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the 27th of June, prepared from the 24th, and the statement of the Federal loss, contrast strangely: About 9 A. M. of the day appointed the troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry was kept up. At all points the enemy met us with determined courage, and in great force. * * * By half-past 11 the assault was over, and had failed. The statement of loss was twenty-five hundred killed and wounded. According to this, an army of Americans, inured to war, was defeated by a loss of but two and a half per cent. It is incredible. General Sherman's subordinates must have imposed upon him. It is equally incredible that another army of American veterans, as completely protected as men using arms can be, could strike but two and a half per cent. of men exposed to their muskets and cannon, in seven lines at least, in two hours and a half. The writer has seen American soldiers, not inured to war, win a field with a loss ten times gr
Benjamin F. Butler (search for this): chapter 25
lf, into an extensive thicket, which compelled the Southern troops to halt when otherwise they were not opposed. Two hours after we were slightly attacked-by a reconnoitering party, probably; it was so easily repelled. We made no other attack, but held our ground till after nightfall, to carry off our wounded. Our army remained in line nearly parallel to the Goldsboroa road, to remove the wounded to Smithfield. Its flanks were somewhat thrown back — the left only of cavalry skirmishers. Butler's cavalry was observing the right Federal column; Wheeler's arrived from Averysboroa the evening of the 19th. Mower's movement (see page 304) was made after three o'clock; for he had proceeded but a mile and a half when attacked and driven back, about half-past 4 o'clock, being then in rear of our centre where orders could not reach him. So the skirmishing mentioned on page 304 must have been very brief. Our men, being intrenched, easily drove off the enemy. In reference to wide discrepan
railroad, the other the direct wagon road. Hardee's Corps was near the former, Polk's and Hood's at Cassville. Johnston determined to attack the column on the direct road with Polk's and Hood's Corps when the other was at Kingston, three hours march to the west. Polk was to meet and attack the head of the column; Hood, marchinPolk was to meet and attack the head of the column; Hood, marching a little in advance of him on a road on his right, was to join in the action as the enemy deployed. When the latter had marched some miles in the proper direction,e afternoon. But at night General Hood's persistent declaration that he and General Polk would not be able to hold their ground an hour, caused the withdrawal of theesaw, as an observatory, and at headquarters. Page 53: The circumstances of General Polk's death were these: He had accompanied General Hardee and me to Pine Mount t minute, and a minute later, while we were walking slowly toward our horses, General Polk being on the very top of the hill, a third shot passed through the middle of
Billy Sherman (search for this): chapter 25
son had attacked on the 9th, according to General Sherman's plan, Resaca could easily have been helnowledge. The retreat to the east, which General Sherman supposed that the Confederates would have and, therefore, was advantageous to him (General Sherman), and not to his adversary. On page 3rted that morning by General Wheeler. General Sherman's returns, on pages 24 and 136, shows ninne received. According to the reports of General Sherman's subordinates, they gave but two; or, onnot have been so little as four thousand. General Sherman does not allude to this action. In the et much so, to say the least. On page 48, General Sherman claims to have taken three thousand two hd 18th: By a not unusual error of memory, General Sherman probably attributes to Johnston language liminaries of peace, citing authorities. General Sherman assented, and in less than two hours the day before. With this paper before him, General Sherman wrote rapidly that which was adopted and [31 more...]
321 to 324): In the morning of May 19th, the Federal army was approaching Cassville, in two bodies, one following the railroad, the other the direct wagon road. Hardee's Corps was near the former, Polk's and Hood's at Cassville. Johnston determined to attack the column on the direct road with Polk's and Hood's Corps when the otly signal stations were on Kenesaw, as an observatory, and at headquarters. Page 53: The circumstances of General Polk's death were these: He had accompanied General Hardee and me to Pine Mount to reconnoitre. We placed ourselves in a battery near the summit, on the enemy's side. After seeing everything that interested us, we tf the inaccuracy of these reports. After the action of June 27th (pages 60, 61), we counted--one thousand dead of the Army of the Cumberland lying before two of Hardee's divisions, very near, some against, our breastworks. The calculated proportion of wounded to killed is five to one; this would indicate a loss of six thousand
south end of Kenesaw, and on a hill near, were outside of our position --not occupied by our line, and if at all, only by pickets, and General Sherman was deceived by reports of efforts to retake them and night attacks, which were never made by our troops. If the Confederate troops were so incessantly beaten, it is unaccountable that they were permitted to remain before Marietta four weeks, and then shifted their ground only to avoid losing their communications. The attack on Hooker and Schofield on the 22d, was made against orders by General Hood with Stevenson's Division, supported by Hindman's. It was defeated by intrenched artillery. But the troops held the ground they gained long enough to remove their dead and wounded. On the 25th, an attack like this was made on Stevenson's Division by the troops that had repulsed it 6n the 22d, and they were repelled with as heavy a loss as they had inflicted then. But this affair escapes General Sherman's notice. Pages 60 and 61: Th
rs, suffered very severely. On page 34, General Sherman claims to have surprised Johnston, by McPherson's arrival before Resaca on the 9th; forgetting, apparently, that his approach was discovered o but by a division-so intrenched as to be able to maintain itself a full day, at least. So if McPherson had attacked on the 9th, according to General Sherman's plan, Resaca could easily have been he side, and Resaca on the other, he could not have escaped. If the other course, suggested for McPherson by General Sherman, had been taken — that of placing his whole force astride the railroad abov assailed him in the same manner, with the same advantages. Either course suggested, taken by McPherson, would have compelled Johnston to attack him, and with such advantages of numbers and positionnts. General Sherman was misinformed as to the taking of an important ridge by the advance of McPherson's whole line, and bloody repulses of Confederate attempts to retake it-this on the 15th; there
Jefferson Davis (search for this): chapter 25
bly attributes to Johnston language that he heard in Raleigh the following evening (see pages 349 and 351). It could not have entered the mind of the latter that any of the class to which General Sherman belongs could entertain a suspicion that Mr. Davis was accessory to assassination. The object of our meeting, expressed in a letter in his report, page 137, was to make a general armistice-to enable the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war. Hend proposed that they should agree upon preliminaries of peace, citing authorities. General Sherman assented, and in less than two hours the terms, drawn up and adopted next day, were agreed upon, except that General Sherman refused to include Mr. Davis and his Cabinet in the article (sixth) granting amnesty. This question was discussed till sunset, when they agreed to resume the subject next morning. General Breckenridge accompanied Johnston to the meeting, and Mr. Reagan put on paper the t
nd if at all, only by pickets, and General Sherman was deceived by reports of efforts to retake them and night attacks, which were never made by our troops. If the Confederate troops were so incessantly beaten, it is unaccountable that they were permitted to remain before Marietta four weeks, and then shifted their ground only to avoid losing their communications. The attack on Hooker and Schofield on the 22d, was made against orders by General Hood with Stevenson's Division, supported by Hindman's. It was defeated by intrenched artillery. But the troops held the ground they gained long enough to remove their dead and wounded. On the 25th, an attack like this was made on Stevenson's Division by the troops that had repulsed it 6n the 22d, and they were repelled with as heavy a loss as they had inflicted then. But this affair escapes General Sherman's notice. Pages 60 and 61: The description of the attack on the Confederate army on the 27th of June, prepared from the 24th, and
hours after we were slightly attacked-by a reconnoitering party, probably; it was so easily repelled. We made no other attack, but held our ground till after nightfall, to carry off our wounded. Our army remained in line nearly parallel to the Goldsboroa road, to remove the wounded to Smithfield. Its flanks were somewhat thrown back — the left only of cavalry skirmishers. Butler's cavalry was observing the right Federal column; Wheeler's arrived from Averysboroa the evening of the 19th. Mower's movement (see page 304) was made after three o'clock; for he had proceeded but a mile and a half when attacked and driven back, about half-past 4 o'clock, being then in rear of our centre where orders could not reach him. So the skirmishing mentioned on page 304 must have been very brief. Our men, being intrenched, easily drove off the enemy. In reference to wide discrepancies, General O. O. Howard's (right) wing fought only in this skirmish. Yet it is claimed (page 305) that its loss w
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