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Snake Creek (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 23
have distinguished friends from foes, except at a short distance, and they would have had to fire at random. We expected to back the Federals against Owl and Snake Creeks—the two narrow and rickety bridges of which could not have stood heavy pressure— early in the day, without incurring much risk from the gunboats. It was only amps against an attack, because we had no orders to do so, and because such a course would have made our raw men timid. The position was naturally strong, with Snake Creek on our right, a deep, bold stream, with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front; and Lick Creek, with a similar confluent, on our left; thus narrowing the sprthington, an officer of his command, in August, 1862, he said: And here I mention, for future history, that our right flank was well guarded by Owl and Snake Creeks, our left by Lick Creek, leaving us simply to guard our front. No stronger position was ever held by an army. . . . But even as we were on the 6th of April, y
Island Number Ten (Missouri, United States) (search for this): chapter 23
means of transportation, and restricted supplies of all kinds, General Beauregard had assembled, at and about Corinth, an army of over forty thousand men, exclusive of some nine thousand occupying the Mississippi River defences, at New Madrid, Island No.10, and Fort Pillow. And General Van Dorn, at General Beauregard's request, was moving rapidly from Van Buren, Arkansas, with an army of nearly twenty thousand men, to unite also with our forces at Corinth. He would have arrived in time to takearkable strategic powers, his ill-health had not prevented him from advising and effecting the evacuation of Columbus, until then erroneously considered the Gibraltar of the West; fortifying and strengthening Fort Pillow, New Madrid Bend, and Island No.10; urging General Johnston to abandon his retreat towards Stevenson, and march to Decatur, so as to facilitate a junction of the two armies; and, finally, despatching most of his staff, with special messages, to the governors of four States, and
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 23
na, to ascertain whether they could send him, at Corinth, the State troops they had available at that time; and he also requested General Johnston, who was then at Murfreesboroa, retiring, with some fifteen thousand men, from Bowling Green and Nashville, to Stevenson, to change the direction of his retreat to Decatur, Alabama, that he might more readily form a junction with the forces at Corinth, at the proper time. To this request, General Johnston willingly acceded. By the 27th of March,rals Halleck, Grant, and Buell seem to have been equally unprepared for his sudden onslaught. General Buell, with five divisions of his army, well organized and fully equipped, numbering at least thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, had left Nashville from the 15th to the 20th of March, to form a junction at his leisure with Grant at Savannah, via Columbia, Mount Pleasant, and Waynesboro. He was delayed several days at Columbia by high water in Duck River, the bridge having been destroyed b
Mount Pleasant (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 23
cords. But Generals Sherman and Prentiss were not the only commanding officers surprised by Beauregard's foolish attack. Generals Halleck, Grant, and Buell seem to have been equally unprepared for his sudden onslaught. General Buell, with five divisions of his army, well organized and fully equipped, numbering at least thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, had left Nashville from the 15th to the 20th of March, to form a junction at his leisure with Grant at Savannah, via Columbia, Mount Pleasant, and Waynesboro. He was delayed several days at Columbia by high water in Duck River, the bridge having been destroyed by the Confederates. While there he first heard, on or about the 29th of March, that Grant's army had moved to Pittsburg Landing, on the left bank of the Tennessee River. General Buell resumed his march on the 31st, intending—having obtained the approval of General Halleck—to stop for cleaning up and rest at Waynesboro; he had not yet received any intimation that Gener
Louisiana (Louisiana, United States) (search for this): chapter 23
from any just blame. The reader will pardon us for briefly reverting to them. General Beauregard, it will be remembered, only arrived at Jackson, Tennessee, on the 17th of February. General Polk, with about fourteen thousand five hundred men of all arms, was in command in that military district. Four days after General Beauregard's arrival, and before he had yet formally assumed command, he despatched five officers of his staff to the governors of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, to ascertain whether they could send him, at Corinth, the State troops they had available at that time; and he also requested General Johnston, who was then at Murfreesboroa, retiring, with some fifteen thousand men, from Bowling Green and Nashville, to Stevenson, to change the direction of his retreat to Decatur, Alabama, that he might more readily form a junction with the forces at Corinth, at the proper time. To this request, General Johnston willingly acceded. By the 27th of Marc
Monterey (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 23
Waddell was one of General Beauregard's volunteer aids. For the whole of his statement, see Appendix to Chapter XX. St. Louis, November 8th, 1878. General G. T. Beauregard: * * * * * * * * * I joined you on the morning of the 5th, at Monterey, and rode with you to Headquarters No. 1. Judging of time by what I had done that morning, I am of opinion that it was afternoon before you and General Johnston reached the ridge where the front line was formed and Headquarters No. 1 was establ text imputes to you a knowledge, and also implies that it is upon your authority, that Colonel W. P. Johnston asserts my having said that I would be found in bed in my ambulance; whereas the fact is, that I had ridden with General Johnston from Monterey, on the preceding day, to the field. I only slept in my ambulance that night, as I had no tent, and did not see it again until my return to Corinth. I was again on horseback shortly after daybreak on the 6th—earlier, for that matter, than Gene
Wissembourg (France) (search for this): chapter 23
russian war, which cost France, besides her high military renown, the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and one billion of dollars. On the 4th of August, 1870, three Prussian divisions, of the Crown Prince's army, surprised and crushed, at Wissembourg, on the Sarre River, one division of McMahon's corps (the 1st) of thirty-six thousand men, which formed the right wing of the French army, composed of the élite of the French troops. Two days afterwards the Crown Prince attacked again, suddenly, the remainder of the French corps, at Woerth, a few miles back from Wissembourg. The other two corps, 5th and 7th of McMahon's army, were not quite within supporting distance, and instead of opposing his overpowering adversary in such a manner only as to give time to those two corps to concentrate on a good defensive position in his rear, he made a determined stand at Woerth, calling on them to hurry up to his assistance. Only two divisions of the 5th corps (De Failly's) reached him in ti
Turenne (search for this): chapter 23
n from the battle-field on the evening of the 6th. comparison drawn by Mr. Davis between General A. S. Johnston and Marshal Turenne. VII. General Beauregard's opinion as to the fighting of the Confederates during the battle of the 7th. VIII. corper, we think, to direct attention to the comparison, drawn by Mr. Davis, between General Albert Sidney Johnston and Marshal Turenne, with reference to the battle of Shiloh. Says Mr. Davis: Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. II. p. 68. To take an example far from us, in time and place, when Turenne had, after months of successful manoeuvring, finally forced his enemy into a position which gave assurance of victory, and had marshalled his forces for a decisive battle, hem a junction there, and fight the battle of Shiloh, not after months of successful manoeuvring, as was the case with Marshal Turenne, but, on the contrary, after months of irreparable disasters, which had brought the country to the brink of despair,
Ricker (search for this): chapter 23
herman says also, in his report: On Saturday (5th) the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front, yet I did not believe they designed anything but a strong demonstration. And further on he adds: About 8 A. M. (Sunday) I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry, to our left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp. Major Ricker says that, after reporting to General Sherman a reconnoissance he had made on the day preceding the battle: I told him I had met and fought the advance of Beauregard's army, and that he was advancing on us. General Sherman remarked, It could not be possible; Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations to attack us in ours—mere reconnoissance in force. See Boynton's Sherman's Historical Raid, pp. 33, 84, for further extracts from official records. But Gen
D. B. Harris (search for this): chapter 23
e would be found in his ambulance in bed. Governor Harris, knowing this, and how feeble General Bea seems to be going on well on the right. Governor Harris assented. Then, said Beauregard, the batteferred to General Beauregard's letter to Governor Harris, dated March 9th, 1880, written after then reply to that letter (April 13th, 1880) Governor Harris wrote: . . . But my recollection isnston's and Mr. Davis's books, but not in Governor Harris's letter to General Beauregard. We know that Governor Harris is sincere in his belief that these were General Beauregard's words, but his ier, General Beauregard knew no more than Governor Harris, or any other member of General Johnston'to have derived their information—namely, Governor Harris, in his letter of April 13th, 1880, alreadered a cessation of hostilities had not Governor Harris suggested that the fight had better go on Who could give credence to this, even if Governor Harris had not given the counter-statement alrea[1 more...]
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