Inducements to naval enterprise.
The probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy whose interest it is to avoid a meeting in strikingly illustrated by facts in the naval history of
Europe.
Not only single vessels, but whole fleets, have often man aged to keep out of the way of a hostile squadron.
Take the following remarkable instances:
In 1744, apprehending a French invasion,
Sir John Norris was sent from
England with a large squadron to intercept the French fleet, which consisted of twenty ships and a land force of twenty-two thousand men. The
French succeeded in sailing the short distance to the
British coast without meeting any opposition, and was only prevented from landing the troops by a storm, which drove them back upon the coast of
France for shelter.
In 1755 an English fleet of several ships of the line and some frigates were sent to intercept a French fleet of twenty-five ships of the line and many smaller vessels, which had sailed from
Brest for
America.
The fleets passed each other in a thick fog. All but two of the French vessels reached
Quebec, and nine of them soon afterwards returned to
France.
In 1759 a British force, under
Commander Boy, blockaded a French fleet in the port of
Dunkirk.
The French commander, seizing a favorable opportunity, not only escaped from his enemy, but attacked the coast of
Scotland, and cruised about till the next year, without meeting a single British vessel, although sixty one British ships of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of
England and
France.
A still more remarkable case occurred in 1796, when the
French attempted to throw the army of
Hoche into
Ireland.
The most extraordinary efforts were made by the
British naval authorities to intercept the French fleet in its passage.
Three fleets were put on guard: one, the
Channel fleet, under Lord Bridport, consisting of thirty sail of the line, was stationed close on the
British shores; a second, under
Curtis, in the Downs; a third, under Colpays, watched the harbor of
Brest.
Yet the French fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty- five thousand men, actually passed unobserved these three lines of coast guard, though it occupied eight days in making the passage and three more in landing the troops.
And they not only passed, but returned, only one of their number being intercepted by the vast naval force of
England!
In 1791 a French squadron again passed a British fleet with perfect impunity.
The same thing occurred twice in 1798, when the immense British fleets failed to prevent the landing of
Gen. Humbert's army, and later in the year, when a French squadron of nine vessels and three thousand men escaped
Sir J. B. Warren's squadron and safely reached the coast of
Ireland.
The escape of the Toulon fleet, in 1798, from that vigilant and energetic commander, Lord Nelson, was still more remarkable.
There were in this fleet forty ships of war and an immense fleet of transports, making in all three hundred sail, and carrying forty thousand troops.
Its destination was
Malta, and it slipped out of port, followed by
Nelson, who tried two courses for
Alexandria, and missed the
French in both.
The sea was narrow; the vessels numerous, the fleets actually crossed each other on a certain night; yet
Nelson could see nothing of them himself, and heard nothing of them from merchant vessels.
In 1805 another
Toulon fleet escaped from
Nelson.
He sought for it in vain in the Mediterranean; then proceeded to the
West Indies; then back to
Europe, along the coast of
Portugal, in the
Bay of Biscay, and off the
English Channel.
But all in vain.
When they did meet at last at
Trafalgar it was because both fleets were willing to try the issue of a battle.
If great squadrons can thus elude the vigilance of an enemy, how much more easily single ships, built for speed, and designed to prey upon the commerce of its adversary.
We have seen how for years a few Confederate vessels have foiled the whole naval power of the
United States. --Whenever they have come in collision with a Yankee man-of-war they have whipped her, but the cases of collision have been only two in three years. Such facts should stimulate our people to put privateers afloat on every sea. There is no branch of warlike enterprise which offers such inducements.--The risks are small; the profits immense.--The ocean is a big pond, and full of big fish.
The angling is almost as safe as on a river bank, and the returns vastly more remunerative.
Let us hope that the Virginia Volunteer Navy will be soon afloat, and that every State of the
Confederacy will follow her example.
