Bragg's advance and retreat.1
General Bragg's
Kentucky campaign has drawn on him more criticism than any other part of his career as a military commander.
During that memorable march I rode at his side from day to day, and it was his habit to confide to me his hopes and fears.
About the end of June, 1862,
General Bragg was visited by many prominent citizens of
Kentucky, who had abandoned their homes, and who assured him that Kentuckians were thoroughly loyal to the
South, and that as soon as they were given an opportunity it would be proven.
Fired with this idea, he planned his offensive campaign.
On the 21st of July, 1862, the movement of the Army of Mississippi from
Tupelo was ordered.
The infantry moved by rail, the artillery and cavalry across the country.
Headquarters were established at
Chattanooga on the 29th.
On the 30th
Major-General Kirby Smith visited
General Bragg at that point, and it was arranged that
Smith should move at once against the
Federal forces under
General George W. Morgan in
Cumberland Gap.
In this interview
General Bragg was very certain that he would begin his forward move in ten or fifteen days at latest, and if
Kirby Smith was successful in his operation against
Morgan he would be on his offensive against
Buell.
Kirby Smith took the field on the 13th of August, 1862.
On the 28th, after some inevitable delays,
Bragg crossed the
Tennessee, his right wing, under
Polk, 13,537 strong; the left wing, under
Hardee, 13,763 strong,--total effective, 27,320 rank and file.
General Bragg by this time was deeply impressed with the magnitude of his undertaking.
He had lost faith somewhat in the stories that had been told him of
Kentucky's desire to join the
South, but he proposed to give the people a chance of so doing by the presence of Southern troops.
At the same time he was resolved to do nothing to imperil the safety of his army, whose loss, he felt, would be a crushing blow to the
Confederacy.
He reached
Carthage on the 9th of September.
On the 12th he was at
Glasgow, Kentucky, where he issued a proclamation to Kentuckians.
About that time also the corps of
Polk and
Hardee were ordered to unite.
Buell was now moving on
Bowling Green from the south.
On the 16th our army surrounded and invested
Munfordville, and
General Wilder, with its garrison of four thousand men, was forced to capitulate.
General Kirby Smith, having found
Morgan's position impregnable, detached a part of his forces to invest it, and, advancing on
Lexington, defeated the
Federal forces encountered at
Richmond, Ky. He was relying on an early junction with
General Bragg.
On the 17th of September
Generals Polk and
Hardee were called to a council at
Munfordville.
With the map and the cavalry dispatches out-spread before him,
General Bragg placed
General Buell and his army in our rear, with
Munfordville on the direct line of his march to
Louisville, the
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assumed objective point of his movement,
General Bragg then explaining his plan, which was discussed and approved by his lieutenants.
Our advance was then resumed, leaving
General Buell to pursue his march unmolested.
This action was subsequently severely criticised by military men, and at the time it was greatly deplored by many officers of his command.
At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 18th of September, indeed,
Bragg was on the point of rescinding the order to continue the march, and of directing instead an immediate offensive movement against
Buell.
The importance of recovering
Nashville induced the proposed change of operation.
But, upon further consideration, he reverted to his previous plans, saying to me with emphasis, “This campaign must be won by marching, not by fighting.”
He used similar language at subsequent stages of the campaign before the
battle of Perryville.
At the moment he evinced no regret at having allowed
Buell to pass on our left flank.
The success of the column under
Kirby Smith in its combat at
Richmond, Ky., elated him. He was worried by the delays that retarded his
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junction with that officer, and was greatly relieved when all the Confederate forces in
Kentucky were united at
Lexington.
Here a brilliant entertainment was given to the two generals by our old comrade,
General William Preston, in his delightful
Kentucky home.
But it was here, also, that
General Bragg fully realized that the reported desire of
Kentucky to cast her lot with the
South had passed away, if indeed such a disposition had ever existed; for not only was
Kentucky unprepared to enter the
Confederacy, but her people looked with dread at the prospect of their State being made a battle-field.
Under these circumstances he remarked to me again and again, “The people here have too many fat cattle and are too well off to fight.”
He was now aware that he had embarked in a campaign that was to produce no favorable result, and that he had erred in departing from his original plan of taking the offensive in the outset against
Buell by an operation on that general's communications.
He was determined, however, not to expose his army to disaster, nor to take any chances.
The information we were receiving indicated that
Buell was being heavily reenforced.
It was now the eve of the
battle of Perryville, and
Kirby Smith, at
Salvisa, twenty miles to the north-east, was calling for reinforcements, as he was confident that the feint was against
Perryville, and that the main attack would surely fall on him. Thus urged,
General Bragg, against his own judgment, yielded, and detached two of his best divisions (
Withers's and
Cheatham's) to
Smith's aid. The former division could not be recalled in time, and the latter arrived the morning of the battle.
Having placed
General Polk in command of the troops,
Bragg had gone to
Frankfort, the capital of the
State of Kentucky, to witness the inauguration of the secessionist governor,
Hawes.
The inaugural was being read when the booming of cannon, shortly followed by dispatches from our cavalry outposts, announced the near presence of the enemy.
As the hall was chiefly filled by the military, who hurried away to their respective commands, the governor was obliged to cut short his inaugural address.
The field of
Perryville was an open and beautiful rolling country, and the battle presented a grand panorama.
There was desperate fighting on both sides.
I saw a Federal battery, with the Union flag planted near its guns, repulse six successive Confederate charges before retiring, saving all but one gun, and eliciting praise for their bravery from their desperate foes.
About dark,
Polk, convinced that some Confederate troops were firing into each other, cantered up to the colonel of the regiment that was firing, and asked him angrily what he meant by shooting his own friends.
The colonel, in a tone of surprise, said: “I don't think there can be any mistake about it. I am sure they are the enemy.”
“Enemy! Why, I have just left them myself.
Cease firing, sir. What is your name?”
rejoined the
Confederate general.
“I am
Colonel----of the----
Indiana.
And pray, sir, who are you?”
Thus made aware that he was with a Federal regiment and that his only escape was to brazen it out, his dark blouse and the increasing obscurity happily befriending him, the
Confederate general shook his fist in the
Federal colonel's face and promptly said: “I will show you who I am, sir. Cease firing at once!”
Then, cantering down the line again, he shouted authoritatively to
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the men, “Cease firing!”
Then, reaching the cover of a small copse, he spurred his horse and was soon back with his own corps, which he immediately ordered to open fire.
The
battle of Perryville, a hard-fought fight against many odds, was merely a favorable incident which decided nothing.
Our army, however, was elated and did not dream of a retreat, as we had held the field and bivouacked on it. But the
commanding general, full of care, summoned his lieutenant-generals to a council in which both advised retreat.
The next day
General Smith's army was called to
Harrodsburg, where a junction of the two forces was effected, and where a position was selected to receive
Buell's attack ;--this, however, not being made,
Bragg was enabled to take measures for an immediate retrograde.
Forrest was at once dispatched by forced marches to take position at
Murfreesboro‘, and prepare it for occupancy by the retreating Confederates.
The conduct of the retreat was intrusted to
Polk.
Our army fell back first to
Camp Dick Robinson, whence the retreat began in earnest, a brigade of cavalry leading.
All the supplies which it was impossible to carry from this depot were burned; the rest were hauled away in wagons, including provisions, merchandise of all kinds, and captured muskets, while captured cannon were drawn by oxen.
Refugees, with their families, slaves, and a great deal of household stuff; omnibuses, stages, and almost every other description of vehicle were to be seen in this heterogeneous caravan.
Thousands of beef cattle, sheep, and hogs were driven along under the charge of Texans as reckless as the affrighted cattle they were driving.
General Smith's army and
Polk's and
Hardee's corps followed the trains.
The Federal army promptly took up the pursuit and made an effort by a flank movement to intercept our long unwieldly trains.
General Wheeler with his cavalry brought up the rear — fighting by day and obstructing the roads at night.
Before the pursuit was abandoned at
Rock Castle, that officer was engaged over twenty-six times.
His vigilance was so well known by the infantry that they never feared a surprise.
Hard marching, stony roads, and deep fords lay before us until we had crossed
Cumberland Gap.
But at last almost all that had been taken out of
Kentucky was safely conveyed to
Morristown, Tenn.
About the 31st of October, 1862,
General Bragg, having made a short visit to
Richmond, there obtained the sanction of the Confederate Government for a movement into
middle Tennessee.
Returning to
Knoxville,
General Bragg made preparations with the utmost rapidity for the advance to
Murfreesboro‘, where
General Breckinridge was already posted, and
General Forrest was operating with a strong, active cavalry force.
Our headquarters were advanced to
Tullahoma on the 14th of November, and on the 26th to
Murfreesboro‘. Notwithstanding long marches and fighting, the condition of the troops was very good; and had they been well clad, the Confederate army would have presented a fine appearance.
On November 24th, 1862, the commands of
Lieutenant-General Pemberton at
Vicksburg, and that of
General Bragg in
Tennessee, were placed under
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General Joseph E. Johnston, and his official headquarters were established at
Chattanooga.
Immediately thereafter
General Johnston visited
Murfreesboro‘, where he passed some days devoted to a thorough inspection of the army.
Our forces numbered somewhat over 40,000 men.
General Johnston's visit, was followed during the second week in December by that of
President Davis and his aide,
General Custis Lee.
The President asked
Bragg if he did not think he could spare a division of his army to reeforce
Pemberton.
Bragg assented and dispatched a division of 8000 men under
Stevenson.
This step was contrary to the decided opinion previously expressed to
Mr. Davis by
General Johnston.
[See p. 473.]
So well satisfied was
General Bragg at having extricated his army from its perilous position in
Kentucky, that he was not affected by the attacks upon him by the press for the failure of the campaign.
He was cheerful, and would frequently join the staff about the camp-fire, and relate with zest incidents of his services under
General Taylor in
Mexico.
2 On the 26th General
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Wheeler, commanding the cavalry outposts,
3 sent dispatches in quick succession to headquarters reporting a general advance of
Rosecrans's army.
Soon all was bustle and activity.
General Hardee's corps at
Triune was ordered to
Murfreesboro‘. Camps were at once broken up and everything was made ready for active service.
On the 27th of December our army was moving.
On Sunday, December 28th,
Polk and
Hardee met at
General Bragg's headquarters to learn the situation and his plans.
Rosecrans was advancing from
Nashville with his whole army.
Wheeler with his cavalry was so disposed at the moment as to protect the flanks, and, when pressed, to fall back toward the main army.
Hardee's corps, consisting of the divisions of
Breckinridge and
Cleburne, with
Jackson's brigade as a reserve, constituted our right wing, with its right resting on the
Lebanon Pike and its left on the
Nashville road.
Polk's corps, composed of
Withers's and
Cheatham's divisions, was to take post with its right touching
Hardee on the
Nashville road, and its left resting on the
Salem Pike;
McCown's division was to form the reserve and to occupy our center.
Such was the position of the Confederate army on the 29th of December.
On Tuesday, December 30th,
Rosecrans was in our front, a mile and a half away.
At 12 o'clock artillery on both sides was engaged.
At 3 o'clock the Federal infantry advanced and attacked our lines, but were repulsed by the
Louisiana and
Alabama brigade, under
Colonel Gibson, commanding
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in the absence of
General Daniel Adams.
But night soon interposed, quiet prevailed, and the two armies bivouacked opposite to each other.
General Bragg was on the field the entire day, but returned to his headquarters that evening at
Murfreesboro‘. He called his corps commanders together and informed them that his advices convinced him that
Rosecrans, under cover of the day's attack, had been massing his troops for a move on our left flank.
It was then agreed that
Hardee should at once move to the extreme left
Cleburne's division of his corps and the reserve (
McCown), and that, next morning,
Hardee should take command in that quarter and begin the fight.
At daylight on the 31st (Wednesday),
Hardee, with
Cleburne's and
McCown's divisions, attacked
McCook's corps of the
Federal army.
For a
 |
|
the Nashville pike out of Murfreesboro‘, looking North-West toward the rise of ground which was the site of fortress Rosecrans, constructed after the withdrawal of Bragg.
From A photograph taken in 1884. |
while the enemy were disorganized, many of the men being still engaged in cooking their breakfasts, but they very soon got under arms and in
 |
|
View of Murfreesboro'from the vicinity of fortress Rosecrans.
From a photograph taken in 1884. |
position, and resisted the attack with desperation.
At this juncture
Polk advanced with
Withers's and
Cheatham's divisions, and after hard fighting
McCook's corps was driven back between three and four miles. Our attack had pivoted the
Federals on their center, bending back their line, as one half-shuts a knife-blade.
At 12 o'clock we had a large part of the field, with many prisoners, cannon, guns, ammunition, wagons, and the dead and wounded of both armies.
Between 2 and 3 o'clock, however,
Rosecrans massed artillery on the favorable rising ground to which his line had been forced back.
On this ground cedar-trees were so thick that his movements had not been perceived.
Our line again advanced.
Stewart's,
Chalmers's,
Donelson's, and
Maney's brigades, supported by
Slocomb's,
Cobb's, and
Byrne's batteries, were hurled against the
Federal line, but could not carry it. Reenforced by
Gibson's and
Jackson's brigades, another charge was ordered, but the position was not carried and many were-killed and wounded on our side.
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A bitter cold night was now on us. We were masters of the field.
The sheen of a bright moon revealed the sad carnage of the day, and the horrors of war became vividly distinct.
That night
General Bragg again made his headquarters at
Murfreesboro‘, whence he gave orders for the care of the wounded.
All the churches and public buildings were turned into hospitals.
He announced to
Richmond by telegraph: “God has granted us a happy New year.”
We had indeed routed the
Federal right wing, but the bloody work was not over.
During January 1st
Rosecrans's army was intrenching itself, but
General Bragg was of the opinion that their quiet meant a retreat.
During the morning of the 2d (Friday) quiet prevailed, except some shelling on our right.
At about noon
General Bragg determined to dislodge the force on his right.
Orders were given to that end, and our best troops were carefully selected.
Hanson's,
Preston's,
Gibson's, and
Hunt's brigades, with
Cobb's and
Wright's batteries, were placed under
Major-General Breckinridge.
A gun fired by one of our batteries at 4 o'clock was the signal for the attack.
After a fierce fight we carried the hill.
The orders were to take its crest, and there remain intrenched.
General Breckinridge endeavored to execute this order, but the commanders of the brigades engaged could not restrain the ardor of their men, who pushed on beyond support.
The Federal batteries that had been massed on the other side of the stream now opened on them and drove the
Confederates back with terrible slaughter, fully 2000 of our men being killed and wounded in this attack.
At 10 o'clock P. M. the news of this disastrous charge, led by the
élite of the Confederate army, cast a gloom over all.
Saturday, January 3d, the two armies faced each other, with little fighting on either side.
The miscarriage of the 2d determined
General Bragg to begin to fall back on
Tullahoma; but all day of the 3d our forces maintained their line of battle taken up early that morning.
That night the evacuation of
Murfreesboro' was effected.
General Rosecrans entered
Murfreesboro' on Sunday, the 4th of January, 1863.
Meantime his adversary was in full retreat on
Tullahoma, thirty-six
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miles distant.
By this time
General Bragg's corps commanders, as well as their subordinates down to the regimental rank and file, scarcely concealed their want of confidence in him as the commander of the army.
On the 11th of January he invited from his corps, division, and brigade commanders an expression of their opinion on that point, and their replies, while affirming their admiration for his personal courage, devotion to duty, and ability as an organizer, frankly confessed that his army had lost confidence to such an extent in his capacity for chief command as wholly to impair his further usefulness.
On the 4th of February
General Polk went so far indeed as to write direct to
President Davis with regard to the dissatisfaction felt, and the necessity for the immediate substitution of another commander.
4
To vindicate himself,
General Bragg at once made an official report of the battle of the 31st of December, especially in relation to the miscarriage of the effort to break the enemy's center.
5
The feeling outside as well as inside of his army, however, waxed so strong against
Bragg that
President Davis ordered
General Johnston, then near
Vicksburg, to go to
Tennessee, with authority, if he thought it wise, to relieve
Bragg from command.
Johnston's arrival was hailed with joy, for our army specially wanted him as their commander.
But after spending more than a week looking into its condition, he decided that he would not relieve
Bragg, and thereupon returned toward
Vicksburg with his staff.
This result quieted the bad feeling somewhat, but did not restore harmony between the corps
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commanders and their commanding general.
Seldom did either of them visit headquarters except officially.
On the other hand,
Bragg was on good terms with the division and brigade commanders, namely,
Wheeler,
Cleburne, and
Withers,
Patton Anderson,
J. C. Brown,
J. K. Jackson,
Bate, and
Walthall.
The certainty he felt that
General Rosecrans would retire from his front had led him to suffer the 1st to pass without advancing his right to cover the rising ground, thus giving ample leisure to
Rosecrans to intrench and to restore order to his army after the fight of the 31st, when all the advantages of battle had remained with us. But on Friday, the 2d of January, he was convinced that
Rosecrans was not going to retreat and that fighting must soon be resumed.
After riding over the ground early on the morning of the 2d, at 11 o'clock he had adopted the following plan: To seize and carry by a vigorous assault that rising ground now occupied by the
Federal forces, allowing only one hour to intervene between the time of the attack and dark, so that night should stop the fighting and give us opportunity to fortify at once.
It was for that reason the hour of 4 P. M. was selected for the operation.
The failure of Friday to secure the heights on our right necessitated an entire change of our lines, and Saturday his determination was to fall back to
Tullahoma and await
General Rosecrans's advance.
No such move, however, having been made, our army went into winter quarters, undisturbed.
While the army was at
Murfreesboro‘, no firing of guns being allowed, the country remained full of rabbits, some of which during the battle, alarmed by the din, rushed swiftly past one of our regiments, which at the time was advancing under a heavy fire of musketry.
One of our soldiers was heard by a staff-officer to yell out, “Go it, cotton-tail; I'd run too if I hadn't a reputation.”
At
Tupelo an order had been issued forbidding the men firing their muskets when in camp.
One of the volunteers shooting at a chicken killed a man; he was tried and shot, not, as unjustly stated, for disobedience of orders, but for killing the man. During one of
General Bragg's rides near
Tullahoma, he happened to meet a countryman dressed in his “butternut” garb, one of those rough, independent citizens of the mountain district of Tennessee, who, after intelligently giving all the information asked of him about the roads we were looking for, was also asked by the general if he did not “belong to
Bragg's army.”
“
Bragg's army?”
was the reply.
“He's got none; he shot half of them in
Kentucky, and the other got killed up at
Murfreesboro‘.”
The general laughed and rode on.
