As the Army of the Ohio, moving from
Bardstown, approached
Perryville on the 7th of October, 1862,
McCook's corps formed the left,
Crittenden's the right, and mine — which was moving on the direct road by the way of
Springfield, and was ahead of the others — the center.
[See maps, pp. 6 and 24.] In my column,
R. B. MitchelPs division had the lead;
Schoepf followed, and
Sheridan brought up the rear.
Our advance was vigorously resisted by
Wheeler's cavalry, forming the rear-guard of
Hardee's corps, which was retiring before us. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the head of the column was nearing the line of
Doctor's Creek, a tributary of the
Chaplin River, or more properly the
Chaplin Fork of
Salt River, the enemy, in force, was observed lining the crest of the ridge on the farther bank, obviously with the intention of disputing the possession of a few pools of water that remained in the water-course, which was otherwise nearly dry. An excessive drought had prevailed for months in this part of
Kentucky.
At sight of the enemy, orders were given to form
Mitchell's division in order of battle across the
Springfield road and along some high ground on the right.
When
Schoepf came up his division was massed in reserve in
Mitchell's rear, on the left of the road, and
Sheridan, arriving after
Wheeler had been dislodged and was being pressed back toward
Perryville, was posted in front and to the right of
Mitchell.
Before daybreak on the 8th, a position was gained that covered the pools in
Doctor's Creek, and these formed our only water-supply for the next two days, or as long as the enemy held the
Chaplin River.
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During the night
General Buell ordered
McCook's and
Crittenden's corps to march at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 8th, and to form in order of battle on the center corps — my own. The movements of these columns were delayed, and
General Buell, apprehensive of an attack while the center corps was isolated, directed me to select a strong position, and my troops were soon moving out of their camps and taking positions for the main attack, which it was supposed would come on about 10 o'clock. As that hour drew near, I observed, in visiting
General Sheridan's ground, that a part of it was vacant, and that one of his brigades was in march on the road to
Perryville, and the remainder were preparing to follow.
On inquiry it was discovered that this movement was in consequence of some misunderstanding of orders.
General Sheridan was directed to recall the brigade, resume his position, and limit himself to its defense until a general advance to attack in force should be ordered.
To this order was added the explanation that
General Buell was particularly solicitous that nothing be done to bring on a general engagement until after the junction of the flank corps.
General Sheridan lost no time in reestablishing his division on the ground to which he had been originally assigned.
He had barely accomplished it when he was attacked in force and a fight ensued, in which the loss was severe on both sides.
In the meantime the head of
General McCook's corps, coming over the
Mackville pike, appeared on the high ground marked
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Ridge on the Union left occupied by Stone's and Bush's batteries-the scene of Starkweather's contest [see P. 58]. from a photograph from the direction of Rousseau's line, taken in 1885. |
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by Russell's house, due north of
Sheridan's position about one mile. This was about 10:30 A. M. Marking out his line of battle,
General McCook ordered
General Rousseau to form it.
Loomis's battery was established on a commanding piece of ground near Russell's house, and to the left of it.
General Rousseau had been previously ordered to send a line of skirmishers to the left
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View looking North-east from the position of Loomis's Battery, the center of Rousseau's line [see map, P. 24, and note on P. 55]. from a photograph taken in 1885. |
and front to examine some wood on that quarter, and
Captain Wickliffe, with his company of cavalry, was sent to reconnoiter the ground to the left of this line of skirmishers.
At this time there was some light skirmishing going on with
Sheridan's division, at the head of the center corps, which was still in column, as previously described; but this soon ceased, and
General McCook was satisfied that the enemy he found engaging my corps when he arrived had retired from the field.
McCook's corps, as previously related, had been ordered to march at 3 A. M., but it was 2:30 A. M. before the order reached
General McCook, and his march began at 5 A. M.
McCook had with him then two divisions,
Rousseau's and
Jackson's.
Rousseau's division took the lead on the march, but when it arrived at
Perryville only two of the brigades were present — the remaining one,
Starkweather's, having been thrown to the rear by the interposition of
Jackson's division, which cut it off at
Mackville.
Without waiting for the arrival of this brigade,
General McCook, after giving his assistant adjutant-general particular instructions to post
Jackson's two brigades on a commanding piece of ground immediately to the right of the
Mackville and
Perryville road, and to hold them in column so that they could be moved in any direction as occasion required, turned over the command to
General Rousseau, and galloped off to report to
General Buell at headquarters.
Buell was in my camp, on the
Springfield pike about two and a half miles distant from
McCook's position on the
Mackville pike.
At half-past 12 the
Confederates advanced, and in a few moments the skirmishers and artillery were engaged.
The attack fell upon
Sheridan's division at the head of my corps and upon
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Position of Loomis's Battery on Rousseau's line, looking across Doctor's Creek.
From a photograph taken in 1885.
Loomis's battery occupied the highest part of the ridge above H. P. Bottom's house, at about the center of Rousseau's line (see map, p. 24). Lytle's brigade extended from the battery across the old Mackville pike to the “burnt barn.”
Lytle's brigade was assailed from the direction of Bottom's house, and from the right flank.
The attack upon the position held by Loomis's battery was made chiefly from the ridge in the middle distance of the picture on page 54. The Confederates gained the north-east side of that ridge by following down the dry bed of Doctor's Creek under the shelter of its west bank.--editors. |
the head of
McCook's corps, now advancing from its first position at Russell's house down the slope toward
Chaplin River.
When
General McCook returned to his troops after having reported at headquarters, he found that
General Rousseau had advanced the right of the line about eight hundred or a thousand yards, and was occupying a commanding ridge which was to the left of the
Mackville and Perryville pike.
The enemy was firing on this line from three batteries, and
Loomis's and
Simonson's batteries were replying.
As there was no Confederate infantry in sight
McCook ordered the firing to cease, so as to economize ammunition, and then prepared to make a reconnoissance toward
Chaplin River for water, as he had just been ordered to do by
General Buell.
Riding off to the left,
General McCook found a commanding ridge about six hundred yards from the stream and overlooking it. Sending for
Generals Jackson and
Terrill, he showed them the water, marked his line of battle, and placed a battery on it with strong supports.
General Terrill was then ordered to advance a body of skirmishers down the slope to the water as soon as the line was formed.
Not being apprehensive of an attack,
General McCook then went back to his right.
It was now nearly 2 o'clock. At this time the line of the left corps stood with its right on the
Mackville and Perryville pike near the crossing of
Doctor's Creek and its left near
Chaplin River, its direction being about due north and south.
It was formed of two brigades of
Rousseau's division
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Farm-House of H. P. Bottom.
From a photograph taken in 1885.
The farm-house stands near Doctor's Creek, under the ridge occupied by Rousseau; and the view is from the old Mackville pike.
[See map, p. 24.] |
（
Lytle's and
Harris's) and
Terrill's brigade of
Jackson's division.
Webster's brigade of
Jackson's division had not yet come into position, and
Starkweather's brigade of
Rousseau's division had not yet reached the field.
Just previously to this the enemy, in pursuance of his plan of attack, had begun to engage
Sheridan's division, the head of the center corps.
Mitchell's division was at that time closing up to take position within supporting distance of
Sheridan.
Caldwell's and
Carlin's brigades of this division were to the right and rear, under cover, and
Gooding's brigade was north of
Doctor's Creek, near the stream.
In this position the latter covered
Sheridan's left, and watched the interval between the two corps so long as the left corps remained in its place in line of battle, and before it advanced to the front.
As
Mitchell came into his position on the second line, the enemy appeared on his right in force and engaged
Carlin's brigade, but were repulsed.
It was now nearing half-past 2, and the enemy's entire line, from his left, where the attack began on
Sheridan, to his right, where it fell in heaviest force on
Rousseau, was in full progress, carrying everything before it. When
Sheridan's assailants reached his main line he gave them a reception, cool, effective, and disastrous, and when their repulse was complete a brigade from the second line (
Carlin's), which had been called up to assist in the defense, pursued the enemy to
Perryville, thus turning his left and establishing itself on his rear.
General Sheridan's action was according to the sound principles of the profession, and, as he was amply and promptly supported, the operations on this part of the field, in which he had the lead, were fully successful,
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and his conduct here foreshadowed the exceptionally successful career that lay before him.
General McCook was assailed by greatly superior numbers.
His brigades, which
General Rousseau had put in motion to the front in his absence, were surprised on the march by
General Bragg's attack, and were taken in the act of forming, and on ground favorable to the attacking party.
Rousseau's right brigade, the extreme right of the left corps, was attacked with great severity and pertinacity.
Terrill's brigade on the left, and
Starkweather's, which had now arrived, were in turn heavily assailed.
Being composed of entirely raw troops,
Terrill's brigade in a few moments gave way in confusion, losing
Parsons's battery of eight
Napoleon guns.
General Jackson, who was with this brigade, was killed at the first fire.
General Terrill did all in his power to steady his men, but in vain.
An hour and a half later, while still striving to rally his broken troops, he was mortally wounded.
2 Starkweather's brigade and
Stone's and
Bush's batteries were on the extreme left and rear of
Terrill's brigade, and checked the attack.
General McCook, perceiving that he was assailed by at least three times his number, sent an aide-de-camp,
Lieutenant L. M. Hosea, to
General Sheridan, requesting him to look to the right of his line and see that it was not turned.
Just at this time
Sheridan had his attention fully occupied with his own right, where two opposing batteries were in position, and troops were massing behind them to attack him front and flank.
About half an hour later
McCook sent
Captain H. N. Fisher, of his staff, to
General Schoepf, commanding the reserve of my corps, with an urgent request for reinforcement, reporting that his reserves were all exhausted and his corps upon the point of being compromised.
General Schoepf was at the time on the march to the front with two of his brigades (
Walker's and
Steedman's), and although desirous of rendering assistance, he declined to take the responsibility of changing his line of march.
He referred the officer to me, but I was at the time at
General Buell's headquarters, where I had been since noon.
Owing to the conformation of the ground and to the limited use of artillery on both sides, no sound of the battle had been heard at
General Buell's headquarters until the attack reached
General Sheridan's position, which was about half-past 3 o'clock. Then the cannon firing became so continuous and was so well sustained and so different from the irregular shots, at wide intervals, which had characterized the “shelling of the woods” earlier in the day, that it was readily recognized as a battle.
It was near 4 o'clock when there came up the valley of
Doctor's Creek the sound of rapid artillery firing.
It was too heavy and too well sustained to come from merely “shelling the woods.”
Listening attentively for a moment,
General Buell said to me, “That is something more than shelling the woods; it sounds like a fight.”
I at once mounted and set off at a rapid pace down the
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Engagement of Starkweather's Brigade on the extreme Union left.
From a Lithograph.
General John C. Starkweather, in his official report, says that the brigade, consisting at the time of the 24th Illinois, 1st and 21st Wisconsin, and 79th Pennsylvania, “arrived on the field of battle at about 1:30 P. M., having marched twelve miles--about three miles thereof being through fields, woods, etc. Finding the troops already engaged well on the right, center, and left, and thinking the extreme left position most accessible, and, from appearances, one that should be held at all hazards, I placed my command at once in position facing the enemy's right.”
General McCook, in his report on the part taken by Starkweather's brigade, says that the 21st Wisconsin was stationed “in a corn-field, lying down, awaiting the approach of the enemy, and when he approached with his overwhelming force this new regiment poured into his ranks a most withering fire.” |
road in the direction of the firing.
Within a mile I met
Captain Fisher coming at full speed and bearing
General McCook's message.
Instead of sending
Captain Fisher back to
General McCook with my answer to his appeal for help, I advised him to continue on and bear to
General Buell the astounding news, and at once sent orders to
Schoepf to go to the interval between the two corps,--on the left of
Sheridan,--and to
Mitchell to close toward
Sheridan's right and support him. Directing my course toward the left, I found
Gooding's brigade of
Mitchell's division still standing to the left of
Doctor's Creek, and at once put it in motion to the right to join the main body of the division and be nearer
Sheridan, who had just reported that he was hard pressed in front and that the enemy was driving our left wing.
General Schoepf was now on the ground with his leading brigade (
Walker's). This he was ordered to deploy, to replace
Gooding.
In the midst of these movements, another staff-officer,
Captain W. T. Hoblitzell, came from the left corps for help, with the information that the troops, though fighting stubbornly, were falling back everywhere, and that if assistance was not speedily afforded they must soon be driven from the field.
Up to this moment the fighting with
Sheridan had been growing in intensity, and judging from the sound that it must soon culminate, I detained
Captain Hoblitzell to await the issue.
It was soon perceived that the firing was diminishing, and as there were no signs of defeat on our side, I turned
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to
Walker's brigade to send it over to the left wing, when I discovered it had not yet deployed, and, moreover, did not seem to be sufficiently familiar with the tactics to make the simplest movements with promptness and intelligence.
Accordingly I sent my adjutant-general,
Captain J. E. Stacy, to recall
Gooding and order him to proceed under the guidance of
Captain Hoblitzell to report to
General McCook.
Gooding took with him
Pinney's Wisconsin battery.
Within twenty minutes after receiving the order,
Gooding made himself felt on the flank of the
Confederates, who had thus far been steadily driving
Rousseau's troops back toward the
Russell House.
Within a few minutes after this brigade had started,
Sheridan, having repulsed his assailants, turned his guns and opened fire across the valley of
Doctor's Creek on
Rousseau's assailants, who, in their advance, had come to present their flank within easy range, and from his commanding position he delivered a fire so effective as to force back the enemy in this part of the field, to the great relief of the right of
General McCook's line.
Just after
Sheridan's artillery opened,
General Steedman came up with his brigade of
Schoepf's division and kept on his course down
Doctor's Creek.
The enemy had now been so far driven from
McCook's front that they were beyond the reach of
Steedman's infantry; but, passing under the fire of
Sheridan's guns,
Steedman halted and opened to the left with
Smith's battery of his brigade.
Viewed from the
Confederate stand-point, the
battle of Perryville appears to have consisted of an attempt to turn the left flank of the
Union line, in which, for the distance of a thousand or twelve hundred yards, the assailants drove all before them.
At this juncture, after a fierce fight, the attack came to a stand, having expended its force, and the left of the
Confederate line was now itself driven and turned, and its line of retreat threatened.
This last the
Confederates supposed had been effected by a fresh corps arriving on the field from the direction of
Lebanon.
In abandoning the battle-ground the
Confederates, although obliged to leave their wounded behind, moved without any sense of humiliation, for they had made a good fight, and appeared only to be withdrawing from the presence of a greatly superior force.
From the
Union side, the battle takes this appearance: The center corps, arriving on the ground alone on the afternoon of the 7th, met with considerable opposition in establishing itself in position.
This opposition continued with only a brief interval till about 11 o'clock on the 8th, when the flank corps began to arrive on the line abreast of the center.
After the lapse of about an hour four brigades from the left wing started to the front in quest of water.
This movement coincided with the advance of the
Confederates in full force to turn the left of the
Union army.
Those brigades were accordingly met and overpowered and driven back to their places in line, and some of them beyond it. But they made a most obstinate resistance.
In the center corps the detachments thrown out to watch the approaches to the position held by the leading division were driven in, and that division was attacked in strong force and with great determination.
But the assailants were repulsed and driven from the field, and then the center corps contributed about one-third of its effective force to the relief of the left wing and saved it from destruction.
