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brought with him the smaller fraction of the united forces, and he was on a field that he had set apart for Beauregard's control.
That officer had been for some time on the ground, and he was unwilling that a subordinate should suffer by his arrival.
He would make any sacrifice himself rather than take one laurel from the brow of a fellow-soldier.
It was his wish to give General Beauregard the command of the troops in the field, which would have secured to that officer whatever of glory might be won at Shiloh; but it was in no wise his intention to abdicate the supreme command, or the superintendence of affairs in the management of the department or the movements of the army.
His offer to Beauregard was certainly an act of rare magnanimity.
A somewhat analogous case in his career occurred at the battle of the Neches, in 1839.
While Secretary of War of Texas, he attended his subordinate on the field, gave him the benefit of his military experience, and then received from his hand the report of the combat.
General Johnston had no diffidence as to his fitness for command.
He once said regretfully to the writer, during the Mexican War: “There is one thing I know I can do; I am competent to command troops.”
In this instance, with General Beauregard, his idea of unselfishness, even though heroic, seems somewhat overstrained; for he would chiefly have suffered in case of a failure, but would not have shared in the glories of a victory.
The rumor of this occurrence also gave rise to the following vigorous protest from Governor George W. Johnson:
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