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s, Rosser's cavalry and a battery of artillery were engaged at Dinwiddie, but of these I can find no return. Pickett states in his report that one of his own brigades, as well as one of Johnson's, was absent on the 31st of March; but a portion of Heth and Wilcox's troops stood ready to support him, and his own absent brigade returned to him late on the 1st of April. On the 20th of February the extra-duty men in Pickett and Johnson's divisions were 1,418 in number. and the attack on Warren was e desperate daring of the gambler who risks all on his last throw. When he discovered that Grant was again moving to the left, he quickly, in spite of mud and rains and heavy roads, transferred nearly one-third The forces of Pickett, Anderson, Heth, Wilcox, W. H. F. and Fitz Hugh Lee, and Rosser were all in front of Warren or Sheridan on the 30th of March. These amounted to 27,500 men. See Lee's return of February 20th. But Pickett's Report, published in Pickett's Men, puts them at 8,000!
Cadmus Wilcox (search for this): chapter 8
s cavalry and a battery of artillery were engaged at Dinwiddie, but of these I can find no return. Pickett states in his report that one of his own brigades, as well as one of Johnson's, was absent on the 31st of March; but a portion of Heth and Wilcox's troops stood ready to support him, and his own absent brigade returned to him late on the 1st of April. On the 20th of February the extra-duty men in Pickett and Johnson's divisions were 1,418 in number. and the attack on Warren was doubtless rate daring of the gambler who risks all on his last throw. When he discovered that Grant was again moving to the left, he quickly, in spite of mud and rains and heavy roads, transferred nearly one-third The forces of Pickett, Anderson, Heth, Wilcox, W. H. F. and Fitz Hugh Lee, and Rosser were all in front of Warren or Sheridan on the 30th of March. These amounted to 27,500 men. See Lee's return of February 20th. But Pickett's Report, published in Pickett's Men, puts them at 8,000! of his
plank to try and communicate with Sheridan. Both these orders to Warren were obeyed. He sent Bartlett's brigade to the left, on the White Oak road, and three regiments by the Boydton road in the dttack the enemy at Dinwiddie court-house on one side, and Sheridan on the other. On account of Bartlett's position, they [the enemy] will have to make a considerable detour to reinforce their troops Oak road a mile and a half west of Warren's left on the 31st of March, the Crump road, on which Bartlett was moving, runs directly south about two miles, when it enters the main Five Forks road near tadvantage that Warren was already in possession of the Crump road, as far as Gravelly run, with Bartlett's brigade. Accordingly, at 9.45 P. M., Meade enquired of Grant: Would it not be well for War of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line to the Boydton plank road, and the refusal along it. Bartlett's brigade is now on the [Crump] road from G. Boisseau running north, where it crosses Gravelly
Dinwiddie (search for this): chapter 8
cavalry on the direct road to the court-house. But Sheridan pushed out at the same time from Dinwiddie, with Merritt and Crook's commands, leaving Custer at the rear to guard the trains and the roa the rebels lay on their arms that night not more than a hundred yards from Sheridan's lines. Dinwiddie, however, was held. Merritt and Davies, with their commands, reached the court-house withouief simply desired to protect Warren against an intervention of the enemy between his left and Dinwiddie; but the moment he learned that Sheridan was opposed by infantry as well as horse, and had beehe Crump road, his route would bring him directly in the rear of Pickett's force as it fronted Dinwiddie. The Fifth corps could then either attack the enemy in rear, or if, alarmed by the national e of your command by the road Bartlett is on, and strike the enemy in rear, or between him and Dinwiddie. General Sheridan reported his last position as north of Dinwiddie court-house, near Dr. Smit
rant: The enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Dinwiddie, and Davies and Devin are coming down the Boydton road to join us. . . . The men behaved splendidly. Our loss in kill. Meanwhile he telegraphed to Meade: Colonel Porter has returned from Sheridan. He says that Devin has been driven back in considerable confusion south of Boisseau's house. The effort has been tg upon our rear in force.—Pickett's Report. They were followed fast by Merritt's two divisions, Devin on the right and Custer on the left, while Crook remained at the rear to hold Dinwiddie and the as directed to press the enemy, and promptly pushed Custer out by the Scott or western road, and Devin by the main one, to Five Forks. Twice he encountered temporary breastworks, erected since the d the cavalry had now gained the angle and connected with his left inside the rebel breastworks. Devin contested with Custer the honor of having first gained a foothold, and both divisions had plante
ame time from Dinwiddie, with Merritt and Crook's commands, leaving Custer at the rear to guard the trains and the roads connecting with Meadt of Dinwiddie. Meanwhile, Sheridan had brought up two brigades of Custer's division, and these, with Gibbes and Gregg, were now in line; sli road leading to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as most on his flanks. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at re followed fast by Merritt's two divisions, Devin on the right and Custer on the left, while Crook remained at the rear to hold Dinwiddie andtt accordingly was directed to press the enemy, and promptly pushed Custer out by the Scott or western road, and Devin by the main one, to Fivd with his left inside the rebel breastworks. Devin contested with Custer the honor of having first gained a foothold, and both divisions had
J. A. Early (search for this): chapter 8
xtracted from these returns. Omitting any mention of the sick, the extra-duty men, or those in arrest, Colonel Taylor asserts that on the 28th (he should say 20th) of February, 1865, the date of Lee's last return, the rebel general had exactly 39,879 muskets available. But, in order to make this showing, he excludes from his computation not only the sick, the extra-duty men, and those in arrest, 13,728 in number, but all officers, all artillery, all cavalry, all detached commands, all of Early's force in the Valley, which joined Lee for his last campaign, and all the troops, regular and local, in Richmond. He calculates that, in the attack on Fort Steadman on the 25th of March, Lee lost from 2,500 to 3,000 men, and that during the month of March about 3,000 rebels deserted. Thus, on the 31st of March, says Taylor, Lee had only 33,000 muskets with which to defend his lines. This number he contrasts with an effective total, which he ascribes to Grant, of 162,239. But this total o
his occasion. The general-in-chief had three aides-de-camp with Sheridan this day, sending them in succession to communicate his views. Colonel Porter was instructed first to say that the movements of the main army would very much depend upon the result of Sheridan's operations; that Grant would have preferred to send him the Sixth corps, but it was at too great distance to reach him in time, and the Fifth corps, being the nearest, had been dispatched instead. A little before noon Colonel Babcock arrived, with a verbal message from Grant to the effect that Sheridan was to have complete control of his own movement, that the responsibility would rest entirely with him; and that, if in his judgment, Warren should not prove equal to the task assigned him, Sheridan must not hesitate to relieve him and put another in command of the Fifth corps. This message was the result of the experience of a year. Grant believed that disappointments and partial rebuffs had occurred again and ag
J. Boisseau (search for this): chapter 8
difficulties. Let us suppose the two divisions that General Grant directed to be moved by J. Boisseau's were expected to reach General Sheridan by midnight. The order which I received was writteual deprivation of it, and we had but a short distance to move before reaching the enemy near J. Boisseau's. At five minutes past two A. M. the bridge on the Boydton road was complete, and Ayres advsaid to Sheridan: The Fifth corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. Boisseau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent Mackenzie's cavalry, which ' house, which leads out across Chamberlain's bed or run. I understand you have a division at J. Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flanks. I will hold on here. .. We marched in retreat in a southwest direction until we approached a road leading south to Boisseau's cross-roads, and followed the other two divisions. The enemy did not follow us from his entr
Wesley Merritt (search for this): chapter 8
trains and the roads connecting with Meade. Merritt was thrown forward on the principal road to tht, and penetrated Sheridan's line, isolating Merritt and Davies from the remainder of the command.went crashing through the woods in pursuit of Merritt, wheeling towards the Boydton road, Gibbes ste by the rear rank and abandon the pursuit of Merritt, which, if continued, would have taken in flad to drive the rebels back to Five Forks with Merritt's column, press them into their works, and matroy the entire army of Northern Virginia. Merritt accordingly was directed to press the enemy, o hold the national column in check, and when Merritt's line was formed and ready to attack, they gind their works along the White Oak road, and Merritt had pressed so close that the rebel skirmisheime the fire of Ayres's division was heard by Merritt, and the cavalry promptly responded to the sid were followed by Griffin, and afterwards by Merritt's cavalry. Sheridan, meanwhile, had been g[10 more...]
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