Early's March to Washington in 1864.1
by Jubal A. Early, Lieutenant-General, C. S. A.
On the 12th of June, 1864, while the Second Corps (
Ewell's) of the Army of Northern Virginia was lying near
Gaines's Mill, in rear of
Hill's line at Cold Harbor, I received orders from
General Lee to move the corps, with two of the battalions of artillery attached to it, to the Shenandoah Valley; to strike
Hunter's force
2 in the rear and, if possible, destroy it; then to move down the valley, cross the
Potomac near
Leesburg, in Loudoun County, or at or above
Harper's Ferry, as I might find most practicable, and threaten
Washington city.
3 I was further directed to communicate with
General Breckinridge, who would cooperate with me in the attack on
Hunter and the expedition into
Maryland.
The Second Corps now numbered a little over eight thousand muskets for duty.
It had been on active and arduous service in the field for forty days. Divisions were not stronger than brigades ought to have been, nor brigades than regiments.
On the morning of the 13th, at 2 o'clock, we commenced the march, and on the 16th arrived at the
Rivanna River, near
Charlottesville, having marched over eighty miles in four days. At
Charlottesville I received a telegram from
Breckinridge, dated at
Lynchburg, informing me that
Hunter was then in
Bedford County about twenty miles from that place and moving on it. The railroad and telegraph between
Charlottesville and
Lynchburg had been, fortunately, but slightly injured by the enemy's cavalry, and had been repaired.
I ordered all the trains of the two roads to be sent to me with all dispatch, for the purpose of transporting my troops to Lynehburg.
The trains were not in readiness to take the troops on board until sunrise on the morning of the 17th, and then only enough were furnished to transport about half my infantry.
I accompanied
Ramseur's division, going on the front train; but the road and rolling stock were in such bad condition that I did not reach Lynehburg until about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and the other trains were much later.
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As
General Breckinridge was in bed, suffering from an injury received near Cold Harbor, at his request
General D. H. Hill, who happened to be in town, had made arrangements for the defense of the city with such troops as were at hand.
Slight works had been hastily thrown up on
College Hill, covering the turnpike and Forest roads from Liberty, manned by
Breckinridge's infantry and the dismounted cavalry of the command [Jones's and
Vaughn's brigades] which had been with
Jones at
Piedmont.
The reserves, invalids from the hospitals, and the cadets from the Military Institute at
Lexington occupied other parts of the line.
My troops, as they arrived, had been ordered in front of the works to bivouac, and I immediately sent orders for them to move out on the turnpike, and two brigades of
Ramseur's division arrived just in time to be thrown across the road at a redoubt about two miles from the city as
Imboden's command was driven back by vastly superior numbers.
These brigades, with two pieces of artillery in the redoubt, arrested the progress of the enemy, and
Ramseur's other brigade, and the part of
Gordon's division which had arrived, took position on the same line.
The enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery on us, but as night soon came on he went into camp on our front.
Orders had been given for the immediate return of the trains for the rest of my infantry, but it did not get to
Lynchburg until late in the afternoon of the 18th, and meanwhile I contented myself with acting on the defensive.
There was artillery firing and skirmishing along the line, and in the afternoon an attack was made to the right of the turnpike, which was handsomely repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy.
A demonstration of the enemy's cavalry on the
Forest road was checked by part of
Breckinridge's infantry under
Wharton, and
McCausland's cavalry.
As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by the railroad, though none of my artillery had gotten up, arrangements were made for attacking
Hunter at daylight on the 19th; but after midnight it was discovered that he was moving, and at light it was observed that he was in retreat, and pursuit commenced.
The enemy's rear was overtaken at
Liberty, twenty-five miles from
Lynchburg, just before night, and driven through that place, after a brisk skirmish, by
Ramseur's division.
The day's march on the old turnpike, which was very rough, had been terrible.
The pursuit was resumed early on the morning of the 20th, and the enemy was pursued into the mountains at Buford's Gap, but he had taken possession of the crest of the
Blue Ridge, and put batteries in position commanding a gorge through which the road passes.
On the 21st the pursuit was resumed very shortly after sunrise.
The enemy had turned off from
Salem toward
Lewisburg, and
McCausland had struck his column and captured ten pieces of artillery, but was compelled to fall back, carrying off, however, the prisoners and also a part of the artillery, and disabling the rest.
As the enemy had got into the mountains, where nothing useful could be accomplished by pursuit, I did not deem it proper to continue it farther.
A great part of my command had had nothing to eat for the last two days, except a little bacon which was obtained at Liberty.
It had marched sixty miles in the three days pursuit, over very rough roads.
I determined, therefore, to rest on the 22d, so as to enable the wagons and artillery to get up, and prepare the men for the long march before them.
4
At
Lynchburg I had received a telegram from
General Lee, directing me, after disposing of
Hunter, either to return to his army or to carry out the original plan, as I might deem most expedient.
After the pursuit had ceased I received another dispatch from him, submitting it to my judgment whether the condition of my troops would permit the expedition across the
Potomac to be carried out, and I determined to take the responsibility of continuing it. On the 23d the march was resumed, and we reached
Buchanan that night.
On the 26th I reached
Staunton in advance of the troops, and the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing transportation and getting provisions from
Waynesboro‘. The official reports at this place showed about two thousand mounted men for duty in the cavalry, which was composed of four small brigades, to wit:
Imboden's,
McCausland's,
Jackson's, and
Jones's (now
Johnson's). The official reports of the infantry showed ten thousand muskets for duty, including
Vaughn's dismounted cavalry.
Besides
Breckinridge's own infantry division, under
Elzey (now under
Vaughn, afterward under
Echols),
Gordon's division of the Second Corps was assigned to
General Breckinridge, in order to give him. a command commensurate with his proper one.
Nearly half the troops were barefoot, or nearly so, and shoes were sent for. But without waiting for them the march was resumed on the 28th, with five days rations in the wagons and two days in haversacks.
Imboden was sent through Brock's Gap to the
South Branch of the
Potomac to destroy the railroad bridge over that stream, and all the bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from that point to
Martinsburg.
On
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Map of the Virginia campaigns of 1864-5. |
the 2d of July we reached
Winchester, and here I received a dispatch from
General Lee, directing me to remain in the lower valley until everything was in readiness to cross the
Potomac, and to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal as far as possible.
This was in accordance with my previous determination, and its policy was obvious.
My provisions were nearly exhausted, and if I had moved through
Loudoun it would have been necessary for me to halt and thresh wheat and have it ground, as neither bread nor flour could be otherwise obtained; which would have caused much greater delay than was required on the other route, where we could take provisions from the enemy.
Moreover, unless the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was torn up the enemy would have been able to move troops from the
West over that road to
Washington.
On the morning of the 3d
Sigel, with a considerable force, after slight skirmishing, evacuated
Martinsburg, leaving considerable stores in our hands.
McCausland burned the bridge over
Back Creek, capturing the guard at North Mountain depot, and succeeded in reaching
Hainesville; but
Bradley T. Johnson, after driving
Mulligan, with hard fighting at
Leetown, across the railroad, was himself forced back, when
Sigel united with
Mulligan, upon
Rodes's and
Ramseur's divisions,
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which arrived at
Leetown after a march of twenty-four miles. During the night
Sigel retreated across the
Potomac at
Shepherdstown to
Maryland Heights.
During the night of the 4th the enemy evacuated
Harper's Ferry, burning the railroad and pontoon bridges across the
Potomac.
It was not possible to occupy the town of
Harper's Ferry, except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly commanded by the heavy guns on
Maryland Heights; and the 5th was spent by
Rodes's and
Ramseur's divisions in demonstrating at that place.
In the afternoon
Breckinridge's command moved to
Shepherdstown and crossed the
Potomac, followed by
Rodes's and
Ramseur's divisions early on the 6th.
Gordon's division advanced toward
Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into his works.
Working parties were employed in destroying the aqueduct of the canal over the
Antietam, and the locks and canal-boats.
On the 7th
Rodes moved through
Rohrersville on the road to Crampton's Gap in
South Mountain, and skirmished with a small force of the enemy, while
Breckinridge demonstrated against
Maryland Heights.
McCausland had occupied
Hagerstown and levied a contribution of $20,000, and
Boonsboro' had been occupied by
Johnson's cavalry.
A letter from
General Lee had informed me that an effort would be made to release the prisoners at
Point Lookout, and directing me to take steps to unite them with my command.
My desire had been to manoeuvre the enemy out of
Maryland Heights, so as to move directly to
Washington; but lie had taken refuge in his strongly fortified works, and I therefore determined to move through the gaps of
South Mountain north of the
Heights.
On the 7th the greater portion of the cavalry was sent in the direction of Frederick:; and that night the expected shoes arrived and were distributed.
Early on the morning of the 8th the whole force moved:
Rodes through Crampton's Gap to
Jefferson;
Breckinridge through Fox's Gap; and
Ramseur, with the trains, through Boonsboro' Gap, followed by
Lewis's brigade, which had started from
Harper's Ferry the night before, after burning the trestle-work on the railroad and the stores which had not been brought off. Early on the 9th
Johnson, with his brigade of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, moved to the north of
Frederick, with orders to strike the railroads from
Baltimore to
Harrisburg and
Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the
Gunpowder, also to cut the railroad between
Washington and
Baltimore, and threaten the latter place; and then to move toward
Point Lookout for the purpose of releasing the prisoners, if we should succeed in getting into
Washington.
The other troops also moved forward toward
Monocacy Junction, and
Ramseur's division passed through
Frederick, driving a force of skirmishers before it.
The enemy in considerable force, under
General Lew Wallace,
5 was found strongly posted
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Map of the battle of the Monocacy. |
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on the eastern bank of the
Monocacy, near the junction, with an earth-work and two block-houses commanding both the railroad bridge and the bridge on the
Georgetown pike.
McCausland, crossing the river with his brigade, dismounted his men and advanced rapidly against the enemy's left flank, which he threw into confusion, but he was then gradually forced back.
McCausland's movement, which was very brilliantly executed, solved the problem for me, and orders were sent to
Breckinridge to move up rapidly with
Gordon's division to
McCausland's assistance, and, striking the enemy's left, to drive him from the positions commanding the crossings in
Ramseur's front, so that the latter might cross.
This division crossed under the personal superintendence of
General Breckinridge, and while
Ramseur skirmished with the enemy in front, the attack was made by
Gordon in gallant style, and with the aid of several pieces of
King's artillery, which had been crossed over, and Nelson's artillery from the opposite side, he threw the enemy into great confusion and forced him from his position.
Ramseur immediately crossed on the railroad bridge and pursued the enemy's flying forces, and
Rodes crossed on the left and joined in the pursuit.
Between 600 and 700 unwounded prisoners fell into their hands, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded
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was very heavy.
Our loss in killed and wounded was about 700.
The action closed about sunset, and we had marched about fourteen miles before it commenced.
All the troops and trains were crossed over the
Monocacy that night, so as to resume the march early the next day. During the operations at
Monocacy, a contribution of $200,000 in money was levied on the city of
Frederick, and some much-needed supplies were obtained.
On the 10th the march was resumed at day — light, and we bivouacked four miles from
Rockville, on the
Georgetown pike, having marched twenty miles.
McCausland, moving in front, drove a body of the enemy's cavalry before him, and had a brisk engagement at
Rockville, where he encamped after defeating and driving off the enemy.
We moved at daylight on the 11th,
McCausland on the
Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceded by
Imboden's cavalry under
Colonel Smith, turned to the left at
Rockville, so as to reach the 7th street pike which runs by
Silver Springs into
Washington.
Jackson's cavalry moved on the left flank.
The previous day had been very warm, and the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain for several weeks.
The heat during the night had been very oppressive, and but little rest had been obtained.
This day was an exceedingly hot one, and there was no air stirring.
While marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaustion.
Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the fortifications around
Washington before they could be manned.
Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the works on the 7th street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed them as skirmishers.
I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived in sight of
Fort Stevens on this road a short time after noon, when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned.
Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skirmishers, and move into the works if he could.
My whole column was then moving by flank, which was the only practicable mode of marching on the road we were on, and before
Rodes's division could be brought up we saw a cloud of dust in the rear of the works toward
Washington, and soon a column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left, and skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire was opened on us from a number of batteries.
This defeated our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became necessary to reconnoiter.
Rodes's skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was practicable to carry them by assault.
They were found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be inclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works in front of each, pierced for an immense number of guns, the whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and strengthened by palisades and abatis.
The timber had been felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground, making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by artillery.
On the right was
Rock Creek, running through a deep ravine which had been rendered impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, and beyond were the works on the
Georgetown pike which had been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of the same
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impregnable character.
6 This reconnoissance consumed the balance of the day.
The rapid marching and the losses at
Harper's Ferry,
Maryland Heights, and
Monocacy had reduced my infantry to about 8000 muskets.
7 Of these a very large number were greatly exhausted by the last two days marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and not more than one-third of my force could have been carried into action.
I had about forty pieces of artillery, of which the largest were 12-pounder Napoleons, besides a few pieces of horse-artillery with the cavalry.
McCausland reported the works on the
Georgetown pike too strongly manned for him to assault.
After dark on the 11th I held a consultation with
Major-Generals Breckinridge,
Rodes,
Gordon, and
Ramseur, in which I stated to them the necessity of doing something immediately, as the passes of
South Mountain and the fords of the
Upper Potomac would soon be closed against us. After interchanging views with them, I determined to make an assault on the enemy's works at daylight next morning.
But during the night a dispatch was received from
General Bradley T. Johnson from near
Baltimore, that two corps had arrived from
General Grant's army, and that his whole army was probably in motion.
As soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front, and found the parapet lined with troops.
I had, therefore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing
Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the
Capitol, and given the
Federal authorities a terrible fright.
Some of the
Northern papers stated that, between Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the city; but on Saturday I was fighting at
Monocacy, thirty-five miles from
Washington, a force which I could not leave in my rear; and after disposing of that force and moving as rapidly as it was possible for me to move, I did not arrive in front of the fortifications until after noon on Monday, and then my troops were exhausted, and it required time to bring them up into line.
I had then made a march, over the circuitous route by
Charlottesville,
Lynchburg, and
Salem, down the valley and through the passes of the
South Mountain, which, notwithstanding the delays in dealing with
Hunter's,
Sigel's, and
Wallace's forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I believe, without a parallel in this or any other modern war. My small force had been thrown up to the very walls of the
Federal capital, north of a river which could not be forded at any point within forty miles, and with a heavy force and the
South Mountain in my rear — the passes through which mountain could be held by a small number of troops.
A glance at the map, when it is recollected that the
Potomac is a wide river, and navigable to
Washington for the largest vessels, will cause the intelligent reader to wonder, not why I failed to take
Washington, but why I had the audacity to approach it as I did, with the small force under my command.
It was supposed by some, who were not informed of the facts, that I delayed in the lower valley longer than was necessary; but an examination of the foregoing narrative will show that not one moment was spent in idleness.
I could not move across the
Potomac and through the passes of the
South Mountain, with any safety, until
Sigel was driven from, or safely housed in, the fortifications at
Maryland Heights.
After abandoning the idea of capturing
Washington I determined to remain in front of the fortifications during the 12th, and retire at night.
Johnson had burned the bridges over the
Gunpowder, on the
Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened
Baltimore, and started for
Point Lookout; but the attempt to release the prisoners was not made, as the enemy had received notice of it in some way. On the afternoon of the 12th a heavy reconnoitering force was sent out by the
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enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, was driven back by
Rodes's division with but slight loss to us.
8 About dark we commenced retiring, and did so without molestation.
Passing through
Rockville and
Poolesville, we crossed the
Potomac at
White's Ford, above
Leesburg, in Loudoun County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners captured at
Monocacy, and our captured beef cattle and horses, and everything else, in safety.
9 
