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Daniel McCook (search for this): chapter 8
ng an attempt to turn the position. The only way to do so is to get a force upon the mountain somewhere where the enemy can not defend it so strongly. On the 10th he wrote from Tunnel Hill to General Thomas: I think you are satisfied that your troops can not take Rocky Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us. And later in the same day: I propose to leave hereabouts one of your corps, say Howard's, the cavalry of Colonel McCook, and the cavalry of General Stoneman, to keep up the feint of a direct attack on Dalton, through Buzzard Roost, as long as possible; and with all the remainder of the three armies to march to, and through, Snake Creek Gap, and to attack the enemy in force from that quarter. * * * * we will calculate all to go to Snake Creek and close up on General McPherson during the day after to-morrow. At 7 A. M. of the 10th this telegram was sent to Halleck: I am starting for the extreme fro
Joseph Johnston (search for this): chapter 8
one hundred thousand men, should have brought Johnston's forty-five thousand to decisive battle in fnorth toward Dalton, and doubtless carried to Johnston the first serious intimation that a heavy forclose support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army in check should he abandon Dalton. and the usual impulse of a conquering army. Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immonstration against Buzzard Roost, attracting Johnston's whole attention to that point, and to have yette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston stands at Dalton we must attack him in positiaca, and will there break the road, and leave Johnston out of rations. To-morrow will tell the stornd make this dispatch that you may understand Johnston acts purely on the defensive. I am attackingt we will all get ready. * * * * Do you think Johnston has yet discovered the nature of your forces?l Sherman having refrained from hurrying, and Johnston having virtually escaped him, he telegraphed [20 more...]
Howard (search for this): chapter 8
in command of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, telegraphed General Grant at Nashville, proposing the following plan for a Spring campaign: I believe if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and Fourth Corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far, at least, as Atlanta. In a subsequent report upon the campaign, dated March 10, 1864, General Thomas thus speaks of this proposition: you are satisfied that your troops can not take Rocky Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us. And later in the same day: I propose to leave hereabouts one of your corps, say Howard's, the cavalry of Colonel McCook, and the cavalry of General Stoneman, to keep up the feint of a direct attack on Dalton, through Buzzard Roost, as long as possible; and with all the remainder of the three armies to march to, and through, Snake C
May 11th (search for this): chapter 8
to retreat by roads to the east of Resaca, which were known to be very rough and impracticable. That night I received further notice from McPherson that he had found Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in consequence he had fallen back three miles to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and was there fortified. I wrote him next day the following letters, copies of which are in my letter-book; but his to me were mere notes in pencil, not retained. The letters referred to are both dated May 11th. The material points affecting the question under discussion, are as follows: General: I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 6:30 P. M. of yesterday. You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker is in close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army in check should he abandon Dalton. He can not afford to abandon Dalton, for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and he observes that we are close at hand waiting for him to quit. H
May 10th (search for this): chapter 8
I am not driving things too fast, because I want two columns of cavalry that are rapidly coming up to me from the rear—Stoneman on my left and Garrard on my right, both due to-day. Yesterday I pressed hard to prevent Johnston detaching against McPherson, but to-day I will be more easy, as I believe McPherson has destroyed Resaca, when he is ordered to fall back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and act against Johnston's flank when he does start. All are in good condition. On the 10th of May, for the first time, he notified General McPherson of his intention to attack in force, through Snake Creek Gap, as follows: The Buzzard Roost Gap is so well defended, and naturally is so strong, that I will undertake to attack Johnston through Snake Creek Gap. * * * * we may not be able to put our project in operation by the day after to-morrow, but we will all get ready. * * * * Do you think Johnston has yet discovered the nature of your forces? On the 10th he also telegraphed Gener
February 28th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 8
rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of a conquering army. Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immediate pursuit was begun. Thus, seven days after the movement began, General Sherman had finally accomplished what General Thomas, who, assisted by General Schofield, had thoroughly reconnoitered the position in February, had urged should be done at the first, as will now appear from the record history of Buzzard Roost and Resaca. On the 28th of February, 1864, before General Sherman had succeeded General Grant in the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, General Thomas, who was in command of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, telegraphed General Grant at Nashville, proposing the following plan for a Spring campaign: I believe if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and Fourth Corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as f
May 15th (search for this): chapter 8
ing his divisions well in hand, acting purely on the defensive, and fighting well at all points of conflict. * * * * On the 14th we closed in. He thus closes the account of these opening operations of the Atlanta campaign: On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army across the bridges, set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight. Our loss up to that time was about six hundred dead and thirty-three hundred and seventy-five wounded—mostly light wounds that did not necessitate seI was disappointed not to have crippled his army more at that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted, these rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of a conquering army. Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immediate pursuit was begun. Thus, seven days after the movement began, General Sherman had finally accomplished what General Thomas, who, assisted by General Schofield, had thoroughly reconnoitered the position in February, had urged shou
16th (search for this): chapter 8
ped him, he telegraphed to General Halleck on the 14th: By the flank movement on Resaca we have forced Johnston to evacuate Dalton, and are on his flank and rear; but the parallelism of the valleys and mountains does not give us all the advantages of an open country; but I will press him all that is possible. And on the 15th: We intend to fight Joe Johnston until he is satisfied, and I hope he will not attempt to escape; if he does, my bridges are down, and we will be after him. And on the 16th: We are in possession of Resaca. * * * * Generals Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry are trying to get into the rear of the enemy, and I hope will succeed. Our difficulties will increase beyond the Etowah, but if Johnston will not fight us behind such works as we find here, I will fight him on any open ground he may stand at. It is easy to see what good ground there was for the opinion which prevailed in the Army of the Cumberland, that the failure of these first movements of the Atlanta ca
15th (search for this): chapter 8
rtion that, from the first he had no intention to attack the position seriously in front. General Sherman having refrained from hurrying, and Johnston having virtually escaped him, he telegraphed to General Halleck on the 14th: By the flank movement on Resaca we have forced Johnston to evacuate Dalton, and are on his flank and rear; but the parallelism of the valleys and mountains does not give us all the advantages of an open country; but I will press him all that is possible. And on the 15th: We intend to fight Joe Johnston until he is satisfied, and I hope he will not attempt to escape; if he does, my bridges are down, and we will be after him. And on the 16th: We are in possession of Resaca. * * * * Generals Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry are trying to get into the rear of the enemy, and I hope will succeed. Our difficulties will increase beyond the Etowah, but if Johnston will not fight us behind such works as we find here, I will fight him on any open ground he may stand
14th (search for this): chapter 8
pated, had abandoned all his well-prepared defenses at Dalton and was found inside of Resaca with the bulk of his army, holding his divisions well in hand, acting purely on the defensive, and fighting well at all points of conflict. * * * * On the 14th we closed in. He thus closes the account of these opening operations of the Atlanta campaign: On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army across the bridges, set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight. Our loss up to that time pointedly with the assertion that, from the first he had no intention to attack the position seriously in front. General Sherman having refrained from hurrying, and Johnston having virtually escaped him, he telegraphed to General Halleck on the 14th: By the flank movement on Resaca we have forced Johnston to evacuate Dalton, and are on his flank and rear; but the parallelism of the valleys and mountains does not give us all the advantages of an open country; but I will press him all that is p
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