The failure to capture Hardee.
When
General Sherman in his march across
Georgia had passed through
Milledgeville,
General Beauregard was hastily ordered from
Mississippi to
Charleston, there to assume command of the department then commanded by
General Hardee,
1 who had urgently asked for his presence.
When he arrived in
Charleston Sherman vas close to
Savannah, the end of his march to the sea. Here he lost an easy and brilliant opportunity to capture, with that city,
Hardee's entire command of about 10,000 men. In his “Memoirs” he writes (Vol.
II., p. 204) that
General Slocum wanted to transfer a whole corps to the
South Carolina bank of the
Savannah River, the object being to cut off
Hardee's retreat.
At that time
Hardee's only line of retreat was at Screven's Ferry to a causeway,
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over two miles in length, on the
South Carolina bank.
Without a pontoon-bridge or other means of getting away, he was relying only on three very small steamboats.
The only troops he had on the Carolina bank were a small force of light artillery and
Ferguson's brigade of
Wheeler's cavalry, numbering not more than 1000 men. At this time
Beauregard's Military division of the West did not embrace the department of
General Hardee, although he had authority and discretion there, in an emergency.
Therefore he had gone to
Charleston on December 7th, with a view of saving and concentrating the scattered Confederate forces in that region for some effective action against
Sherman.
He telegraphed
Hardee (December 8th), advising him to hold
Savannah as long as practicable, but under no circumstances to risk the garrison, and to be ready for withdrawal to a junction with
Major-General Samuel Jones at
Pocotaligo, South Carolina.
At
Hardee's urgent request
Beauregard went to
Savannah on the morning of the 9th.
Finding no means prepared for the contingency of evacuation he directed the immediate construction of a pontoon-bridge, with the plantation rice-flats (collected at my suggestion) for pontoons.
These, moored by old guns and car-wheels for anchors, were covered with flooring supplied by pulling down the wharves and wooden buildings.
After giving instructions as to the plan of operations,
Beauregard returned to
Charleston, Instructions were also given for the best feasible defense of the causeway and road from Screven's Ferry.
On the 14th
Hardee telegraphed to
Beauregard of the enemy's movements, his own doubts and his desire to have specific orders; and on the 15th he again telegraphed, urging
Beauregard to return and determine the actual time for the evacuation and junction with
Jones.
Beauregard (whom I accompanied) went to
Savannah on the night of the 16th, in my wagon, running the gauntlet of
Foster's batteries near
Pocotaligo so as to save the railroad from obstruction by an unlucky shot at his train, and traversing by like conveyance the distance along which the railroad had been broken by
Sherman near
Savannah, my wagon and pair of horses being transported between the breaks in freight-cars.
He found the pontoon-bridge only about one-third constructed, some of
Wheeler's cavalry having destroyed a number of rice-flats collected, supposing they had been gathered by
Sherman for the crossing of the river.
But the work was prosecuted with such vigor by the
chief engineer,
Colonel John G. Clarke, in person, that by daylight of the 19th
General Beauregard found it all but completed, stretching from the city to
Hutchinson's Island, over which a causeway was built; thence to
Pennyworth Island, where another causeway was laid; thence across the
Back River to a causeway that led over the swamps to the main-land of the Carolina bank.
Beauregard ordered the movement to be made that night, though accident delayed it until the night of the 20th, when by this route — the only exit from
Savannah —
Hardee was safely withdrawn, with field-artillery, baggage, and stores, and the bridge then destroyed.
This was one of the neatest achievements of the war, rivaling in decision, resource, and skill the evacuations of
Corinth and of
Morris Island by the same commander.
But meanwhile, cautiously leaving his 60,000 men concentrated on the
Georgia bank of the river,
General Sherman had gone in person around by the sea to
Hilton Head in order to procure the assistance of
Foster's army for the investment of
Savannah from the Carolina bank.
It is clear that, had
Slocum's suggestion been adopted, or had even the single brigade of his corps that had crossed the river above
Savannah been vigorously pushed against the thin line of Confederate pickets covering this causeway, all escape from
Savannah must have been cut off.
General Sherman saw his mistake too late, and, in his letter of December 24th, 1864, he excuses himself to
Halleck: “I feel somewhat disappointed at
Hardee's escape, but really am not to blame.
I moved as quickly as possible to close up the
Union cause-way, but intervening obstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road,
Hardee had slipped out.”
The real point is that, having an overwhelming force, his movement should have been a prompt and vigorous one to the rear of
Savannah, and not a voyage to
Hilton Head to borrow forces from
General Foster.
2 As to “intervening obstacles,” they consisted of some light artillery and a very thin line of cavalry of which, in his letters, he saw fit to write in the most disparaging terms.
In this case they seem to have sufficed to cover the retreat of about 10,000 men.
To estimate
General Sherman's error we must here consider that the
Confederate troops in
Savannah formed the only substantial force then interposed, and the bulk of the only force afterward interposed, between him and
Grant.
From a military point of view, therefore, this failure was of importance.
Beauregard had suggested to the
Government a bold and rapid concentration of a portion of
Lee's army with the forces that he was then assembling, in order to try a supreme and decisive blow against
Sherman, and, if successful, then to concentrate all forces upon
Grant.
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Advancing under difficulties. |
