Through the Wilderness.
by Alexander S. Webb, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A.
In 1861, 1862, and 1863, the Army of the Potomac, under
McClellan,
Hooker, and
Meade, had by constant attrition worn down
Lee's command until, in the minds of many officers and men who were actively engaged in the front, there was confidence that
Lee would not hold out against our army another year.
On April 9th, 1864,
General Grant instructed
General Meade that
Lee's army would be his objective.
Meade had with him, according to his report of April 30th, 95,952 enlisted men, 3486 officers, and 274 guns.
Hancock's corps contained 26,676 men;
Warren's, 24,125 men;
Sedgwick's, 22,584 men ;
1 while
Sheridan controlled 12,525 in the cavalry.
To guard all the trains there was a special detail of 1200 men.
General Grant had also attached the Ninth Corps (an independent command) to the army operating under his eye. The total force under
General Grant, including
Burnside, was 4409 officers and 114,360 enlisted men. For the artillery he had 9945 enlisted men and 285 officers; in the cavalry, 11,839 enlisted men and 585 officers; in the provost guards and engineers, 120 officers and 3274 enlisted men. His 118,000 men, properly disposed for battle, would have covered a front of 21 miles, two ranks deep, with one-third of them held in reserve; while
Lee, with his 62,000 men similarly disposed, would cover only 12 miles.
Grant had a train which he states in his “Memoirs” would have reached from the
Rapidan to
Richmond, or sixty-five miles.
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Of
Lee's army,
Longstreet's corps (two divisions) numbered about 10,000;
Ewell's corps about 17,000.
A. P. Hill went into the
Wilderness with about 22,000 men for duty in the ranks; “
Jeb”
Stuart's cavalry numbered about 8000, and the artillery about 4800.
Lee's total strength, as estimated by
General Humphreys, was 61,953 men, and the number of field-guns 224.
General Grant's aggregate over
Lee was therefore 94 guns and 56,819 enlisted men; but then
Lee had, at the outset, his position in the
Wilderness, and
Grant did not know at that time, as did
General Meade and
General Hooker, to what advantage
Lee could turn the
Wilderness, with its woods, ravines, plank roads, and dirt roads.
The Army of the Potomac began to cross the
Rapidan at midnight of May 3d, after due preparation on the part of
Sheridan's cavalry to cover our front.
A canvas and a wooden pontoon bridge were laid at Germanna Ford, similar bridges at Ely's Ford, and a wooden bridge at
Culpeper  |
|
Relative positions of forces, morning and evening, May 4, 1864. |
Mine Ford.
These three fords cover about seven miles of the
Rapidan River,which in general flows south-east.
Hancock, preceded by
Gregg's cavalry, crossed at Ely's Ford and moved to
Chancellorsville, which placed him on the left, or south-east, side of the
Wilderness battle-field.
Warren, with
Wilson's cavalry in front (and followed by
Sedgwick), crossed at Germanna Ford and followed the Germanna Plank road, due south-east, to Wilderness Tavern.
Sedgwick encamped for the night three miles south of the ford.
The sixty-five miles of trains were until 2 P. M. of May 5th in passing over Culpeper Mine Ford and Germanna Ford.
General Humphreys, who was
Meade's chief-of-staff at the time, states that the halt of the infantry on the 4th at
Chancellorsville and the
Wilderness was caused by the difficulty in moving the trains across the
Rapidan.
General Law, who commanded a brigade under
Longstreet, states that on the 2d of May
General Lee, in the presence of a number of his officers,
[
154]
expressed the opinion that the
Union army would cross the river at Germanna or Ely's Ford.
[See p. 118.]
General Lee's headquarters were at
Orange Court House;
Longstreet, with his corps, was distant at
Gordonsville;
Ewell was near at hand on the
Rapidan, above
Mine Run; and
A. P. Hill was on his left, higher up the stream; and it seems that
Lee intended to move with his whole force against
Grant's right flank as soon as
Grant was far enough advanced into the
Wilderness on the road to
Richmond.
As for the
Wilderness, it was uneven, with woods, thickets, and ravines right and left.
Tangled thickets of pine, scrub-oak, and cedar prevented our seeing the enemy, and prevented any one in command of a large force from determining accurately the position of the troops he was ordering to and fro. The appalling rattle of the musketry, the yells of the enemy, and the cheers of our
own men were constantly in our ears.
At times, our lines while firing could not see the array of the enemy, not fifty yards distant. After the battle was fairly begun, both sides were protected by log or earth breastworks.
For an understanding of the roads which shaped the movements in the
Wilderness, cross the
Rapidan from the north and imagine yourself standing on the Germanna Plank road, where the
Brock road intersects it, a little south of Wilderness Tavern, and facing due west.
In general, the
Union right wing (
Sedgwick) held the Germanna road, and the left wing (
Hancock) the
Brock road, while the center (
Warren) stretched across the obtuse angle formed by them.
At the
Lacy house, in this angle,
Grant,
Meade, and
Warren established their headquarters during the day of the 5th.
If, standing at the intersection of these roads, you stretch forward your arms, the right will correspond with the
Orange turnpike, the left with the Orange Plank road.
Down the
Orange turnpike, on May 5th,
Lee sent
Ewell against
Warren, while two divisions of
A. P. Hill advanced by the Orange Plank road to check
Hancock.
Nearly a day later,
Longstreet reached the field on the same road as
Hill.
The engagements fought on May 5th by
Ewell on the
Orange turnpike, and by
A. P. Hill on the Orange Plank road, must be regarded as entirely distinct battles.
Warren received orders from
Meade at 7:15 in the morning to attack
Ewell with his whole force.
General Sedgwick, with
Wright's division and
Neill's brigade of
Getty's division, was ordered to move out, west of the Germanna Plank road, connecting with the Fifth Corps, which was disposed across the turnpike in advance of Wilderness Tavern.
At this time also,
General Hancock, at
Chancellorsville, was warned by
General Meade that the enemy had been met on the turnpike, and he was directed to halt at
Todd's tavern until further orders.
Meantime,
Crawford's division of
Warren's corps, between the turnpike and plank road, in advancing, found
Wilson's cavalry skirmishing with what he supposed to be the enemy's cavalry.
At 8 A. M., under
[
155]
 |
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Relative positions in the Wilderness, May 5: for the most part the troops are indicated by divisions, and when a name designates a brigade it is inclosed in parentheses.--editors. |
orders,
Crawford halted, and, hearing that our cavalry, at
Parker's store, almost directly south of him, was in need of support, he sent out skirmishers to assist them.
Those skirmishers struck
Hill's corps, moving down the Orange Plank road toward the
Brock road.
Thus at 8 A. M.
General Grant and
General Meade had developed the presence of
Hill on their left and
Ewell on their right.
Getty's division of
Sedgwick had reached Wilderness Tavern; and when it was learned that
Hill was coming down the Orange Plank road,
Getty was directed to move out toward him, by way of the
Brock road, and drive
Hill back, if possible, behind
Parker's store.
On our right
Johnson's division of
Ewell was driven back along the
Orange turnpike in confusion by
General Griffin of
Warren's corps.
Ricketts and
Wright of
Sedgwick were delayed in reaching their position on the right of
Warren, and for lack of such support
Griffin's right brigade under
Ayres was forced back and two guns were abandoned.
Wadsworth, with his division of
Warren's corps, supplemented by
Dennison's brigade of
Robinson's division, of the same corps, had started forward in a westerly direction, until he found himself with his left toward the enemy.
McCandless's brigade of
Crawford's
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 |
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Throwing up breastworks in the Wilderness.
From a sketch made at the time. |
division (also of
Warren's corps) had endeavored to obtain a position on the left of
Wadsworth, but lost its bearings in the entangled woods so that its left came in contact with
Ewell's right, and it, as well as
Wadsworth's left, was driven in by Daniel's and
Gordon's brigades, forming the right of
Ewell.
Thus
Crawford was left with his left flank in the air, and he of necessity was drawn in about 2 o'clock and posted about a mile south-west from the
Lacy house, facing toward his first position at Chewning's house.
Wadsworth finally took position on the left of
Crawford, facing toward the south and west, with his back toward the
Lacy house.
Griffin, on
Crawford's right, reached to the
Orange turnpike.
Wright's division of
Sedgwick formed on the right of
Griffin, with the left of
Upton's brigade resting on the pike; then came the brigades of
Penrose and
Russell, then
Neill's brigade of
Getty's division.
Soon after getting into position
Neill and
Russell were attacked by
Johnson, who was repulsed.
Still farther to the right, toward the Germanna Plank road,
Seymour, of
Ricketts's division, came up and took position.
The entire Union front line was now intrenched.
At this time on the center and right
Warren and
Sedgwick were securely blocked by
Ewell's single corps.
On the left of the line the situation was this: At 11 A. M.
Hancock, whose advance had passed
Todd's tavern, received a dispatch stating that the enemy was coming down the Orange Plank road in full force, and he was directed to move his corps up to the
Brock road, due north.
He was further informed that
Getty had been sent to drive the enemy back, and must be supported immediately; that on the turnpike
Griffin had been pushed back somewhat, and that he (
Hancock) must push out on the
Plank road and connect his right with
Warren's left.
[
157]
Hancock promptly started his column, and met
General Getty at the junction of the
Plank and Germanna roads.
Getty's division was then in line of battle, along the
Brock road, with
Grant's brigade on the left of the
Plank road, and
Wheaton's and
Eustis's brigades on the right of the road which the troops were intrenching.
This was at 2 P. M. of the 5th.
Getty informed
Hancock that there were two divisions of
A. P. Hill out in his front, and
Hancock directed the finishing of the works that had been begun, before any advance should be made.
Hancock placed
Birney's division on the left of
Getty, in two lines of battle along the
Brock road, and
Mott's and
Gibbon's divisions on
Birney's left;
Barlow's division held the extreme left and formed an angle on the
Brock road overlooking the bed of an unfinished railroad.
Most of the artillery of
Hancock's corps was posted with
Barlow's division.
2 Frank's brigade of
Barlow's division was stationed partly across the
Brock road, near the junction of the
Brock road and a cross-road leading to the
Catharpin road.
All of
Hancock's corps were directed to throw up breastworks of logs and earth, the intrenched line beginning at
Getty's left and extending to
Barlow's left, where it was refused to cover the flank.
The second line, of the Second Corps, also threw up earth-works, and a third intrenched line was formed behind
Birney and
Mott nearest the
Plank road.
At 4:30 P. M.
Getty started to the attack, and marched but four hundred yards when he struck
Heth's division of
Hill's corps, and found the enemy in force, his right having been reinforced by
Wilcox's division.
Hancock threw forward
Birney and
Mott on the left of
Getty, and put a section of
Ricketts's old battery on the
Plank road.
General Hancock says in his report: “The fight here became very fierce at once, the lines of battle were exceedingly close, the musketry continuous and deadly along the entire line.”
3 Carroll's and
Owen's brigades of
Gibbon's division were sent in to support
Getty, upon the
Plank road.
Colonel Carroll, an excellent fighting man, was wounded, but remained on the field.
More to the left,
Brooke and
Smyth, of
Barlow's division, attacked the right of
Hill, and forced it back.
About 4 o'clock, also,
Wadsworth, who had been sent from his position near the
Lacy house to strike across the country toward the
Plank road, halted for the night in line of battle, facing nearly south between Tapp's house and the
Brock road.
4 This ended the operations of May 5th, leaving the Army of the Potomac in close contact with
Ewell and
Hill.
[
158]
During the night of the 5th orders were given for a general attack by
Sedgwick,
Warren, and
Hancock at 5 o'clock the next morning.
Burnside, who, with his corps, had been holding the line of the Orange and Alexandria railroad back to
Bull Run, set his corps in motion the afternoon of the 4th and made a forced march to the field.
The leading division, under
Stevenson, moving from
Brandy Station, crossed at Germanna Ford the night of the 5th, was held in reserve at Wilderness Tavern, and joined
Hancock on the
Brock road at 8 A. M. of the 6th.
Potter and
Willcox, coining from Bealton and Rappahannock Station, reached the field about daylight, and were ordered to fill the gap between
Warren and
Hancock and join in the general attack.
5 Ferrero's colored division, after a forced march of forty miles, was held in the rear to guard the trains.
Longstreet's arrival on the field was known and reported by
General Hancock to
General Meade at 7 A. M. on the 6th; indeed, it was found that
Longstreet was present when, at 5 o'clock, my brigade (of
Gibbon's division) was ordered to relieve
General Getty.
When I advanced I immediately became engaged with
Field's division, consisting of
Gregg's,
Benning's,
Law's, and
Jenkins's brigades, on the north side of the Orange Plank road.
Just before 5 o'clock the right of the line under
Sedgwick was attacked by the
Confederates, and gradually the firing extended along the whole front.
Wadsworth's division fought its way across
Hancock's front to the
Plank road, and advanced along that road.
Hancock pushed forward
Birney with his own and
Mott's divisions,
Gibbon's division supporting, on the left of the
Plank road, and soon drove his opponents from their rifle-pits, and for the time being appeared to have won a victory.
His left, however, under
Barlow, had not advanced.
From information derived from prisoners and from the cavalry operating in the vicinity of
Todd's tavern, it was believed at this time that
Longstreet was working around the left to attack the line along the
Brock road.
Instead of attacking there,
Longstreet moved to the support of
Hill, and just as the
Confederates gave way before
Birney's assault,
Longstreet's leading division, under
General C. W. Field, reached
Birney's battle-ground and engaged my line.
Thus at 8 o'clock
Hancock was battling against both
Hill and
Longstreet.
General Gibbon had command on the left.
Hancock himself was looking out for the
Plank road.
Warren's Fifth Corps, in front of
Ewell, had obeyed the orders of
General Grant, in making frequent and persistent attacks throughout the morning, without success.
The same may be said of
Wright, of
Sedgwick's Sixth Corps, who was attacking
Ewell's left; but
Ewell was too strongly intrenched to be driven back from his line by the combined Fifth and Sixth corps.
General Burnside, with the divisions of
Willcox and
Potter, attempted to relieve
Hancock by passing up between the turnpike and the
Plank road to
[
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 |
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Relative positions in the Wilderness, May 6.
For the most part the troops are indicated by divisions, and when a name indicates a brigade it is inclosed in parentheses.
It should be noted that Griffin's line, before connecting with Wright, extended a short distance parallel with the Orange turnpike.
Wadsworth, early in the morning, advanced south from near the Lacy house to the Orange Plank road, and formed across that road as indicated.
Leasure's brigade, of Stevenson's division, coming into the line in Gibbon's first position, advanced north across Hancock's front to the Plank road.
On the morning of the second day Webb, of Gibbon, fought on, and north of, the Plank road, while his other two brigades, Owen and Carroll, were supporting Getty on, and north of, the Plank road.
Gibbon had general charge of Hancock's left, and Birney of Hancock's right.--editors. |
Chewning's farm, connecting his right with
Warren and joining the right of
Hancock, now held by my brigade.
6 Burnside's other division, under
Stevenson, moved up the
Plank road in our support, and I placed four of his regiments, taken from the head of his column, on my right, then pressed to the rear and changed my whole line, which had been driven back to the
Plank road, forward to its original line, holding
Field's division in check with the twelve regiments now under my command.
Now, at this very moment,
General Wadsworth (who had assumed command over me because he stated that
Stevenson ranked me, and he must take us both in his command) had given to me the most astonishing and bewildering order,--which was to leave
[
160]
the twelve regiments under my command at his (
Wadsworth's) disposal, and to go to the left, find four regiments, and stop the retreat of those troops of the left of our line who were flying to the
Brock road.
7 When I rode off to obey this unfortunate order,
General Wadsworth, in order to stop the enemy's attack upon
Birney upon his left, went to the 20th Massachusetts of my brigade and ordered that regiment to leave its log-works and charge the enemy's line, a strong breastwork on the west side of a ravine on
Wadsworth's front.
General Wadsworth was told that the regiment could not safely be moved, that I had changed my front on that regiment and held the line by
means of it.
Wadsworth answered that the men were afraid, leaped his horse over the logs and led them in the charge himself.
He was mortally wounded,
8 and my line was broken by
Field, and swept
[
161]
off as by a whirlwind.
Birney's line, as a consequence, was broken to pieces, and back to the
Brock road went the troops.
This attack was directed by
Lee in person.
[See also p. 124.] When I came back from endeavoring to carry out the order that
Wadsworth had given me, I found the 19th Maine, under
Colonel Selden Connor, on the
Plank road.
Another regiment also staid with me to hold the
Plank road and to deceive the
Confederates, by fighting as though they had a continuous line.
Colonel Connor was shot in the leg after a long skirmish; I offered him my horse, but his wounds being such as to render him unable to mount, he had to be carried to the log-works.
His regiment staid there until I gave the order to break like partridges through the woods for the
Brock road.
Burnside had finally become engaged far out on our right front;
Potter's division came upon the enemy intrenched on the west side of a little ravine extending from
Ewell's right.
General Burnside says that after considerable fighting he connected his left with
Hancock's right and intrenched.
Hancock was out of ammunition, and had to replenish the best way he could from the rear.
At 3:45 P. M. the enemy advanced in force against him to within a hundred yards of his log-works on the left of the
Plank road.
The attack was of course the heaviest here.
Anderson's division came forward and took possession of our line of intrenchments, but
Carroll's brigade was at hand and drove them out at a double-quick.
Now let us return to our right, and stand where
General Meade and
General Grant were, at the
Lacy house.
The battle was finished over on the left so far as
Hancock and
Burnside were concerned.
Grant had been thoroughly
 |
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Distributing ammunition under fire to Warren's Fifth Corps, May 6.
from a sketch made at the time. |
[
162]
 |
|
The burning woods, May 6-rescuing the wounded.
From a sketch made at the time. |
defeated in his attempt to walk past
General Lee on the way to
Richmond.
Shaler's brigade of
Wright's division of
Sedgwick's corps had been guarding the wagon-trains, but was now needed for the fight and had returned to the Sixth Corps lines.
It was placed on the extreme right on the Germanna Plank road, due north from where
General Grant was standing.
Shaler's brigade was close up to the enemy, as indeed was our whole line.
Shaler was busy building breastworks, when it was struck in the flank, rolled up in confusion, and
General Seymour and
General Shaler and some hundreds of his men were taken prisoners.
But the brigade was not destroyed.
A part of it stood, and, darkness helping them, the assailants were prevented from destroying
Wright's division.
Wright kept his men in order.
[See p. 127.]
This is in fact the end of the
battle of the Wilderness, so far as relates to the infantry.
Our cavalry was drawn in from
Todd's tavern and the
Brock road.
The enemy's cavalry followed them.
They were all intrenched, and
General Grant decided that night that he would continue the movement to the left, as it was impossible to attack a position held by the enemy in such force in a tangled forest.
To add to the horrors of war, we had the woods on fire all around us, and
Humphreys estimates that about two hundred of our men were burned to death.
The best possible proof that this was an accidental battle can be found in the movements of the troops.
There was no intention to attack
Lee in the
Wilderness.
[
163]
The 6th of May was the last day of the
battle of the Wilderness.
Ewell had most effectually stopped the forward movement of the right wing of
Meade's army, and
Hill and
Longstreet defeated our left under
Hancock.
The fact is that the whole of the left was disorganized.
From
Hancock down through
Birney and
Gibbon, each general commanded something not strictly in his command.
Hancock had “the left,”
Gibbon “the left” of
Hancock;
Birney had his own and
Mott's divisions, and
Wadsworth had
Webb and
Stevenson.
The troops of these division commanders were without proper leaders.
We had seen the mixed Second and Ninth corps driven in, in detail, on our left.
We knew that the Fifth and Sixth corps were blocked, and we felt deeply the mortification consequent upon our being driven back to the
Brock road.
From personal contact with the regiments who did the hardest fighting, I declare that the individual men had no longer that confidence in their commanders which had been their best and strongest trait during the past year.
We are told by
General Badeau in his history that at the very time our men were being tossed about on the
Plank road “
General Grant lay under the trees awaiting
Burnside's advance, and revolving the idea of a movement still farther to the
Union left, thrusting his whole force between
Lee and
Richmond.”
We did move toward
Spotsylvania.
Warren's Fifth Corps was directed to withdraw from the
Wilderness after dark on the 7th of May, and to move by the left behind
Hancock on the
Brock road, with
Sedgwick (the Sixth Corps) following him, and to proceed toward the court house.
[See map,
 |
|
View from near the Wilderness Tavern, looking toward the battle-field--2 P. M., May 7.
from a sketch made at the time. |
[
164]
 |
|
Out of the Wilderness, Sunday morning, May 8-the March to Spotsylvania.
From a sketch made at the time. |
p. 167.] This was attempted, but
Warren found that he was required with his corps to help
Sheridan's cavalry, which was detained by
J. E. B. Stuart at
Todd's tavern, or near that point.
Warren gave the required assistance, driving out of his way
Stuart, who was assisted by infantry.
At 8:30 P. M.
Warren moved by the
Brock road to the left of the Second Corps, and
Sedgwick moved by the pike and Germanna Plank road to
Chancellorsville, thence by the Piney Branch Church road to the intersection of that road with the
Brock road.
At this point
Sedgwick was ordered to leave a division, with another at Piney Branch Church, and a third midway between these two.
Burnside started to follow
Sedgwick, but early on the morning of the 8th he was ordered to halt at
Aldrich's, where the Piney Church road leaves the main Fredericksburg Plank road, to guard the trains.
Ferrero's division of this corps was now detached for this service.
Warren was delayed by the blocking of the
Brock road by the mounted troops of the provost guard, and this delay gave
Longstreet's men, under
R. H. Anderson, the opportunity to reach
Spotsylvania in advance of
Warren.
When
Warren reached
Todd's tavern at 3 A. M., he found
Merritt's cavalry engaging the
Confederates.
Hancock had waited for the whole army to pass, and reached the tavern at 9 o'clock on the 8th.
9 At 11 A. M.,says
General Humphreys, “
Hancock sent his leading brigade under
Miles to make a reconnoissance down the
Catharpin road toward Corbin's Bridge, about two miles distant.”
Miles had his own brigade, one battery, and one brigade
[
165]
of
Gregg's cavalry.
He found
Hampton's cavalry, and held them at bay until 5:30 P. M. While returning, Miles was attacked by
Mahone's infantry, and was compelled to call up reenforcements.
At 1:30 P. M.
Hancock sent
Gibbon east ten miles to support
Warren and
Sedgwick.
About 8 A. M. on the 8th
Warren's leading division, under
General John C. Robinson, deployed into the clearing north of Spotsylvania Court House, and was fired upon by Confederates upon Spotsylvania Ridge.
General Robinson was severely wounded in the first fire.
Griffin's division advanced on the right of
Robinson's; but the line, being unable to sustain itself, soon fell back until it was succored by the divisions of
Crawford and
Wadsworth, which now reached the front.
A line was taken up east of the
Brock road, near
Alsop's.
Sedgwick came up about noon, and the Fifth Corps, supported by
Sedgwick, were at 1 P. M. directed to storm the
Confederate position on Spotsylvania Ridge.
Sedgwick moved south to join
Warren's left; but it was late in the day when
Crawford's division of the Fifth and one of
Wright's brigades under
Penrose assaulted what proved to be
Rodes's division of
Ewell's corps in position and intrenched.
On the morning of the 9th
Burnside's corps moved across from the
Plank road to the
Fredericksburg road at the crossing of the
Ny River.
This brought him east of the court house one and a half miles. He pushed over the river one division under
O. B. Willcox.
Stevenson's division came up at noon.
Potter's division remained a mile in rear on the
Fredericksburg road.
Willcox fought a brigade of
R. H. Anderson and some dismounted cavalry.
Hancock moved east to the right of
Warren, and intrenched overlooking the
Po. On the morning of the 9th
Sheridan started on a raid around
Lee's army.
10
In front of
Hancock the
Po River ran from west to east, then it turned due south opposite
Warren's right.
The Confederate left rested for a time on this south bend, and the bridge over it at the crossing of the Shady Grove Church road was fortified by
Longstreet.
While the several corps were adjusting their lines on the 9th,
General Sedgwick, our most esteemed general, was killed by a sharp-shooter, and
Horatio G. Wright took command of the Sixth Corps.
General Burnside had reported to
General Grant on the 9th that he had met the enemy on the east of Spotsylvania Court House, and he had added to his report that he judged, from the indications in his front, that
Lee was about to move north toward
Fredericksburg.
It was therefore determined that
Hancock should make a reconnoissance toward
Lee's left, crossing the east and west bend of the
Po River, moving south as far as the
Shady Grove road, turning the enemy's left; then to move east, and cross the
Po River again by the
Block House road bridge.
Hancock crossed three of his divisions (
Mott was with
Wright) at different points at 6 o'clock in the morning, forcing the crossing, and meeting a very stubborn resistance in front of
Barlow, who was on his left, and but little in front of
Gibbon, who was on his right.
He now laid three pontoon-bridges over the river, it being fifty feet wide and not fordable, and then pushed due south toward the
Block House bridge, but reached that point too late that night to attempt a crossing.
[
166]
During this night orders were issued from
Meade for the operations of the next day:
Hancock was to endeavor to find the position of the enemy's left, to force him from the position of his (
Hancock's) front.
The Sixth Corps was ordered to feel the intrenchments near the center.
Mott's division of
Hancock's corps, still kept north of the
Po River with
Wright, and on the left of the Sixth Corps, was to prepare to join
Burnside, who with his corps (the Ninth) was to attack
Early from the east on the morning of the 10th.
But at dawn on the 10th an examination of the
Block House bridge, made by
Hancock, showed that the enemy was strongly intrenched on the east side of the
Po at that point.
However,
Brooke's brigade of
Barlow's division was sent down the
Po River to a point half a mile below the bridge.
Brooke discovered the enemy in strong force holding intrenchments extending nearly half a mile below the bridge, their left resting on the
Po River.
But other arrangements had been made for the movement of the army, and
Meade now ordered
Hancock back.
Meade was directed to arrange for the assault at 5 o'clock, under
General Hancock's command, in the afternoon on the front of
Warren and
Wright.
Birney, while withdrawing, was attacked;
Hancock, who had started ahead with
Gibbon to prepare for the attack, recrossed to the south bank of the
Po and joined
Barlow.
Barlow was half a mile south of his bridges.
His left, composed of
Miles's and
Smyth's brigades, was along the
Shady Grove road, facing south, their left rested at the bridge.
Brooke's and
Brown's brigades were in front, or south of the
Shady Grove road.
North-east, and to their rear one and a half miles,
Field's guns were planted in intrenchments, sweeping the ground behind them and covering the pontoon-bridge over the
Po. Hancock drew back
Brooke and
Brown to the right and to the rear; and then Miles and
Smyth retired to the crest south of the pontoon-bridges.
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Relative positions of the opposing Corps at Spotsylvania, May 8-21, 1864. |
These troops formed a
tete-du-pont facing south.
Heth's division, of
Hill's corps, attacked the two right brigades with vigor, but was twice repulsed.
The Union loss was very heavy.
Hancock, finding the enemy repulsed and the woods on fire in the rear of his line, crossed to the north side of the
Po River. One gun, the first ever lost by the Second Corps, was jammed between two trees in the midst of this fire, and was abandoned by
Birney's men. Many of our wounded perished in the flames.
Of this battle on our right,
General Hancock said, “The enemy regarded this as a considerable victory.
Had not
Barlow's division received imperative orders to withdraw,
Heth's division would have had no cause for congratulation.”
Meanwhile,
Warren had determined to make the attack, and at 3:45 he did so, directing it personally and leading in full uniform.
11
The assaulting column was composed of
Crawford's division,
Cutler's division (formerly Wadsworths), and
Webb's and
Carroll's brigades of the Second Corps.
The official diary of
Longstreet's corps says that “6 some of the enemy succeeded in gaining the works, but were killed in them.”
We were driven back, however, with heavy loss, including
Brigadier-General James C. Rice, of
Cutler's division, killed.
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General Hancock returned to us at half-past 5, and we were ordered to make another attack at 7 P. M. with
Birney's and
Gibbon's divisions and part
of the Fifth Corps.
We made the assault, but we were driven back a second time.
Our men were demoralized by fruitless work.
Over on our left, in the Sixth Corps,
General Wright had found what he deemed to be a vulnerable place in the
Confederate line.
It was on the right of
Rodes's rebel division and on the west face of the salient.
Colonel Emory Upton was selected to lead this attack.
Upton's brigade was of the First Division, Sixth Corps.
He had four regiments of
Neill's brigade attached to his command; and
General Mott, commanding a division of the Second Corps, had been ordered by
General Wright to assault the works in his front at 5 o'clock to assist and support
Upton's left.
Upton formed in four lines.
The Sixth Corps batteries played upon the left of the enemy's salient, enfilading it, and, as they ceased firing,
Upton charged.
Rushing to the parapet with a wild “Hurrah,” heedless of the
terrible front and flank fire he received, his men poured over the enemy's works; captured many prisoners, after a hand-to-hand fight; and, pressing forward, took the second line of rebel intrenchments with its battery.
Mott, who was on
Upton's left, did not support him. The enemy being reenforced,
Upton was ordered to retire, but he carried back with him several stand of colors and 1200 prisoners.
12 On the left
Burnside made an attack in conjunction with those on the right.
He pushed close to the enemy, on the
Fredericksburg road, and intrenched.
General T. G. Stevenson, commanding one of his divisions, was killed in making this assault.
On the 10th of May the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps lost 4100 men killed and wounded.
Not many were missing.
The Confederates lost probably two
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thousand men. On the 11th
13 dispositions were made for the grand assault the next day on the “Bloody angle.”
Of that assault I have little to write.
Grant had his back to the north, and enwrapped the V-shaped salient occupied by
Lee. During the night three divisions of the Second Corps were to move to the left behind the Sixth and Fifth, and join the Ninth Corps in an assault at 4 A. M. on the 12th.
Warren and
Wright were to hold their corps in readiness to take part.
We moved to the attack at 4:35 A. M. on the 12th, and captured
Johnson and four thousand men from
Ewell; also twenty pieces of artillery.
At this time I was shot in the head and went to the rear.
Another will tell of the incidents of our bloody but fruitless assault.
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Struggling for the works at the “bloody angle.”
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