by Martin T. McMAHON, Brevet Major.-General, U. S. V.
The chief events of this chapter in the history of the Army of the Potomac were the pursuit of
Lee to
Virginia, the affair of the
Vermont brigade at
Beaver Creek, in Maryland, the cavalry engagements at
Hagerstown and
Williamsport, the action at Bristoe Station, the taking of the
Rappahannock redoubts, the movement to
Mine Run, and the Kilpatrick-
Dahlgren raid to
Richmond.
After the
battle of Gettysburg two corps of the army, the First and the Sixth, under
Major-General John Sedgwick, pressed
Lee's retreating forces to the pass at
Fairfield.
[See maps, Vol.
III., pp. 381 and 382.] A strong rearguard held the pursuit in check, compelling frequent formations of the leading brigades in line of battle.
Every house and barn along our route of march was filled with wounded Confederates.
Lee passed through the mountains in the night of July 5th. One brigade,
General T. H. Neill's, was detailed by
General Sedgwick to follow and observe the enemy's movements, and the rest of the corps rejoined the main body of the army in the neighborhood of
Emmitsburg, crossed the
Catoctin range at
Hamburg, and came upon the enemy at
Beaver Creek July 10th, 1863.
At this point it seemed that
Lee intended to make a decided stand.
His position was a strong one, and apparently was held by a sufficient number of troops.
The Vermont brigade, under
Colonel L. A. Grant, was ordered to the front as skirmishers and deployed in a piece of woods covering a front of about half a mile.
The rest of the command was massed in readiness, and a general engagement was confidently expected.
The enemy advanced in line of battle upon the woods
[
82]
where the Vermonters with one battery, somewhat in the rear of their skirmish-line, were posted.
In general, a skirmish-line, upon being confronted by the advance of a line of battle, is expected to retire.
The
Vermonters, however, did not so understand it, and, each one holding his position, they delivered such a steady and telling fire that the enemy's line was twice repulsed.
The history of war furnishes few instances such as this, yet the Vermonters did not seem to think that they had accomplished any-thing out of the usual line of duty.
The enemy, moving from
Beaver Creek, took position on the 12th in the neighborhood of
Funkstown and fortified heavily.
His line ran in general to the right from
Funkstown, forming the arc of a circle, the right resting near the field of
Antietam.
The country was familiar to many of us, who had served in the
South Mountain and
Antietam campaign.
A council of war was called that night at
General Meade's headquarters, and the question was discussed whether an attack should be ventured on the following morning upon
Lee's intrenched position.
Our right covered
Hagerstown without occupying the city.
Our general line extended to the left, following the direction of the enemy's position.
General Sedgwick proposed at the council to take the Sixth and Eleventh corps from our right and, moving by night through and beyond
Hagerstown, to occupy by daylight a position upon the enemy's flank and rear, and by a determined attack cut him off from the
Potomac while the rest of the army moved directly on his front.
This proposition, it appears, was negatived in the council.
[See Vol.
III., p. 382.] The next day was passed in observation and in preparations for an attack.
In the night-time (July 13th)
Lee's army withdrew, and, falling rapidly back, crossed the
Potomac in safety.
Longstreet's corps moved up the valley, crossed the
Blue Ridge by way of
Chester Gap, and proceeded to Culpeper Court House,
[
83]
where it arrived on the 24th.
Hill's corps followed closely by the same route.
Ewell, delayed by a fruitless pursuit of
General Kelley's force west of
Martinsburg, found the
Gap obstructed by
Meade, crossed the mountains farther up at Thornton's Gap, and joined the other corps in the vicinity of
Culpeper.
Kilpatrick's cavalry, which had been sent by way of the
Monterey pass, destroyed some of the enemy's trains but had accomplished little in the way of interrupting the passage of the river.
The pontoons were again brought into use, and once more the Army of the Potomac entered upon “the sacred soil.”
The men were in excellent spirits and condition, and as they marched over the bridges of boats at
Harper's Ferry and
Berlin the men broke out into the refrain, “Carry me back to old Virginny.”
Meade advanced to
Warrenton and the
Rappahannock, where he took position confronting
Lee. Before the season for operations had finally closed,
Meade had pushed his advance to and beyond the
Rapidan, the enemy giving up Culpeper Court House, which
Meade occupied as headquarters September 13th.
1
On the 7th of October the enemy's signal-flags, which were read by our signal-officers on
Pony Mountain as ours no doubt were read by the enemy, communicated intelligence which indicated that
General Lee was making a formidable movement.
This proved to be a movement to his left — with the evident purpose of turning our right flank.
For reasons never fully explained nor understood, the whole Army of the Potomac, which had marched all the way from
Gettysburg for the purpose of engaging
Lee, was ordered to retreat.
It fell back in good order, certainly, but without apparent occasion.
After passing the
Rappahannock,
General Meade ordered a halt and directed
[
84]
General Sedgwick to recross in the direction of
Brandy Station and give battle.
The movement was executed; but
General Lee was not found in the position indicated, being actually engaged in crossing the
Rappahannock some miles above, at the
Sulphur Springs.
General Sedgwick desired and proposed to move in that direction and attack him while crossing.
General Meade did not approve of the suggestion and the retreat continued.
On the 14th
Warren was attacked at Bristoe Station and won a brilliant victory.
2 The situation at that time was singularly precarious.
All the trans-portation of the army was massed in fields off the road, and a breaking of our line at any point would have inflicted incalculable damage.
A panic among teamsters is a thing greatly to be dreaded in an army.
When we reached the vicinity of
Centreville the army was halted and took position to await attack.
Lee had followed closely, destroying the rail-road as he advanced.
After a brief reconnoissance he started in his turn to retreat to the
Rapidan.
Meade pursued, pressing him closely and rebuilding
[
85]
the railroad as rapidly as he marched.
At
Gainesville, or Buckland Mills, on October 19th, there was an affair with the cavalry advance in which both
Custer and
Kilpatrick distinguished themselves, each in his own way.
Custer with one brigade became engaged with part of
Fitzhugh Lee's command, which retired before him after crossing the stream at
Gainesville.
The rest of
Lee's command had been drawn off to the left for the purpose of attacking in the rear in case
Kilpatrick afforded the opportunity, which he promptly did. With his second brigade he moved forward in support of
Custer, who needed no support, however, and the enemy's cavalry came in upon
Kilpatrick's rear and scattered him.
Kilpatrick believed and reported that he had been routed by infantry.
General Custer and the evidence were to the contrary, however; those who came in upon the rear were dismounted cavalry.
Some sensation was created throughout the army by this repulse of the cavalry and by the reports of
General Kilpatrick, and an order was issued by
General Meade, evidently in anticipation of a general engagement the next day. One division of infantry sent over the stream at nightfall, however, developed the fact that all of
Lee's army except
Stuart's cavalry had already recrossed the
Rappahannock.
The next day
Warrenton was occupied and the Army of the Potomac halted for some time in the vicinity of the river.
On the 7th day of November there was a general movement.
The Fifth and Sixth corps under
Sedgwick were directed to the redoubts of the Rappa-hannock near the site of the old railroad bridge, which had been destroyed.
The rest of the army, under
General French, was to force the passage at
Kelly's Ford, some distance below.
Sedgwick's orders were to “push the enemy across the river before dark, if possible.”
The redoubts of the
Rappahannock
[
86]
 |
|
Warrenton junction, Virginia, October, 1863.
The smoke shown in the picture was caused by burning buildings and piles of railway ties fired by the Confederates when they abandoned this region.
[See p. 84.] The troops on the left are Birney's division, Third Union Corps. |
hannock were two formidable works, both on the left of the railroad, and connected by a curtain or chain of rifle-pits; a further line of rifle-pits ran left from the left redoubt some distance along the river.
Two brigades of
General Early's corps held the works.
The Sixth Corps went into position about midday to our right of the railroad and opened fire from its batteries.
The Fifth Corps occupied the river-front below the line of the railroad.
The batteries made but little impression.
Daylight was fast disappearing.
General Sedgwick asked the writer for the order of the day; he read it through and, riding slowly forward, joined
General Wright, commanding the Sixth Corps. “
Wright,” he said, what do you think are the changes of an assault with infantry on that position?
“
General Wright replied, somewhat inconsequently,” Just as you say, General.
“” What does
Russell think about it?
“asked
Sedgwick.
Russell's division was in line of battle upon the rough and somewhat stony slope leading up to the works, one brigade,
Colonel Upton's, being deployed as skirmishers.”
Here comes
Russell; he can speak for himself, “answered
Wright.
As
Russell joined the group,
Sedgwick asked, `”
Russell, do you think you can carry those works with your division?7
Russell replied very quietly, “I think I can, sir.”
“Go ahead and do it.”
In less than five minutes
Russell's line was seen advancing at trail-arms, picking up the skirmish-line as it was reached, and moving forward until lost in the smoke and the darkness.
The enemy's fire was steady, destructive, and continuous, and was accompanied by derisive yells.
The 6th Maine and the 5th Wisconsin, moving directly upon the redoubts, broke over the parapet.
A sergeant of the 6th Maine, who was the first man inside the works, finding
[
87]
himself surrounded called out that he surrendered, but instantly seeing men of his command tumbling over the parapet, he yelled, “I take it back,” and made a dash for the colors, which he secured.
He was mentioned in orders the next day.
Upton's men had swarmed over the rifle-pits and rapidly advanced to the head of the pontoon-bridges, thereby cutting off the enemy's retreat.
This affair was singularly brilliant.
More than 1600 prisoners, eight colors, all the guns, 2000 stand of small-arms, and the pontoon-bridges were captured.
3 Colonels D. B. Penn and
A. C. Godwin, commanding the two brigades of
Hays's Confederate division, shared the fate of their men. They break-fasted with me on the following morning, and were both very complimentary to our troops in speaking of the engagement.
One of them described it as the most brilliant feat of arms he had yet seen, and said, with some mixture of humor and pathos, that less than half an hour before our attack he made reply to a question from
General Lee, who had ridden over to the works with
General Early, that he wanted no more men, and that he could hold the position against the whole Yankee army.
The position captured was commanded, and in some sense supported, by works on the farther side of the river, but the capture of the redoubts was so quick and complete that the enemy's guns on the right bank were of no service to him. They could indeed have swept the interior of the redoubts, which were open in the direction of the river, but it would have been very destructive to the garrison.
4
[
88]
At
Kelly's Ford, on the same day, a slight success was achieved, and the Army of the Potomac on the next day effected the passage of the
Rappahannock.
5 Headquarters were established at
Brandy Station and pickets thrown out over forty miles of territory.
There was a period of inaction, of fun and festivity, until the 26th of November, when the army crossed the
Rapidan at Germanna and
other fords and moved in the direction of
Mine Run.
The season was not favorable.
The weather was bitterly cold and the roads were difficult.
General French with the Third Corps, crossing the
Rapidan at Germanna Ford, became engaged with the enemy on the 27th at Payne's Farm.
He advanced through heavy undergrowth and an almost impassable tangle and was sharply resisted by the enemy —
Edward Johnson's division and
Gordon's brigade.
French's advance was checked.
Part of the Sixth Corps was hurried forward to French's support but took no part in the action.
Night coming on, a further attempt to advance was deemed unadvisable.
Meanwhile, and several miles to the left, on broader and better roads, the other corps of the army had passed the
Rapidan and had moved out to the position of
Mine Run.
This little stream runs northward into the
Rapidan through a valley bordered on both sides by gradual slopes more or less wooded, with here and there a farm-house.
The enemy occupied the crest of the western slope.
Our position was naturally on the eastern ridge.
During the night
Sedgwick was ordered to withdraw his own corps and French's and join the main body of the army, connecting with
Warren's right at
Locust Grove.
This movement was completed by
[
89]
daylight on the morning of the 28th of November.
An angry skirmish-fire continued all (lay, and upon our part reconnoissances were made in various directions.
On the evening of the 28th a council of war was called, and at this council it was decided that a flank movement to the left under the command of
General Warren, who had proposed and advocated it, should be attempted.
The troops assigned to this duty under
Warren were his own corps,
A. H. Terry's division of the Sixth, and 300 cavalry, reinforced later by the divisions of
Prince and
Carr of the Third Corps.
It was generally understood that
Warren's movement as a flank operation was to have been upon a much wider scale than it subsequently proved to be. It was thought that he was to make a circuit of perhaps several days' march, cutting
Lee off from all communication, and coming in not so much upon his immediate flank as upon his line of communication and his rear, while
Meade with the rest of the army moved upon his actual front.
Warren's command marched in the night-time.
During the next day, November 29th,
Sedgwick, holding our right, discovered that the enemy's left flank was unprotected by earth-works, slashings, or abatis, and reported to
General Meade that a movement during the night of a strong body of troops, passing them before morning upon the enemy's left, might by a
 |
|
Map of the field of operations of November, 1863. |
[
90]
sudden attack at daylight reach his flank and rear and double him up on
Warren, who was expected to come in on his extreme right.
After some delay and further examination of the position this movement was ordered, and two corps, the Fifth and the Sixth, under
Sedgwick, proceeded during the night to the position indicated, and were massed in the woods without having attracted the attention of the enemy.
Meade's orders were to open with artillery at 7, and at 8 to attack along the line with infantry.
These orders were also sent to
Warren.
Warren's movement had been made upon a more circumscribed line than was understood in the council which had approved it. It was,
 |
|
1. “the Shebang,” quarters of the United States Sanitary commission.6 2. General Post-Office, Army of Potomac, December, 1863, at Brandy Station.7 |
moreover, anticipated or discovered by the enemy, who diligently and heavily fortified to resist it. Upon reaching the position he sought,
Warren, with the good instincts of a soldier, recognized that an attack upon a position so defended would be foolish and disastrous, and so reported to
General Meade.
In the meantime
Sedgwick opened fire with all his batteries at the hour indicated.
The enemy replied with spirit, but in such a manner as to confirm
[
91]
the view that his line at this point was not strongly held.
Our infantry as yet were concealed in the woods, the two corps massed in column of brigades, and held like hounds in the leash.
There was much rivalry between these two corps, and between the divisions and the brigades of each, and they sent committees inviting each other to a reunion in the enemy's works, each one promising to be there first to receive the others.
The fire of the batteries prevented anything looking to the reinforcement of the enemy's position, which was in our left front.
Our right, when deployed, would have overlapped them.
Suddenly over the wires came a message from
General Meade, “Suspend the attack until further orders.”
We stopped firing.
The enemy did likewise, gun for gun.
Meade had heard from
Warren that his movement had failed.
Sedgwick,
Sykes, and
Wright believed, however, that their movement on the right, if it had not been suspended, would have been completely successful.
A few minutes later another dispatch directed
Sedgwick to report at the headquarters of the
commanding general.
I accompanied him. We found
General Meade evidently greatly disappointed and angry at the failure of
Warren's movement.
He had sent for
Sedgwick to take command at headquarters while he rode to join
Warren, who could only be reached by a long and somewhat difficult route.
He returned later in the day in the worst possible humor and ordered the with-drawal of the troops of the Fifth and Sixth corps to the position held by them the day before, closer to the center of the line.
That night he asked
Sedgwick by telegraph as to the chances of success of an attack in his immediate front, or of an attack upon that part of the enemy's lines which had been threatened by him in the morning.
Sedgwick replied that the line threatened by him in the morning had been so heavily intrenched and fortified after the suspension of his fire that he deemed it now the least available point of assault, and that the chance of carrying the position then in his front, moving across the open valley and up the other slope against well-constructed lines of rifle-pits, was not encouraging.
In this movement the men suffered greatly from the rain, which froze as it fell; they were without shelter, and had had long marches and severely trying ones; yet they were in excellent spirits and physically in good condition; but the heart was taken out of everybody when on the 1st of December the order came to retire across the
Rapidan and resume the camps from which we had started out so gayly a week before.
8 The troops burrowed in the earth and built their little shelters, and the officers and men devoted themselves to unlimited festivity, balls, horse-races, cock-fights, greased pigs and poles, and other games such as only soldiers can devise.
At this time the abuses of the conscription system were made manifest to the men at the front by the character of a large part of the recruits who were sent through that agency.
The professional bounty-jumper and the kidnapped emigrant and street boy, who were “put through” the enlistment
[
92]
[
93]
offices in New York and elsewhere, came in large numbers, the professionals with the intention of deserting at the earliest opportunity and repeating the profitable experiment of enlisting for large bounties.
Their favorite time for leaving was during their first tour of picket duty, and it was found necessary to throw a cordon of cavalry outside our own picket lines.
A gallows and a shooting-ground were provided in each corps, and scarcely a Friday passed during the winter-while — the army lay on
Hazel River and in the vicinity of
Brandy Station that some of these deserters did not suffer the death penalty.
During the winter the army grew again into superb condition, and awaited with high spirits the opening of the spring campaign.
On the 23d of March a reorganization of the Army of the Potomac took place, when its five corps were consolidated into three.
The First Corps was transferred to the Fifth; two divisions of the Third were incorporated with the Second, but permitted to retain their distinctive flag and badge; the other division of the Third Corps was transferred to the Sixth, but directed to abandon its own flag and badge and assume that of the Greek cross.
The corps commanders retained were — of the Second,
General W. S. Hancock; of the Fifth,
General G. K. Warren; of the Sixth,
General John Sedgwick.
The First and Third corps thus passed out of existence.
The only other event of note, before the arrival of
General Grant, was the Kilpatrick-
Dahlgren raid upon
Richmond.
It was authorized directly from
Washington, and was not the suggestion of
General Meade, nor (lid it have his approval; however, he set about carrying it into effect with all proper spirit and energy.
The movement depended largely for its success upon its secrecy, and, therefore, when
Colonel Dahlgren arrived from.
Washington before the preparations were completed, and asked to be permitted to accompany
Kilpatrick,
Meade was annoyed to learn that the expedition was currently discussed in the capital.
The plan was for
Kilpatrick to move generally from our left, passing the right flank of
Lee's army, and to proceed to
Richmond by as direct routes as possible, while, as diversions, and to cover his movement,
Custer, with 2000 cavalry, was to make a raid beyond
Gordonsville, and the Sixth Corps and
Birney's division of the Third were to move in support of
Custer to Madison Court House on Robertson's River.
No effort was made to conceal this movement, as it was intended to convey the impression to the enemy that a formidable attempt was to be made upon his left flank.
Upon the arrival of
Sedgwick and
Birney at Robertson's River at nightfall of the 27th of February,
Custer went by with his command, with instructions to proceed toward
Charlottesville, and, if possible, to destroy the railway bridge near that place.
While his command was passing,
Custer inquired of
Sedgwick as to the relative importance of his movement as compared with that of
Kilpatrick, and asked whether in the council at which the movement was discussed it was stated or understood that the bridge-head near
Charlottesville was fortified and defended with infantry; also whether it was known that
Rosser with 5000 Confederate cavalry was in the valley through which
Custer might be
[
94]
obliged to return after doing his work, and that, moreover, probably the road by which he advanced would be occupied in his rear by
Stuart and the main body of the cavalry of
Lee's army.
Sedgwick assured him that all these points had been discussed and considered.
Custer thought a moment and said, “Well, then, I may have to do one of two things: either strike boldly across
Lee's rear and try to reach
Kilpatrick, or else start with all the men I can keep together and try to join
Sherman in the south-west.”
Upon reaching the neighborhood of
Charlottesville he found, as he expected, that the bridge-head was heavily held by infantry and artillery, and retraced his march.
Stuart meantime had placed his troops across the road by which
Custer had advanced, and was awaiting him. Through the treachery of a guide the head of
Custer's column was turned off to the right for the purpose, it was believed, of bringing it in upon the main body of
Lee's infantry, where its capture would be certain.
Custer discovered the attempt in time and retraced his steps to the main road which he had left.
Stuart meantime had learned of the departure of
Custer from the direct route, and at once moved his command to intercept him. This cleared the way for
Custer and enabled him to return within the lines of the Sixth Corps, with only an affair with a rear-guard.
His movement had certainly had the desired effect as a diversion, While these operations were taking place
Kilpatrick had advanced in the direction of
Richmond and had divided his forces, sending a portion under
Dahlgren to strike the
James River above
Richmond, retaining the main body under his own command until he was satisfied that the experiment was not feasible.
He made his way down the
Peninsula in the direction of
Butler's command, and was subsequently transferred by boat to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, or more properly the horse-hospital camp, near
Washington.
Aside from our losses in men, and among them the gallant and heroic
Dahlgren, the result of this movement was to disable for the time being 3000 or 4000 of the very flower of our cavalry.
 |
|
Fugitive negroes at the Rapidan.
From a photograph. |
