hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in descending order. Sort in ascending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
W. T. Sherman 925 7 Browse Search
P. H. Sheridan 435 3 Browse Search
Vicksburg (Mississippi, United States) 320 0 Browse Search
W. S. Hancock 281 3 Browse Search
A. E. Burnside 266 2 Browse Search
Chattanooga (Tennessee, United States) 260 0 Browse Search
G. K. Warren 251 1 Browse Search
Washington (United States) 226 16 Browse Search
George H. Thomas 220 6 Browse Search
James B. McPherson 215 1 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. Search the whole document.

Found 181 total hits in 49 results.

1 2 3 4 5
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 55
d not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. So I wrote the following: Cold Harbor, Va. June 5, 1864 General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate Army. It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lyinr dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answered this immediately by saying: Cold Harbor, Va. June 6, 1864 General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army of N. Va. Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send immediately, as you ties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. I answered: Cold Harbor, Va. June 6, 1864 General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army, N. Va. The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the tw the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote to Lee: Cold Harbor, Va. June 7, 1864, 10.30 A. M. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army of N. Va. I regret that your note of seven P. M. yesterday should have been received at the nea
A. E. Burnside (search for this): chapter 55
n when the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to reliwith Smith: Hancock's corps was got into position to the left of Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While Warren and Burnside were makinBurnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they shouldd, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack with great earnestright succeeded in gaining the outer-probably picket --rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground — which brought the whole army on one line. Ns and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: Burnside thought something could be done in his front, but Warren differed. I conclude
R. E. Lee (search for this): chapter 55
fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party ond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but w to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of June-forty-eight hours after it cowere got out to collect the men left upon the field. In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote to Lee: Cold Harbor, Va. June 7, 1864, 10.30 A. M. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army of N. Va. I regret that your note of se
John Gibbon (search for this): chapter 55
lect the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commence at half-past 4 in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickimmediately turned against the men who had just been using them. No assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer r
Martindale (search for this): chapter 55
but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put [James H.] Martindale's division in it, and with [William T. H.] Brooks supporting him on the left and [Charles, Jr.] Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer-probably picket --rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground — which brought the whole army on one line. Near Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 7 A. M. Major-General Meade, Commanding A P. The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if n
George G. Meade (search for this): chapter 55
acked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for thcket --rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground — which brought the whole army on one line. Near Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 7 A. M. Major-General Meade, Commanding A P. The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and ino more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 12.30 P. M. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther ad
Horace Brooks (search for this): chapter 55
gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put [James H.] Martindale's division in it, and with [William T. H.] Brooks supporting him on the left and [Charles, Jr.] Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer-probably picket --rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground — which brought the whole army on one line. Near Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 7 A. M. Major-General Meade, Commanding A P. The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from
G. T. Anderson (search for this): chapter 55
her at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost sThere was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith. During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting their object. Hancock was moved from his place i
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 55
they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit toough General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the lineties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead toave dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General Lee's response was that he could not consent to the buriaas you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspoen left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain, &c., U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold
May (search for this): chapter 55
n arms and ammunition. The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we gained-and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice — was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not been made, I have no doubt that the m
1 2 3 4 5