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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Ratisbon (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
e battle of Austerlitz, he had resolved, in case of check, to take his line of operations through Bohemia upon Passau or Ratisbon, which offered to him a country, new and full of resources, instead of retaking that by Vienna, which offered nothing bupoleon, there are several where the two systems are alternately employed in 24 hours, as for example, the affairs around Ratisbon in 1809. On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two hypotheses: 1. When they tend to concentrate a die Alps, it might adopt according to events sometimes the strategical line which should lead from Ulm upon Donanwerth and Ratisbon, sometimes that which should lead from Ulm towards the Tyrol; finally, that which should conduct from Ulm upon Nuremberger half consists precisely in giving to such efforts the most decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena and at Ratisbon. The whole art of strategical warfare is contained in these three different applications. I shall be pardoned for repe
Saxony (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
of Napoleon had at Rivoli, Verona and Legnano, to watch the Adige, those which he had in 1813 in Saxony and in Silesia in advance of his line of defense, were strategical positions, as well as those o Austria had acceded to the great coalition against Napoleon, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, another Bavaria, and another Italy; thus Saxony, or more properly speaking, the country situate natural line, the fine highway from Leipzig to Frankfort, besides the ten roads which lead from Saxony through Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel. Here is enough to prove the importance of it would be unjust to judge of central lines by the fate which those of Napoleon experienced in Saxony: it is that his front of operations was found outflanked upon the right, and taken in reverse bye of Savoy, in 1706, exercised upon the events of that epoch, also the declaration of Maurice of Saxony, in 1551, and of Bavaria in 1813, sufficiently proves that it is important to attach to one's se
Belgium (Belgium) (search for this): chapter 3
on of his career in Portugal, in Spain and in Belgium, and, in fact, it was the only one which suit example, the theatre of war of the French in Belgium; it is quite plain that the one of the two paed by the mental reservations of Austria upon Belgium, was not less fatal, in causing the march of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligmy (1815), and that o. The Austrians gained victories, and retook Belgium, because Dumouriez extended unskillfully his detail, enabling the French to consolidate in Belgium? Finally, the army was put in motion, after ed the success at Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium. In 1795, the French committed such great faazines to be despised; large armies, invading Belgium and Germany without provisions, lived sometiming among the inhabitants is very possible in Belgium, in Italy, in Suabia, upon the rich banks bf ithout success at Toulon, on the Rhine and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion might have[2 more...]
Lisbon (Portugal) (search for this): chapter 3
ey are for some, equally formidable would they be for others, as may be seen from all that precedes. After having pointed out the danger there would be for a continental army to be thrown back upon the sea, it should appear astonishing that any one could have vaunted the advantages of bases established upon its shores, and that they could suit any but an insular army. In fact, Wellington, coming with this fleet to the succor of Portugal and of Spain, could adopt no better base than that of Lisbon, or, more properly speaking, the presqu‘ île of Torres-Vedras, which covers the only avenues to that capital on the land side. Here the banks of the Tagus, and those of the sea, covered not only his two flanks, but they yet assured his line of retreat, which could have place only upon his vessels. Seduced by the advantages which this famous intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras had procured the English general, and only judging from effects, without going back to causes, many generals, very l
Rovereto (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
succor of Mantua, had at first only the simple line of operations of the Adige, but arrived at Roveredo he formed three columns separated by great obstacles; he operated then upon three momentary strte with its right. Wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, wishes to cover the two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza; Bonaparte, after having overthrown and repulsed the first upon the Lavis, changes parting from the Appenines, led to Verona, where it stopped. When he had repulsed Wurmser upon Roveredo and had resolved to penetrate into Tyrol in his pursuit, he pushed into the valley of the Adigewhich would have somewhat embarrassed Napoleon; but that Austrian general, beaten anteriorly at Roveredo, ignorant for several days of what the French army was doing, and believing that he had it all leon, repulsed at Bassano, would already have returned. Even though Davidovich had advanced to Roveredo, facing Vaubois, he would there have been surrounded in that gulf of the Adige between the two
Marienberg (Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
of Napoleon extended first from Hamburg to Wittenburg, from whence it ran along the line of the Allies to near Glogau and Breslau, since his right was at Lowenberg; finally, he fell back in rear upon the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His forces were distributed upon this great front in four masses, the strategic positions of which were interior or central. Withdrawn later behind the Elbe, his real line of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a crotchet in rear on Marienberg; for Hamburg and Magdeberg even, were found already outside of his strategic field, and he would have been lost if he had thought of carrying his operations in that direction. As another example, I will cite his position around Mantua in 1796. His front of operations extended, in reality, from the mountains of Bergamo to the Adriatic Sea, whilst that in need his true line of defense was upon the Adige, between Lake Garda and Legnano, afterwards on the Mincio, between Peschiera and Mant
Coblenz (Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
When the Prussians arrived towards the end of July at Coblentz, it is certain that the French could no longer make a wares the ten roads which lead from Saxony through Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel. Here is enough to prove the im a base; its line of operations ran from Cologne and from Coblentz upon Luxemburg and Namur; Wellington had Antwerp for a baplaced on great rivers as to command both banks; Mayence, Coblentz, Strasbourg, comprehending Kehl, are true models of this banks would well fulfill the double destination. That of Coblentz, recently constructed seems to mark the epoch of a new sy in permanent fortifications, such as has been applied at Coblentz, offers the advantage of averting these dangers, by puttidebouching therefrom in presence of an enemy. However if Coblentz is a formidable establishment the fortress of Ehrenbreitso offer as many advantages as the great detached forts of Coblentz. These towers are forty in number, armed each with six p
Frankfort (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
om that of the Elbe; whereas by moving from Gera to the west in the direction of Weimar, he placed his front of operations in advance of the three routes of Saalfield, Schleiz and Hof, which served him as lines of communication, and which he covered thus perfectly. And even if the Prussians had imagined they could cut him off from his lines of retreat by throwing themselves between Gera and Bareith, then they would have opened to him his most natural line, the fine highway from Leipzig to Frankfort, besides the ten roads which lead from Saxony through Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel. Here is enough to prove the importance of those kinds of combinations; let us return to the series of maxims announced. 4. To manoeuvre wisely, it is necessary to avoid forming two independent armies upon the same frontier; such a system could scarcely be suitable except in cases of great coalitions, or when there should be immense forces which could not be made to act upon the same zone
Coburg (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
k upon the Baltic, after having been cut off from its communications, is another proof of this truth. If the Prince of Coburg had operated as has been done in our day, he would easily have made Pichegru repent of having executed that audacious manthe army before Landrecies, since the departure of those forces obliged it to retard its invasion? Did not the Prince of Coburg lose all the advantages of his central position, allowing all his heavy detachments to be beaten in detail, enabling the cal troops of Prussia and of Austria, as well as their chiefs: Mack, among others, to whom the successes of the Prince of Coburg were attributed, augmented his reputation by publishing instructions for extending lines to the end of opposing a thinnerson; the Austrians, on the contrary, better directed, by Clairfayt, Charteler and Schmidt, than by Mack and the Prince of Coburg, proved that they had some conception of strategy. Every one knows that the Arch-Duke triumphed in 1796, over Jourdan
Emden (Lower Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
in their favor the North Sea, forming the third side, and that consequently they had only to gain the side Bd by manoeuvres, in order to be masters of the four faces, that is to say, the base and all the communications of the enemy, as the above figure shows. The French Army E, departing from the base Cd, to gain the front of operations Fgh, cut off the allied Army J, from the side Bd, which formed its base; this latter would then have been thrown back upon the angle L, A, M, formed near Emden, by the lines of the Rhine, the Ems and the North Sea; whilst the French army, E, could always communicate with its bases of the Main and Rhine. The manoeuvre of Napoleon upon the Saale in 1806, was combined absolutely in the same manner; he occupied at Jena and at Naumburg the line Fgh, and marched afterwards by Halle and Dessau, in order to throw back the Prussian Army J, upon the side Ab, formed by the sea. The result is sufficiently well known. The great art of directing properly o
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