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Morris Island (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): article 5
he succeeded in his designs the navy would find it a comparatively easy task to ascend the harbor of Charleston. That plan, so far as it relates to General Gillmore's operations, embraced — firstly, the occupation of the southern portion of Morris Island; secondly, the capture of Wagner and Gregg; thirty, the reduction of Sumter. With the reduction of Sumter the navy was to advance. The course marked out for Gen. Gillmore was not adhered to in the particular of capturing Wagner and Greguce Sumter over the heads of Wagner and Gregg. He was induced to adopt that course more readily from the fact that the fall of Sumter was the principal object aimed at by the expedition. So by destroying Sumter before capturing the works on Morris island Gen. Gillmore offered to the navy an opportunity of greatly accelerating their movements. The archives unmistakably indicate that Sumter was considered by the army and navy authorities at Washington to be the chief obstacle in the way of our
Fox (search for this): article 5
can be placed in proper condition. The understanding between the Government and Admiral Dahlgren and the Government and Gen. Gillmore is a point which deserves attention. The war records clearly set forth the plan of operations to be pursued by both commanders either singly or in conjunction. The plan itself was conceived for the most part by Gen. Gillmore. The lamented Admiral Foote was present at the council to which the plan was submitted, as were also General Halleck and Assistant Secretary Fox. Those gentlemen, in fact, were members of the council. In that document General Gillmore plainly indicates what he is able to do and will do. His views were fully endorsed by the members of the Board, all agreeing at the time that if he succeeded in his designs the navy would find it a comparatively easy task to ascend the harbor of Charleston. That plan, so far as it relates to General Gillmore's operations, embraced — firstly, the occupation of the southern portion of Morris I
Foote (search for this): article 5
lgren will probably take the next forward step, which he has intimated his intention to do as soon as his fleet can be placed in proper condition. The understanding between the Government and Admiral Dahlgren and the Government and Gen. Gillmore is a point which deserves attention. The war records clearly set forth the plan of operations to be pursued by both commanders either singly or in conjunction. The plan itself was conceived for the most part by Gen. Gillmore. The lamented Admiral Foote was present at the council to which the plan was submitted, as were also General Halleck and Assistant Secretary Fox. Those gentlemen, in fact, were members of the council. In that document General Gillmore plainly indicates what he is able to do and will do. His views were fully endorsed by the members of the Board, all agreeing at the time that if he succeeded in his designs the navy would find it a comparatively easy task to ascend the harbor of Charleston. That plan, so far as it
Gillmore (search for this): article 5
ment and Admiral Dahlgren and the Government and Gen. Gillmore is a point which deserves attention. The war ree plan itself was conceived for the most part by Gen. Gillmore. The lamented Admiral Foote was present at the were members of the council. In that document General Gillmore plainly indicates what he is able to do and wiharleston. That plan, so far as it relates to General Gillmore's operations, embraced — firstly, the occupatiy was to advance. The course marked out for Gen. Gillmore was not adhered to in the particular of capturinmter before capturing the works on Morris island Gen. Gillmore offered to the navy an opportunity of greatly acral days later a second bombardment of Sumter by Gen. Gillmore, at the suggestion of Admiral Dahlgren, did not ch have been read by my informant, complimenting Gen. Gillmore on the complete success of his enterprise, have e of the demolition of Sumter, I will state that Gen. Gillmore's commission of Major General dates from the 23d
Dahlgren (search for this): article 5
ooperation of the navy and army is concerned the relation is as firm as the military situation can possibly make it. Admiral Dahlgren will probably take the next forward step, which he has intimated his intention to do as soon as his fleet can be placed in proper condition. The understanding between the Government and Admiral Dahlgren and the Government and Gen. Gillmore is a point which deserves attention. The war records clearly set forth the plan of operations to be pursued by both comm do not propose to decide. Several days later a second bombardment of Sumter by Gen. Gillmore, at the suggestion of Admiral Dahlgren, did not elicit a single reply, and proved, beyond all doubt, that the fort did not contain one mounted gun that couwhich he claims to have achieved his victory. Private letters reecived here from officers of the fleet say that Admiral Dahlgren has not delayed his movements because he believes Sumter able to resist the iron-clads, but for other reasons, with
Stanton (search for this): article 5
molished, and is admitted to have been by the War Department. According to the terms of the plan drawn up, then was the time for the navy to attempt a passage up the harbor. The attempt was not made, and why not I do not propose to decide. Several days later a second bombardment of Sumter by Gen. Gillmore, at the suggestion of Admiral Dahlgren, did not elicit a single reply, and proved, beyond all doubt, that the fort did not contain one mounted gun that could be used. Letters from Secretary Stanton, General Halleck, and other officials, which have been read by my informant, complimenting Gen. Gillmore on the complete success of his enterprise, have been forwarded to him: and, if it be necessary to adduce further evidence of the demolition of Sumter, I will state that Gen. Gillmore's commission of Major General dates from the 23d of August, the day on which he claims to have achieved his victory. Private letters reecived here from officers of the fleet say that Admiral Dahlgr
Wagner (search for this): article 5
lmore's operations, embraced — firstly, the occupation of the southern portion of Morris Island; secondly, the capture of Wagner and Gregg; thirty, the reduction of Sumter. With the reduction of Sumter the navy was to advance. The course marked out for Gen. Gillmore was not adhered to in the particular of capturing Wagner and Gregg before demolishing Sumter, it becoming apparent to him, after the unsuccessful assault of Wagner on the 18th of July, that it would be feasible to reduce SumterWagner on the 18th of July, that it would be feasible to reduce Sumter over the heads of Wagner and Gregg. He was induced to adopt that course more readily from the fact that the fall of Sumter was the principal object aimed at by the expedition. So by destroying Sumter before capturing the works on Morris island GenWagner and Gregg. He was induced to adopt that course more readily from the fact that the fall of Sumter was the principal object aimed at by the expedition. So by destroying Sumter before capturing the works on Morris island Gen. Gillmore offered to the navy an opportunity of greatly accelerating their movements. The archives unmistakably indicate that Sumter was considered by the army and navy authorities at Washington to be the chief obstacle in the way of our reaching C
Gregg (search for this): article 5
ar as it relates to General Gillmore's operations, embraced — firstly, the occupation of the southern portion of Morris Island; secondly, the capture of Wagner and Gregg; thirty, the reduction of Sumter. With the reduction of Sumter the navy was to advance. The course marked out for Gen. Gillmore was not adhered to in the particular of capturing Wagner and Gregg before demolishing Sumter, it becoming apparent to him, after the unsuccessful assault of Wagner on the 18th of July, that it would be feasible to reduce Sumter over the heads of Wagner and Gregg. He was induced to adopt that course more readily from the fact that the fall of Sumter was the prGregg. He was induced to adopt that course more readily from the fact that the fall of Sumter was the principal object aimed at by the expedition. So by destroying Sumter before capturing the works on Morris island Gen. Gillmore offered to the navy an opportunity of greatly accelerating their movements. The archives unmistakably indicate that Sumter was considered by the army and navy authorities at Washington to be the chief obsta
Halleck (search for this): article 5
rations to be pursued by both commanders either singly or in conjunction. The plan itself was conceived for the most part by Gen. Gillmore. The lamented Admiral Foote was present at the council to which the plan was submitted, as were also General Halleck and Assistant Secretary Fox. Those gentlemen, in fact, were members of the council. In that document General Gillmore plainly indicates what he is able to do and will do. His views were fully endorsed by the members of the Board, all agreend bombardment of Sumter by Gen. Gillmore, at the suggestion of Admiral Dahlgren, did not elicit a single reply, and proved, beyond all doubt, that the fort did not contain one mounted gun that could be used. Letters from Secretary Stanton, General Halleck, and other officials, which have been read by my informant, complimenting Gen. Gillmore on the complete success of his enterprise, have been forwarded to him: and, if it be necessary to adduce further evidence of the demolition of Sumter, I
21st (search for this): article 5
The situation at Charleston. The Washington correspondent of the New York Times, writing to that paper on the 21st inst., gives the following facts relative to the attitudes of the naval and land commander at Charleston: People are deceived when they the temporary full of operations before Charleston is the result of a difference of opinion between the army and navy commanders. Nothing could be wider of the mark. It is only the importance of individuals, who in their eager desire ave Charleston in our possession, have been compelled to witness a necessarily slow, but thus for prosperous siege, that has led them to assign cause for a delay, the nature of which must be, for prudential reasons, withheld from them. It is of no use to deny that so far as the cooperation of the navy and army is concerned the relation is as firm as the military situation can possibly make it. Admiral Dahlgren will probably take the next forward step, which he has intimated his intention to do a
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