Daniel Ammen, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.2, The Atlantic Coast
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

[144] that had been lately put on board of her, leaving her trim so little by the stern as not to afford sufficient inclination for water to get to the pumps freely.

The neglect to close the hawse-hole, which permitted the rapid accumulation, at the forward extremity of the vessel, of sufficient water to bring her nearly on an even keel.

The large amount of water that was permitted to come into the vessel under the turret, through the XI inch port, and down the berth-deck hatch, which assisted to tip the bows of the vessel.

The amount of water which, owing to the immersion of the forward part of the vessel, came in under the plank sheer.

The absence of all effort to relieve the forward part of the vessel from its depressed position by rolling shot aft, or moving any weight from the bow.

The reader is doubtless satisfied that the sinking of the vessel was clearly preventable up to within a few minutes of the occurrence. Had an apprehension of danger existed at the time the cabin door was securely bolted, it should have been thrown wide open instead; the hawse-hole should then have been filled in around the chain with a gasket, and such weights taken aft as would have been practicable, to increase the ‘trim by the stern’ and the ‘water flow’ to the pumps as much as possible. The fore body of the vessel gradually filled with water, which could not flow aft to the pumps, and it rose to the berth-deck floor.

Five minutes before the vessel went down the signal was made ‘Assistance required.’ At this moment no assistance could be rendered, save to rescue the crew from drowning. The vessel heeled over to the right, or, as seamen would say, ‘to starboard;’ the bow settled, the water within rushed forward; for a minute, more or less, she lay