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ANAK´RISIS

ANAK´RISIS (ἀνάκρισις), the preliminary investigation of a case by an archon or other magistrate before it was brought before the courts of justice at Athens. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the action would lie, both parties, the complainant and defendant, were summoned separately; and if either of them failed to appear without putting in a formal application for delay (ὑπωμοσία), judgment went against him by default (Demosth. c. Theocrin. p. 1324.8). The anakrisis began by both the plaintiff and defendant taking an oath, the former thereby attesting that he had brought the charge honestly and conscientiously; the latter, that to the best of his knowledge he was innocent. According to the grammarians, the oath of the former was called προωμοσία, that of the latter ἀντωμοσία, the two together διωμοσία or ἀμφιορκία [AMPHIORKIA]. (Pollux, 8.55; Hesych. sub voce ἀντωμοσία; Timaeus, s. v. ἀντωμοσία, with Ruhnken's note.) But the word. προωμοσία does not occur in the classical authors, and the other two are not used consistently. Thus we have ἀντωμοσία on the part of a plaintiff (Isae. Dicaeog. § 1), or of the affidavits of the different claimants to an inheritance (ib. § 16; Astyph. § 34; Demosth. c. Macart. p. 1051.3): the διωμοσία of a prosecutor in criminal cases (Antiphon. de caed. Her. § 11; de Choreut. § § 49, 51), and that of the accused (Demosth. c. Aristocr. p. 643.69). It was further promised by both, that the subsequent prosecution and defence should be conducted with fairness and justice. (Harpocrat., Suid., Hesych. sub voce ἀντωμοσία: Pollux, 8.122.) If the defendant did not bring forward any objection to the matter being brought before a court of justice, the proceeding was termed εὐθυδικία. (Demosth. c. Phorm. p. 908.4; c. Steph. i. p. 1103.6.) Such objections might be raised in regard to the competency of the court to which the matter was to be referred, or in regard to the form in which the accusation was brought forward, and the like (Lys. c. Pancl. § 5; Pollux, 8.57); [p. 1.122]they were always looked upon with suspicion (Demosth. c. Leoch. p. 1097.57 f; c. Phorm. p. 944.2); but, nevertheless, they were not unfrequently resorted to by defendants, either in the form of a διαμαρτυρία, or that of a παραγραφή. In the case of a διαμαρτυρία, the plaintiff had to bring forward witnesses to show that the objections raised by the defendant were unfounded; and if this could not be done, the defendant had a right to bring witnesses to show that his objections were founded on justice, and in accordance with the laws. But each of the litigant parties might denounce the witnesses of his opponent as false witnesses, and thus a secondary lawsuit might be interwoven with the principal one. If the διαμαρτυρία was resorted to in a civil case, the party who made use of it had to deposit a sum of money (παρακαταβολή); and when the plaintiff lost his suit, he had to pay to the defendant a fine for having raised an accusation without foundation. In lawsuits about the succession to the property of a person, the διαμαρτυρία was the only form in which objections could be raised. (Bekker, Anecd. p. 236.) The παραγραφὴ was a special plea in bar of a suit, which was made by the defendant and argued without calling any witnesses, and in this also the loser had to pay a fine to the opposite party (Pollux, 8.58). See PARAGRAPHÉ; and for other forms of resistance at this stage, ANTIGRAPHÉ, When these had been set aside, the prosecution proceeded in regular course.

These are, in general, the proceedings in the ἀνάκρισις: and from what thus took place, it is clear that the main part of the evidence on both sides was brought out in the ἀνάκρισις, and at the regular trial in court the main object was to work upon the minds of the judges through the influence of the orators, with reference to the evidence brought out in the ἀνάκρισις. The latter, therefore, consisted of the simple evidence which required no oratorical discussion, and which was contained,--1, in laws; 2, in documents; 3, in the statement of free witnesses; 4, in the statement of slaves; and 5, in oaths. In all these kinds of evidence, one party might have recourse to the πρόκλησις,--that is, call upon the other party to bring forward such other evidence as was not already given. (Demosth. c. Steph. i. p. 1106; c. Pantaen. p. 978, § § 40, 41.) There was, however, no strict obligation to comply with such a demand (Demosth. c. Olymp. p. 1181.50), and in certain cases the party called upon might, in accordance with established laws, refuse to comply with the demand: for instance, persons belonging to the same family could not be compelled to appear as witnesses against one another. (Demosth. c. Timoth. p. 1195.30.) But if the reading of a document, throwing light upon the point at issue, was refused, the other party might bring in a δίκη εἰς ἐμφανῶν κατάστασιν.

In regard to the laws which either party might adduce in its support, it must be observed, that copies of them had to be read in the anakrisis, since it would have been difficult for any magistrate or judge to fix, at once, upon the law or laws bearing upon the question at issue. In what manner the authorities were enabled to insure faithful and correct copies being taken of the laws, is not known; but it is highly probable that any one who took a copy in the archives had to get the signature of some public officer or scribe to attest the correctness of the copy.

Other legal documents, such as contracts (συνθῆκαι, συγγραφαί), wills, book of accounts, and other records (Demosth. pro Phorm. p. 950.18 ff.), not only required the signature and seal of the party concerned, but their authenticity had to be attested by witnesses (Demosth. c. Onet. p. 869.21).

Evidence (μαρτυρία) was given not only by free-born and grown--up citizens, but also by strangers or aliens; and even from absent persons evidence might be procured [EKMARTYRIA], or a statement of a deceased person might be referred to [AKOĒN MARTYREIN]. If any one was called upon to bear witness (κλητεύειν), he could not refuse it; and if he refused, he might be compelled to pay a fine of 1000 drachmas (Demosth. de Fals. Leg. p. 396.176, p. 403.198; Aeschin. c. Timarch., § 46), unless he could establish by an oath (ἐχωμοσία), that he was unable to give his evidence in the case. Any one who had promised to bear witness, and afterwards failed to do so, became liable to the action of δίκη λιπομαρτυρίου or βλάβης. The evidence of an avowed friend or enemy of either party might be rejected (Aeschin. c. Timarch. § 47). All evidence was either taken down in writing as it was given by the witnesses, or, in case of its having been sent in previously in writing, it was read aloud to the witness for his recognition, and he had generally to confirm his statement by an oath. (Demosth. c. Steph. i. p. 1115.45, p. 1119.58, ii. p. 1130.5; c. Con. p. 1269.41; Aeschin. de Fals. Leg. § 126; D. L. 4.7.) The testimony of slaves was valid only when extorted by instruments of torture, to which either one party might offer to expose a slave, or the other might demand the torture of a slave. (Demosth. c. Nicostr. p. 1253.22; c. Aphob. p. 855.38; c. Onet. p. 874.37; c. Steph. ii. p. 1135.21.)

A distinct oath was required in cases where there were no witnesses or documents, but it has been remarked above that oaths were also taken to confirm the authenticity of a document, or the truth of a statement of a witness. [JUSJURANDUM]

If the evidence produced was so clear and satisfactory that there was no doubt as to who was right, the magistrate could decide the case at once, without sending it to be tried in a court. During the anakrisis as well as afterwards in the regular court, the litigant parties might settle their dispute by an amicable arrangement (Pollux, 8.143). But if the plaintiff, in a public manner, dropped his accusation, he became liable to a fine of 1000 drachmas, and incurred partial atimia (Demosth. c. Theocrin. p. 1323.6); in later times, however, this punishment was not always inflicted, and in civil cases the plaintiff only lost the sum of money which he had deposited. When the parties did not come to an understanding during the anakrisis, all the various kinds of evidence brought forward were put into a vessel called ἐχῖνος, which was sealed and entrusted to some officer to be kept until it was wanted on the day of trial. (Demosth. c. Conon. p. 1265.27; Schol. ad Aristoph. Wasps 1427.) The period [p. 1.123]between the conclusion of the preliminary investigation and until the matter was brought before a court, was considered to belong to the anakrisis; and that period was differently fixed by law, according to the nature of the charge. In cases of murder, the period was never less than three months, and in others the trial in court commenced on the thirtieth day after the beginning of the anakrisis: as e. g. in the δίκαι ἐρανικαί, ἐμπορικαί, μεταλλικαί, and προικός (Harpocrat. s. v. ἔμμηνοι δίκαι: Pollux, 8.63, 101), and the day fixed for the trial was called κυρία τοῦ νόμου (Demosth. c. Mid. p. 541.84; p. 544.93). In other cases, the day was fixed by the magistrate who conducted the anakrisis. But either party might petition for a postponement of the trial, and the opposite party might oppose the petition by an oath that the ground on which the delay was sought for was not valid, or unsatisfactory. (Harpocrat. s. v. ἀνθυπωμοσία; Pollux, 8.60.) Through such machinations, the decision of a case might be delayed to the detriment of justice; and the annals of the Athenian courts are not wanting in numerous instances in which the ends of justice were thwarted in this manner for a number of years. (Demosth. c. Mid. p. 541.82; comp. Meier and Schömann, Att. Process, p. 622; Platner, Process u. Klagen, i. p. 135 ff.; C. F. Hermann, Staatsalterth. § 141; Schömann, Antiquit. Jur. publ. Graec. p. 279; Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthumskunde, ii. p. 262, &100.2nd edit.) The examination which an archon underwent before he entered on his office, was likewise called ἀνάκρισις (Demosth. c. Eubul. p. 1319.66; p. 1320.70).

[L.S] [W.W]

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  • Cross-references from this page (2):
    • Aristophanes, Wasps, 1427
    • Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, 4.7
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