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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Varina Davis, Jefferson Davis: Ex-President of the Confederate States of America, A Memoir by his Wife, Volume 2. Search the whole document.

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Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 13
the public interest involved in the correction, which, as stated in my letter to him, was that which gave it, in my estimation, its claim to consideration and had caused me to address him on the subject; Richmond, Va., November 3, 1861. General J. E. Johnston, Commanding Department of the Potomac. Sir: Reports have been and are being widely circulated to the effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him fthe following endorsement: The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report, as received by him at about one o'clock on the morning of July 18th, is inaccurately reported; the following is a copy: Richmond, July 17, 1861. General J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Va. General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decided blow a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House, eit
Garnett (search for this): chapter 13
s of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would reinforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to his opponent (General McClellan), and able to defeat that officer. This done, General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights and the defence of their h II. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett, in Western Virginia. General Garnett's forces amounted only to 3 or 4,000 men, then known to be in rapid retreat bGeneral Garnett's forces amounted only to 3 or 4,000 men, then known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnut's arrival in Richmond. III. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible
Richmond McClellan (search for this): chapter 13
im; or if not, to retire again for a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would reinforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to his opponent (General McClellan), and able to defeat that officer. This done, General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people as he advanced to the recovs by effecting a junction of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett, in Western Virginia. General Garnett's forces amounted only to 3 or 4,000 men, then known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnut's arrival in Richmond. III. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to wait e
R. E. Lee (search for this): chapter 13
which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as compared with his own. The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department, cannot be found among its files, nor any reference to any decision made upon it; and it was not known that the army had advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message, to be verbally delivered, was sent by the Honorable Mr. Chesnut. If the conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a junction of the forces of General Johnston and Holmes should be made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a victory. The ju
P. G. T. Beauregard (search for this): chapter 13
d on that occasion as a volunteer aid to General Beauregard, had stated in the House of Representatiirculated to the effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battlesions and with such feelings, I wrote to General Beauregard as follows: Richmond, Va., August 4, 18 an order to him to make a junction with General Beauregard as a movement left to his discretion, wieral J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Va. General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decit the movement. Upon the receipt of General Beauregard's report of the battle of Manassas, I fotter: Richmond, Va., October 30, 1861. General Beauregard, Manassas, Va. Sir: Yesterday my attelly yours, etc. Jefferson Davis. As General Beauregard did not think it proper to omit that por is an accurate copy of the order: General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decid Holmes should be made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a victory. The junction[1 more...]
J. E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 13
hitherto given. Wherefore I addressed to General Johnston the following inquiry, which, though restthat in this I found myself mistaken. General Johnston, in his report, represented an order to horsement: The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report, as received by him at aboou expressed a desire for the junction of General Johnston's army with your own. The movement was pantially as follows: I proposed that General Johnston should unite, as soon as possible, the buuld be achieved within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from Winchester for Manassasson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would reinforce General Garnett sufficiett was to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the Potomac if practicable had reference to letters of General Johnston of July 12th and 15th, which made it extre of about 25,000 men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General Johnston show hi[8 more...]
Upton (search for this): chapter 13
d Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of more than thirty thousand sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation, prevented any serious thought of advancing upon the Capitol. To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible for the army to advance farther than it has done — to the line of Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced posts at Upton's, Munson's, and Mason's Hill. After a conference at Fairfax Court-House with the three senior general officers, you announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present position. Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. Johnston. This answer to my inquiry was conclusive as to the charge which had been industriously circulated, that I had prevent
Samuel Cooper (search for this): chapter 13
t referred, thereby judiciously suppressing both the endorsement and the portion of the report to which it related. In this case and every other official report ever submitted to me, I made neither alteration nor erasure. That portion of the report which was suppressed by the Congress has, since the war, found its way into the press, but the endorsement that belongs to it has not been published. As part of the history of the time, I here present both in their proper connection: General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va. Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations in the presence of the enemy on July 21st, I propose, I hope not unreasonably, first to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the battle. Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy with a decidedly superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage, to attack or to t
July 12th (search for this): chapter 13
he word after is not found in the despatch before the words sending your sick, as is stated in the report; so that the argument based on it requires no comment. The order to move if practicable, had reference to General Johnston's letters of July 12th and 15th, representing the relative strength and positions of the enemy under Patterson, and of his own forces, to be such as to make it doubtful whether General Johnston had the power to effect the movement. Upon the receipt of General Be make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all of the arrangements exercise your discretion. The words if practicable had reference to letters of General Johnston of July 12th and 15th, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as compared with his own. The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not
21st (search for this): chapter 13
e unjust to yourself in putting your failure to pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of short supplies of subsistence and transportation. Under the circumstances of our army, and in the absence of the knowledge since acquired, if indeed the statements be true, it would have been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed. You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces were moved by you, in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our right, and that the next day's operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's panic. Enough was done for glory, and the measure of duty was full. Let us rather show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable, than, by dwelling on the possibilities recently developed, give form and substance to the criticisms always easy to those who judge after the event. With sincere esteem, I am your friend, Jefferson Davis.
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