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they were told that “if he had made this request before helping them against the Phocians, they would have promised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and had trusted them.” [7] Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves; and this is an excellent method.1 For instance, in the Teucer2 . . . and Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would have betrayed the fleet for a bribe; when Aristophon said no, “Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so?” But the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as Aristides3; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant; accordingly, it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself. [8] Another topic is derived from definition. For instance, that the daimonion4 is nothing else than a god or the work of a god; but he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristogiton, before they did something
noble; and, “I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours.” And as it is said in the Alexander5 that it would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman's person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favor as well as an injury.6 In all these cases, it is by definition and the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question. [9] Another topic is derived from the different significations of a word, as explained in the Topics, where the correct use of these terms has been discussed.7 [10] Another, from division. For example, “There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from consideration as impossible; as for the third, not even the accusers assert it.” [11] Another, from induction. For instance, from the case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that in matters of parentage women always discern the truth;
1 Or, “the ways of doing this are various” （Jebb）.
2 The illustration is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as well known. The Teucer was a tragedy of Sophocles.
3 It would be absurd to use such an argument against the accusation of a “just man” like Aristides, and to pretend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It must only be used when the opponent's character is suspect, and lends itself to such a retort.
4 The reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that a daimonion （a certain divine principle that acted as his internal monitor） checked his action in many cases. When accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove, by his definition of the daimonion, that he was no atheist. Similarly, Iphicrates, by his definition of γενναῖος and συγγενής could refute the allegation that he was ignoble and show that his deeds were more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton than to those of his opponents. Paris could say that he was not intemperate, because he was satisfied with Helen alone. Lastly, Socrates refused an invitation to visit Archelaus, king of Macedonia, because he would be unable to return the benefits received, which would imply his being put to shame, and make the invitation a kind of insult.
5 Of Polycrates.
6 “Just as it is to requite them with evil” （Jebb）.
7 Supplying [λελέκται] περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς [χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς]. Others render “in reference to the use of the word ὀρθῶς” （but ὀρθῶς does not occur in the passage in Aristot. Top. 1.15）. A suggested reading is περὶ τούτου ὀρθῶς εἴρηται.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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