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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Ulm (Arkansas, United States) (search for this): chapter 6
fort, Massena enroute for Spain, retrograded by Strasburg upon Ulm; the Saxons, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers quitted their respective countries. Immense distances separated thus those corps, and the Austrians, united a long time since, were able easily to pierce this web and to destroy or disperse the parts of it. Napoleon, justly uneasy, ordered Berthier to collect the army at Ratisbon, if the war had not commenced at his arrival, but in the contrary case to unite it farther in rear near Ulm. The cause of this double alternative was not difficult to penetrate; if the war had commenced, Ratisbon was found too near the frontier of Austria to be designated as the place of rendezvous, for the corps might arrive and throw themselves separately in the midst of two hundred thousand enemies, by fixing the union at Ulm; the army would be sooner concentrated, or at least the enemy would have five or six marches more to make in order to reach it, which was a capital point in the respecti
Ratisbon (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 6
parts of it. Napoleon, justly uneasy, ordered Berthier to collect the army at Ratisbon, if the war had not commenced at his arrival, but in the contrary case to units double alternative was not difficult to penetrate; if the war had commenced, Ratisbon was found too near the frontier of Austria to be designated as the place of rets manifest meaning; he not only persisted in endeavoring to unite the army at Ratisbon, but he even caused Davoust to return to that city, who had the good sense to ive glorious days of Abensberg, of Siegenburg, of Landshut, of Eckmuhl, and of Ratisbon, which repaired the faults of the miserable logistics of his chief of the stafen his head quarters and France, that Napoleon owed his astonishing success at Ratisbon in 1809. He was found yet at Paris when the Austrian army passed the Inn at Be and eight days afterwards he was conqueror in two battles under the walls of Ratisbon; without the telegraph the campaign would have been lost: this fact suffices f
Leipzig (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 6
ot less extraordinary, of the importance of good logistical measures was given at the battle of Leipzig. In receiving this battle, backed against a defile like that of Leipzig, and wooded prairies cLeipzig, and wooded prairies cut up by small streams and gardens, it would have been important to throw a great number of small bridges, to open roads for arriving at them, and to mark out those roads; that would not have preventg their left by Hoff and Gera, they were partially overwhelmed, and could yet be anticipated by Leipsic at Berlin. If they remained finally behind the Elbe, it was always in the direction of Gera anh all seeming strategic remonstrance had never succeeded in making act in concert, excepting at Leipsic and Brienne. It is known also that it was information given by Seslawin to General Doctoroffaccount. What is certain is that I was convinced upon the steeple of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic of the fruits which one may derive from such an observation; and the aid de camp of the Prince
Dresden (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 6
into Lusace to learn where Napoleon was. General Mack at Ulm and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806 were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often paid dear for the impossibility of having spies and information upon what was passing around them. For information which can be obtained from flying corps, the Russian army is better off than any other, thanks to its Cossacks and the intelligence of its partizans. The expedition of the Prince Koudacheff, sent after the battle of Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who after having swam the Elbe, marched in the midst of the French columns near Wittenburg, is an historical monument of those kinds of excursions. The information furnished by the partisans of Generals Czernitcheff, Benkendorf, Davidoff and Seslawin, have rendered eminent services of the same nature. We recollect that it was a despatch of Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa, intercepted near Chalons by the Cossacks which advised the Allies of the project for
Weimar (Thuringia, Germany) (search for this): chapter 6
nemy's general, and be able to wrest from him the secret of his enterprises; he will limit himself oftener to indicating the movements of which he is a witness, or those which he shall learn through public rumor, and when one shall receive the information of those movements, he will know nothing of those which supervene in the interval, nor of the ulterior end which the enemy proposes to himself; he will know well, for example, that such a corps has passed through Jena, directing itself upon Weimar — such another has passed through Gera, directing itself towards Naumburg; but where will they go? What do they wish to undertake? This is what will be very difficult to learn even from the most skillful spy. When armies encamped in tents, almost wholly united, then news of the enemy was more certain, for parties could be pushed even within sight of their camp, and spies could become instructed of all the movements of those camps. But with the present organization into army corps, whic
Jena (Thuringia, Germany) (search for this): chapter 6
one shall receive the information of those movements, he will know nothing of those which supervene in the interval, nor of the ulterior end which the enemy proposes to himself; he will know well, for example, that such a corps has passed through Jena, directing itself upon Weimar — such another has passed through Gera, directing itself towards Naumburg; but where will they go? What do they wish to undertake? This is what will be very difficult to learn even from the most skillful spy. Whements, since the interest was always the same? Thus well convinced of these truths, I did not hesitate to announce--a month before the war--that it would be what Napoleon would undertake, and that if the Prussians passed the Saale, it would be at Jena and at Naumburg that they would fight. What suppositions did the Duke of Brunswick and his counsellors make at the same instant that I saw so accurately? In order to credit it, it is necessary to read them in the works of Mm. C. de W. and Ruhl
Frankfort (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 6
was undeniably a chef d'oeuvre of logistics. In order to appreciate the merit of similar measures, I would refer, in opposition to them, to two circumstances where faults of logistics came near becoming fatal. Napoleon recalled from Spain in 1809, by the preparations of Austria, and certain of having war with that power, despatched Berthier to Bavaria with the delicate mission of assembling the army, all dispersed from Strasburg to Erfurt. Davoust returned from this city, Oudinot from Frankfort, Massena enroute for Spain, retrograded by Strasburg upon Ulm; the Saxons, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers quitted their respective countries. Immense distances separated thus those corps, and the Austrians, united a long time since, were able easily to pierce this web and to destroy or disperse the parts of it. Napoleon, justly uneasy, ordered Berthier to collect the army at Ratisbon, if the war had not commenced at his arrival, but in the contrary case to unite it farther in rear near U
Madrid (Spain) (search for this): chapter 6
. The command of the territorial divisions will be confided to provident and capable general officers, for upon their operations often depend the security of the communications of the army. It will be objected that in national wars these magazines are impracticable. I shall say, on the contrary, that in such they will often be hazardous; but that it is in such precisely that they should be established upon a greater scale, and that they are the most necessary. The line from Bayone to Madrid had a similar staple line, which resisted four years all the attacks of the guerrillas, although some convoys were taken; it was even extended for a time to Cadiz. Those divisions can even, according to circumstances, be transformed into strategic reserves, as we have said in Article 24; some good battalions, aided by detachments unceasingly going from the army to its base, and from the base to the army, will almost always suffice for keeping up the communications. 6. With regard to measu
Beaumont (Texas, United States) (search for this): chapter 6
ly between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington gave or received fetes at Brussels, both awaiting the signal to invade France, Napoleon, whom they believed at Paris quite occupied with ostentatious political ceremonials, accompanied by his guard, which had just scarcely been reformed at the capital, burst like lightning upon Charleroi and upon the quarters of Blucher, with columns converging from all points of the horizon, to arrive, with rare punctuality, the 14th June in the plains of Beaumont upon the borders of the Sambre, (Napoleon had not departed until the 12th from Paris.) The combinations of those two operations reposed upon a skillful strategic calculation; but their execution was undeniably a chef d'oeuvre of logistics. In order to appreciate the merit of similar measures, I would refer, in opposition to them, to two circumstances where faults of logistics came near becoming fatal. Napoleon recalled from Spain in 1809, by the preparations of Austria, and certain of
Krasnoi (Moldova) (search for this): chapter 6
y Napoleon who had just left Moscow with all his army to commence his retreat. He was not at first believed and it was necessary that Seslawin, piqued, should go and carry off an officer and some soldiers of the guard, in the midst of the French bivouacs, to confirm his report. This information which decided the march of Kutusoff upon Malo-Jaroslawitz, prevented Napoleon from taking the route of Kalouga, where he would have found more resources,where he would have avoided the disasters of Krasnoi and of the Beresina, which for the rest, would have diminished the catastrophe without preventing it entirely. Such examples however rare they may be suffice to give an idea of what can be expected from good partisans conducted by capable officers. To conclude I would sum up this article with the following truths: 1st. That a general ought to neglect nothing in order to be informed of the movements of the enemy and employ to this effect reconnoissances, spies, light corps conducte
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