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June 3rd (search for this): chapter 33
never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but to so maneuvre that the enemy should be forced to attack us-or, to repeat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of march. The movement was begun on the 3d of June. McLaws' Division of my corps moved out of Fredericksburg, for Culpepper Court-House, followed by Ewell's Corps, on the 4th and 5th of June. Hood's Division and Stuart's cavalry moved at the same time. On the 8th, we found two full corps (for Pickett's Division had joined me then), and Stuart's cavalry, concentrated at Culpepper Court-House. In the meantime a large force of the Federals, cavalry and infantry, had been thrown across the Rappahannock, and sent to attack General Stuart.
May 11th, 1875 AD (search for this): chapter 33
ollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at Gettysburg during the first three days of July, 1863. Yours, truly, A. S. Long. To General Longstreet. I add the letter of Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, which should of itself be conclusive. I merely premise it with the statement that it was fully nine o'clock before General Lee returned from his reconnoissance of Ewell's lines: University of Virginia, May 11th, 1875. General James Longstreet: Dear General-Your letter of the 25th ultimo, with regard to General Lee's battle order on the 1st and 2d of July at Gettysburg, was duly received. I did not know of any order for an attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Ma
May 7th, 1875 AD (search for this): chapter 33
of political differences, now undertake to criticise and attack your war record. Such conduct is most ungenerous, and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good Confederates with whom I have had the pleasure of associating in the daily walks of life. Yours, very respectfully, W. H. Taylor. To General Longstreet. The next letter is from Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's staff, who has charge of all the papers left by General Lee. It is as follows: Baltimore, Md., May 7th, 1875. Dear General-Your letter of the 20th ultimo was received, and should have had an earlier reply, but for my engagements preventing me from looking at my papers to find what I could on the subject. I have no personal recollection of the order to which you refer. It certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there anything in General Lee's official report to show the attack on the 2d was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there was not proper concert of action
July 18th (search for this): chapter 33
I need only add that every movement or halt of the troops on that day was made in the immediate presence of General Lee, or in his sight-certainly within the reach of his easy and prompt correction. I quote, in this connection, the order that I issued to the heads of departments in my corps on the 1st. I present the order as issued to Colonel Walton, of the artillery, similar orders having been issued to the division commanders: [Order.] headquarters First Army Corps, near Gettysburg, July 18-5.30 P. M. Colonel-The commanding general desires you to come on to-night as fast as you can, without distressing your men or animals. Hill and Ewell have sharply engaged the enemy, and you will be needed for to-morrow's battle. Let us know where you will stop to-night. Respectfully, G. M. Sorrell, A. A. General. To Colonel J. B. Walton, Chief of Artillery. I offer, also, a report made by General Hood touching this march. He says: While lying in camp near Chambersburg, i
September, 1877 AD (search for this): chapter 33
difficult to pass beyond them without noting the manner in which, by their ignorance, they marred the plans of their chief on the field of battle. Mr. Pendleton robbed Pickett's Division of its most important adjunct, fresh field artillery, at the moment of its severest trial, and thus frustrated the wise and brilliant programme of assault planned by General Alexander, and without the knowledge of that officer. (See narrative of General Alexander in the Southern historical Monthly for September, 1877.) General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July by detaching part of his division on some uncalled — for service, in violation of General Lee's orders, and thus prevented the co-operative attack of Ewell, ordered by General Lee. It is proper to discuss briefly, at this point, the movements of the third day. The charge of that day, as made by General Pickett, was emphatically a forlorn hope. The point designated by General Lee as the point of attack, seemed t
April 28th, 1875 AD (search for this): chapter 33
ent to Ewell's headquarters, with the express view of seeing whether or not the main attack should be made then, and that he returned about nine o'clock; and that after discussing the ground for some time, he determined that I should make the main attack, and at eleven o'clock gave me the order to prepare for it. I now present documents that sustain these assertions. The first letter that I offer is from Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff. It is as follows: Norfolk, Va., April 28th, 1875. Dear General-I have received your letter of the 20th instant. I have not read the article of which you speak, nor have I ever seen any copy of General Pendleton's address; indeed, I have read little or nothing of what has been written since the war. In the first place, because I could not spare the time, and in the second, of those of whose writings I have heard, I deem but very few entitled to any attention whatever. I can only say, that I never before heard of the sunrise attack
20th (search for this): chapter 33
er is from Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff. It is as follows: Norfolk, Va., April 28th, 1875. Dear General-I have received your letter of the 20th instant. I have not read the article of which you speak, nor have I ever seen any copy of General Pendleton's address; indeed, I have read little or nothing of what hGeneral Lee's staff, who has charge of all the papers left by General Lee. It is as follows: Baltimore, Md., May 7th, 1875. Dear General-Your letter of the 20th ultimo was received, and should have had an earlier reply, but for my engagements preventing me from looking at my papers to find what I could on the subject. I have Then a letter from General A. S. Long, who was General Lee's Military Secretary: Big Island, Bedford, Va., May 31st, 1875. Dear General-Your letter of the 20th ultimo, referring to an assertion of General Pendleton's, made in a lecture delivered several years ago, which was recently published in the Southern historical Societ
16th (search for this): chapter 33
cit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right, and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the commanding general is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army. Yours, very truly, Chas. S. Venable. I add upon this point the letter of Dr. Cullen, Medical Director of the First Corps: Richmond, Va., May 18th, 1875. General James Longstreet: Dear General-Yours of the 16th ult. should have received my immediate attention, but before answering it, I was desirous of refreshing my memory of the scenes and incidents of the Gettysburg campaign by conversation with others who were with-us, and who served in different corps of the command. It was an astounding announcement to the survivors of the First Army Corps that the disaster and failure at Gettysburg was alone and solely due to its commander, and that had he obeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief that Meade'
15th (search for this): chapter 33
with a knowledge of our future movements. I supplied him with all the gold he needed, and instructed him to spare neither pains nor money to obtain full and accurate information. The information gathered by this scout led to the most tremendous results, as will soon be seen. General A. P. Hill, having left Fredericksburg as soon as the enemy had retired from his front, was sent to follow Ewell, who had marched up the Valley and cleared it of the Federals. My corps left Culpepper on the 15th, and with a view of covering the march of Hill and Ewell through the Valley, moved along the east side of the Blue Ridge, and occupied Snicker's and Ashby's gaps, and the line of the Blue Ridge. General Stuart was in my front and on my flank, reconnoitering the movements of the Federals. When it was found that Hooker did not intend to attack, I withdrew to the west side, and marched to the Potomac. As I was leaving the Blue Ridge, I instructed General Stuart to follow me, and to cross the P
13th (search for this): chapter 33
f our wagons. Upon the receipt of this intelligence General Lee ordered me to march as rapidly as possible to the relief of our trains. By a forced march we succeeded in clearing the road, and reached Williamsport in time to save our supply trains. We then took position covering the crossing there and at Falling Water, a short distance below. As the other corps arrived they were assigned positions, and we went to work as rapidly as possible to strengthen our line with field works. On the 13th, General Lee informed me that the river had fallen sufficiently at Williamsport to allow us to ford, and that the bridge at Falling Water had been repaired, and that he would, that night, recross the river with his entire army. I suggested, as a matter of convenience, and to avoid confusion, that it might be better to pass the trains over that night, with everything not essential to battle, and let his troops remain in position until the night of the 14th; that, if the rest of his line was a
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