabove Fredericksburg, crossed and filed in on Sedgwick's right. Both Gibbon and Howe made demonstrations against the enemy's flanks, but the nature of the ground prewas now reduced to a general assault. Two storming columns were formed, one from Howe's front and one from Newton's. These dispositions were not completed until 11 A.edgwick's orders certainly did not warrant this delay. Newton followed Brooks. Howe brought up the rear. By noon word reached Lee that Sedgwick had captured the ld a footing on the plank-road. Substantially, Newton faced west, Brooks south, Howe east. Lee, after some hours' preparation, made ready to push in Sedgwick's centP. M. Lee attacked. McLaws fell upon the corner held by Brooks; Early assaulted Howe. The latter's onset was very hardy. Our loss was over two thousand men, but
ver to our right. The conclusion which Hooker drew from this fact was, apparently, that Lee was retreating. Jackson, meanwhile keeping Sickles busy with a small rear-guard, advanced along the Brock road until, toward afternoon, he was abreast and in the rear of our right flank. While he was thus massing his men to take the Army of the Potomac in reverse, Hooker continued to authorize Sickles to deplete the threatened wing by sending a large part of its available strength (Barlow, Birney, Whipple, and Geary in part—some 15,000 men) out into the woods in the hope of capturing the force which had long ago eluded his grasp and was ready to fall upon our rear. Hooker's right flank, of barely 10,000 men, was completely isolated. And yet though scouts, pickets, and an actual attack at 3:30 P. M., proved beyond a peradventure Jackson's presence at this point, Hooker allowed this flank to be held by an untried corps, composed of the most heterogeneous and untrustworthy elements in the Arm
Frederick M. Colston (search for this): chapter 20
g south were but fairly substantial. Facing east were none. Some carelessness was apparent, in that ambulances, ammunition wagons, pack mules and even a drove of beeves were close behind the line. Every one was at ease, though a few were not wanting in anxiety. Little Wilderness Church, near by, endeavored to stamp a peaceful air upon the warlike scene. The general feeling seemed to be that it was too late to get up much of a fight to-day. Jackson, in three lines, Rodes in advance, Colston next and A. P. Hill still coming up, lay close by. He had caught Hooker's right flagrante delicta. At 6 P. M. the order was given, and twenty-two thousand of the best infantry in existence closed rapidly down upon the flank of ten thousand of the least hardened of the troops of the Army of the Potomac. No division in the Army of the Potomac, not the Old Guard, not Frederick's automata, could have changed front under the staggering blow. The fight was short, sharp, deadly, but partial only
the right was otherwise criminal. In him alone centered all the information of constantly occurring changes. To him alone was reported each new circumstance. His subordinates knew but the partial truth. They relied on him for the initiative. At 6 P. M., then, the situation was this: The left and centre lay as before. Howard held the right, the key of the position, with 10,000 men, a half brigade of Devens's only astride the pike, the rest of Devens's and Schurz's facing south, and Steinwehr massed at Dowdall's. Howard's best brigade was gone, and there was not a man to support him between Dowdall's and Chancellorsville. For this portion of the line under Sickles had been advanced into the woods nearly two miles. On the right flank of this little force lay Jackson's corps of over 20,000 men, whose wide wings, like the arms of a gigantic cuttlefish, were ready to clutch it in their fatal embrace. To cover Jackson's march, Lee at intervals during the day tapped at the lines
to the history of Chancellorsville. They in no wise affected the conduct or outcome of the campaign. In order to conceal his real move by the right, Hooker made show of moving down the river, and a strong demonstration with the First, Third and Sixth corps on the left, under command of Sedgwick. Covered by Hunt's guns, on April 29th and 30th, pontoons were thrown at Franklin's crossing and Pollock's mills, troops were put over, and bridgeheads were constructed and held by Brooks's and Wadsworth's divisions. Lee made no serious attempt to dispute this movement, but watched the dispositions, uncertain how to gauge their value. Meanwhile, the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, followed by the Fifth, with eight days rations, marched up to Kelley's ford. Here all three corps crossed the Rappahannock on the night of Wednesday the 29th; and on Thursday the two former crossed the Rapidan at Germania ford, and the latter at Ely's, and all three reached Chancellorsville Thursday afternoon. H
npike, on leaving the forest, ran upon the intrenched divisions of Anderson and McLaws, whom they engaged. Slocum, with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps on the plank ring of the entire Third corps and Williams, of the Twelfth corps. Anderson and McLaws, with seventeen thousand men, still confronted Geary and Hancock with twelve th service. From our left, several divisions could have made a diversion against McLaws's right. Our force at Fairview could have been doubled at any time. But all teights. Wilcox, cut off from Early, alone separated Sedgwick from Lee's rear. McLaws and part of Anderson's men were at once dispatched to sustain Wilcox. These trthe river. The balance of Anderson's force now joined Mc-Laws. With Anderson, McLaws and Early, some twenty-five thousand men, Lee thought he could fairly expect toetire across the river as soon as night should fall. At 6 P. M. Lee attacked. McLaws fell upon the corner held by Brooks; Early assaulted Howe. The latter's onset
d States ford, it was by no means too late to gather the fruits of the vigor and secrecy exhibited thus far in this flank march. But the advance on Friday was checked by Hooker without personal examination of the situation, to the surprise of every one, and against the protest of many of his subordinates. A more fatal error cannot be conceived. Here first appeared Hooker's lack of balance. The troops retired, and Jackson at once took advantage of the situation by advancing his left to Welford's. The Army of the Potomac on Friday night lay huddled in the chapparal around Chancellorsville, instead of occupying, as they might, a well defined position on the open ground in front of Banks's ford. Gradually, during the night, the several corps drifted, weary and disheartened at this unexplained check in the midst of success, into the position which they had taken up after crossing the river, without any idea of fighting there. The line was thus a hap-hazard one, on the worst con
possible, our advance, supposed to be partial only, and then to slowly retire to the Mine-Run road. This he had done, and here Lee's engineers were speedily engaged in drawing up a line of intrenchments. Early was left at Hamilton's crossing, Barksdale remained in the town, and Lee, with the bulk of his forces, hurried out to meet the Army of the Potomac. At an early hour on Friday morning Jackson arrived at the Mine-Run line and took command. Hooker's tardiness in advancing had already allnge these dispositions within fifteen minutes after receipt of Hooker's dispatch, but it was after midnight before he could get his command faced about and fairly headed in the new direction. The Fredericksburg heights were held by Early and Barksdale with eighty-five hundred men, and plenty of artillery. In December a few brigades had here defeated the entire Army of the Potomac. Hooker himself, with his battle worn veterans, had then pronounced the task impossible. It was after midnight
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