Daniel Ammen, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.2, The Atlantic Coast
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

‘ [239] cutlasses and pistols most effectively. By this I would imply the lack of proper organization, it being impossible in the short space of time, on account of so many small squads of men from the different vessels in one mass, lacking proper company formations, and wholly unacquainted with each other, to secure such organization. This led to the confusion exhibited, for it was not due to any want of personal valor on the part of the officers or men.’

A more thorough organization, and a studied preparation with proper arms in the hands of the sailors instead of cutlasses, would have made the gallantry displayed by many serve a more effective purpose, and, indeed, would probably have transformed putative cowardice into effective endeavor. There are few men so stupid or so sublimated as to march on an enemy when the palpable result is simply to be shot. Had parallel lines of trenches been dug during the night on the line between the ironclads and the northeast bastion, extending them to the sea at such distances from the fort as might have been found practicable, and the sailors been properly armed, that bastion might not have proven so popular a point of defence as it evidently was, as seen from the fleet. No reflection is intended on the defenders of the fort, who certainly in the second attack exhibited throughout the utmost pertinacity and courage.

The morning following the fall of the defences of New Inlet, as soon as a channel could be found and buoyed, the light-draught gunboats were taken over the outer bar as fast as possible, and as there is a shoaler one within, similar to the ‘bulkhead’ at Hatteras Inlet, it was only on the forenoon of the 20th that all of the gunboats assigned for operations were within the river proper. Commander Truxton, of the Tacony, reported as follows: ‘In Fort Lamb was a galvanic battery in good working order, connecting ’