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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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June (search for this): chapter 5
ols of cavalry; finally, to establish alarm signals for the case of a serious attack. These are, in my opinion, the best maxims that could be given. In the winter of 1807, Napoleon cantoned his army behind the Passarge in the face of the enemy; the advanced guards alone were barracked in proximity with the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. This army exceeded a hundred and twenty thousand men, and there was much skill necessary to maintain and nourish it in this position until the month of June. The country favored, it is true, this system, and we do not find everywhere one as suitable. An army of a hundred thousand men may find compact winter quarters in countries where cities abound, and of which we have spoken above. When the army is more numerous, the difficulty is increased; it is true, however, that, if the extent of quarters is augmented in proportion to the numerical force, it must be owned also that the means of resistance to oppose to a hostile irruption is increased
October (search for this): chapter 5
ries, Arabia, old Prussia, presents more facilities for establishing quarters therein than countries where cities are rare. Not only are resources there found for the subsistence of troops, but shelters are found near to each other, which permit the maintaining divisions together. In Poland, in Russia, in a part of Austria and France, in Spain, in Southern Italy, it is more difficult to establish ourselves in winter quarters. Formerly, each party entered them respectively at the end of October, and contented themselves with taking reciprocally a few battalions too isolated at advanced posts; it was a partisan warfare. The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters by Turenne, in Upper Alsace, in 1674, is one of the operations which best indicate what can be undertaken against hostile cantonments, and the precautions which should be taken on our side, in order that the enemy do not form the same enterprises. To establish cantonments very compactly, and upon a space as extended
1674 AD (search for this): chapter 5
near to each other, which permit the maintaining divisions together. In Poland, in Russia, in a part of Austria and France, in Spain, in Southern Italy, it is more difficult to establish ourselves in winter quarters. Formerly, each party entered them respectively at the end of October, and contented themselves with taking reciprocally a few battalions too isolated at advanced posts; it was a partisan warfare. The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters by Turenne, in Upper Alsace, in 1674, is one of the operations which best indicate what can be undertaken against hostile cantonments, and the precautions which should be taken on our side, in order that the enemy do not form the same enterprises. To establish cantonments very compactly, and upon a space as extended in depth as in breadth, to the end of avoiding too long a line, always easy to pierce and impossible to rally; to cover them by a river or by a first line of troops barracked and supported by field works; to fix u
1795 AD (search for this): chapter 5
ould remove them thus farther and farther from the bridges. But if the passage were effected, on the contrary, upon one of the extremities of the strategic front of the euemy by changing direction briskly upon that front which would be attacked in its whole extent, as Frederick attacked the Austrian line tactically at Leuthen in all its length, the army would have its bridges behind it, and would cover them in all its forward movements. It was thus that Jourdan, having passed at Dusseldorf (1795) upon the extreme right of the Austrians, could advance in all security upon the Maine; if he was repulsed it was because the French having a double and exterior line of operations, left a hundred and twenty thousand men paralyzed from Mayence to Basle, whilst Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan upon the Lahn. But this circumstance could alter in nothing the evident advantage which a point of passage procures, established upon an extremity of the strategic front of the enemy. The generalissimo could
1796 AD (search for this): chapter 5
passage upon the extent of the same front of operations, as occurred to Jourdan and to Moreau in 1796. If we gain by it on one side the advantage of having in need a double line of retreat, we have chkirch, were very well directed, but could not count among distant retreats. That of Moreau, in 1796, exalted by party spirit, was honorable, without being extraordinary. The retreat of Laccmbe fat Mantua. When the Arch-Duke Charles yielded to the first efforts of the two French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an excentric manoeceuvre? Is it not on the contrary to the concee and to fall unexpectedly upon the advanced guards of the enemy, as the Arch-Duke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a manoeuvre almost always succeeds upon it wooden buildings, fire ships, mills, as the Aurtrians did against the army of Jourdan, in 1796, near Neuweied upon the Rhine, where they came near compromising the army of the Sambre and Mense
1800 AD (search for this): chapter 5
f the point where it ought to be made, is connected with the grand operations which embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an example for causing to be appreciated this assertion. Napoleon, more skillful in strategy than his lieutenst be owned that it is worthy of remark. In our day, General Dedon has celebrated the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl, and that of the Danube at Hochstaedt in 1800: his work should be consulted as classic for details; now, precision in details is everything for these kinds of operations. Finally, three other passages of thnt this frontier as the more advantageous for being defended by lateral movements. This assertion has received, as we have said, cruel denials in the campaigns of 1800, 1805 and 1809, but as the lateral defense has not been precisely well attempted there, the question is still susceptible of controversy. All depends in my opin
1803 AD (search for this): chapter 5
des; the expeditions of the people of the north to England, to France, and even to Italy? Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II was the only colossal enterprise until that which Napoleon formed against England in 1803. All the other expeditions beyond the sea were partial operations; those of Charles V, and of Sebastian of Portugal, upon the Coast of Africa; several descents, like those of the French upon the United States of America, upon Egypt and St. Domingrity find, in the preparations which were made for this descent, one of the most important lessons which this memorable age has furnished for the study of military men and statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France from 1803 to 1805, will be one of the most extraordinary monuments of the activity, foresight and skill of Napoleon; they cannot be too highly commended for the study of young military men. But admitting the possibility even of succeeding in a great descent
1805 AD (search for this): chapter 5
han if he changed direction too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donanwerth and Ingolstadt, in 1805, was an operation nearly of the same kind; the direction chosen became the first cause of the destruction of the army of Mr him than that where he is found; it is a prudent manoeuvre rather than a retreat. It was thus that Napoleon retired, in 1805, from Wischan upon Brunn, in order to lead the allies upon the point which suited him. It was thus that Wellington retreateing defended by lateral movements. This assertion has received, as we have said, cruel denials in the campaigns of 1800, 1805 and 1809, but as the lateral defense has not been precisely well attempted there, the question is still susceptible of conshed for the study of military men and statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France from 1803 to 1805, will be one of the most extraordinary monuments of the activity, foresight and skill of Napoleon; they cannot be too high
1806 AD (search for this): chapter 5
order to unite his columns, then the retreat must recommence in the night, in order to regain ground. The third method of retreat, that of following several parallel routes, is very suitable when those routes are sufficiently near to each other. But if they are too far removed apart, each of the wings of the army, separated from the others, might be separately compromised, if the enemy, directing the weight of his forces upon it, obliged it to receive battle. The Prussian army, coming in 1806, from Magdeburg to gain the Oder, furnishes proof of this. The fourth system, which consists in following two concentric routes, is without doubt the most suitable, when the troops are found removed from each other at the moment when the retreat is ordered; nothing is then better than the rallying of one's forces, and the concentric retreat is the only means of succeeding in it. The fifth mode indicated, is nothing else than the famous system of excentric lines, which I have attributed
1807 AD (search for this): chapter 5
avoiding too long a line, always easy to pierce and impossible to rally; to cover them by a river or by a first line of troops barracked and supported by field works; to fix upon places of concentration which may in every case be attained in advance of the enemy; to cause the avenues to the army to be scoured by permanent patrols of cavalry; finally, to establish alarm signals for the case of a serious attack. These are, in my opinion, the best maxims that could be given. In the winter of 1807, Napoleon cantoned his army behind the Passarge in the face of the enemy; the advanced guards alone were barracked in proximity with the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. This army exceeded a hundred and twenty thousand men, and there was much skill necessary to maintain and nourish it in this position until the month of June. The country favored, it is true, this system, and we do not find everywhere one as suitable. An army of a hundred thousand men may find compact winter quarters in c
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