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the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages, other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them one Confederate to five Yanks. Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared. There was more justification for the ass
Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. Reconnaissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there. Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the
M. C. Butler (search for this): chapter 55
assault on Cold Harbor. Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed him to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landed twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a division [2,500] was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after light o
G. K. Warren (search for this): chapter 55
the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigWarren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out and get on his front. Warren fired his artiWarren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'cloc While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate times with vigor, but were repue capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy forced him to it. There was alsut did not take place until the next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with as moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While Warren and Burnside were making these changes the eneby the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threateningining the outer-probably picket --rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground —ught something could be done in his front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore, to make no
W. S. Hancock (search for this): chapter 55
the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feebleion we had gained, but without effecting their object. Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordearren's corps was moved to the left to connect with Smith: Hancock's corps was got into position to the left of Wright's, and was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but Warren and Burnside were to support The move was to commence at half-past 4 in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour, withity of doing anything more in their respective fronts. Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too stronines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, bf Richmond than to have them go back there. Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break
P. H. Sheridan (search for this): chapter 55
dvance on Cold Harbor-an anecdote of the war- battle of Cold Harbor-correspondence with Lee-Retrospective On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued butortance of Cold Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. He returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evaculock the 1st of June before it reached its destination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Con carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder. Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. He reported
W. H. F. Lee (search for this): chapter 55
or-an anecdote of the war- battle of Cold Harbor-correspondence with Lee-Retrospective On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbe by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered toand Smith; but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either rei offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind him. Fightl Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effeengthening the line we now held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us. During the night the enemy quitted our rig
W. T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 55
followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central Railroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. One of them said, No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better
J. H. Wilson (search for this): chapter 55
While Warren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central Railroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to t
over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put [James H.] Martindale's division in it, and with [William T. H.] Brooks supporting him on the left and [Charles, Jr.] Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer-probably picket --rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground — which brought the whole army on one line. Near Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 7 A. M. Major-General Meade, Commanding A P. The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you
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