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Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11.109
t off a large body of Federals at Pulaski, but by a forced march they got into Columbia just in time to prevent capture. On the 27th of November we formed around ColColumbia, the two wings of the army resting on Duck river, Cheatham being to the right. General Schofield retired to the north side of Duck river, and an artillery fiSchofield's guns. So he concluded to leave General Lee, with two divisions at Columbia, who was ordered to make demonstrations as if to cross the river, while he woussed the river (fording it) on the evening of the 28th, about eight miles from Columbia, and early next morning made a detour through a rough country, skirmishing mosand we felt that a long-sought opportunity had at last arrived. Lee's guns at Columbia kept up lively music, admonishing us that he was meeting his part of the contre command under Hood had crossed the river that morning about four miles above Columbia, Cheatham in front, followed by Stewart and Johnson's division of Lee's corps.
Georgia (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 11.109
the railroad, hoping thereby to draw Sherman out, leaving a portion of his army in Atlanta, and give Hood an opportunity of fighting him in detail. The movement was made, and in the main successful, except no opportunity was given for engaging Sherman's forces in detail. It was then resolved to move Hood's army into Tennessee and destroy Thomas and then take possession of Kentucky and threaten Ohio. The conception was a bold one. Its execution involved leaving a large Federal army in Georgia, which could march unobstructed to the sea, cutting again in twain the Confederacy, or it would move back and join Thomas, securing the destruction of Hood. It was at first determined to cross the Tennessee river above Decatur, but Forrest was near Jackson, Tennessee, and unacquainted with the plan of campaign, and on account of the swollen condition of the Tennessee river could not cross below Florence. So it was determined to cross the entire army at that point, and as soon as our com
Benjamin Franklin (search for this): chapter 11.109
Nashville without a battle and pushed on into Kentucky, and, while I do not claim that it would have changed the result, yet it would certainly have prolonged the war and thrown an uncertain factor into the great problem. It seemed then, as it looks now as we glance back over the scene, that a hand stronger than armies had decreed our overthrow. On the following morning, at the dawn of day, we were in our saddles, and pushed on after Schofield's command, which was rapidly hastening to Franklin. Our division crossed over to the extreme left and approached Franklin over the Carter's creek pike, and about 3 o'clock P. M. we were on the high range of hills just south of Franklin and overlooking the town. The Federal army was in line of battle in front of the town, and we had a fine view of the situation. The soldiers were in fine fighting trim, as they felt chagrined and mortified at the occurrence of the preceding day, and each man felt a pride in wiping out the stain caused by
Albert Sidney Johnston (search for this): chapter 11.109
But we slept, and the Federals marched by without molestation. As I said before, there was not a soldier who did not realize that a golden opportunity was at hand, and every one felt mortified at the inglorious result. We lost confidence in General Hood,, not that we doubted his courage, but we clearly saw that his capacities better suited him to command a division. This whole thing was a wretched affair, let the fault be wherever it may. It reminded me more of the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston on the battle-field at Shiloh than any other event of the war. No one doubts but that his death prevented the destruction of Grant's army, and a victory such as his life guaranteed on that eventful April day would have produced results such as imagination can hardly picture. So, if we had captured Schofield, as could easily have been done at a trifling loss, we would have taken Nashville without a battle and pushed on into Kentucky, and, while I do not claim that it would have c
Wirt Adams (search for this): chapter 11.109
over the battle-field. To those unaccustomed to such things, no description can give an idea of the sight. The dead were literally piled up, and to my sorrow I saw that our loss was much the greatest. We had pressed them into their last line, and there the dead lay mangled together. Entire companies were literally gone. And just a little back the gallant old soldier, General Pat Cleburne, lay dead. He was the idol of his command, and a better soldier never died for any cause. Brigadier-General Adams was killed, he and his horse falling together, just on the earthworks of the enemy. Our loss was about 5,000 men, including five Generals killed and six wounded. I could not but feel that the lives of these men were a useless sacrifice. It seemed to me to be a rashness occasioned by the blunder of the day before. It was an attempt to make good by reckless daring the blunder which incapacity had occasioned the preceding day. Schofield had as many or more men in Franklin than we
Bradley T. Johnson (search for this): chapter 11.109
e felt that a long-sought opportunity had at last arrived. Lee's guns at Columbia kept up lively music, admonishing us that he was meeting his part of the contract. We were satisfied that a few minutes — at most an hour — would be ample time in which to place our command across the pike, and then the surrender of Schofield would follow as night follows day. The command under Hood had crossed the river that morning about four miles above Columbia, Cheatham in front, followed by Stewart and Johnson's division of Lee's corps. We had but little artillery, as the roads were too rough for moving it. It was about 3 or 4 o'clock when everything was ready to advance. Every soldier realized that we would have a fight, but the result was not a question. The Federals only had one division at Spring Hill, numbering about four thousand men, while we had two corps and a division of infantry and the greater part of Forrest's cavalry. Our force was fully sixteen thousand men, and I think near
Walthall (search for this): chapter 11.109
morale of the army was almost destroyed. But instead of retreating at once and saving the remnant of a magnificent army, we moved up and formed around Nashville. Our little army, now about 23,000 strong, was stretched for miles around the city. We were on the extreme left, near the Cumberland river, and were not strong enough to make a good picket line. The rout and retreat were inevitable. Thomas accumulated an army of 82,000. The only wonder is that he did not capture us all. General Walthall, one of the bravest and best of all our gallant army, with a picked command, and aided by Forrest, covered the retreat and enabled us to get out with 18,000 men. We recrossed the Tennessee river on the 26th and 27th days of December. The campaign would have been brilliant and successful but for the fatal action or inaction at Spring Hill. I am well aware that we can look back after events have occurred and detect errors which it seems reasonable prudence would have avoided; but I
S. D. Lee (search for this): chapter 11.109
t in motion. General Hood commanded the expedition, with three army corps of infantry commanded by Generals Stewart, S. D. Lee and Cheatham, with Forrest in command of the cavalry. The entire force numbered about thirty thousand. It was as gallite side of the river, which could not easily be crossed under the fire of Schofield's guns. So he concluded to leave General Lee, with two divisions at Columbia, who was ordered to make demonstrations as if to cross the river, while he would crossft with their battle-flags waving in the mellow sunlight, and we felt that a long-sought opportunity had at last arrived. Lee's guns at Columbia kept up lively music, admonishing us that he was meeting his part of the contract. We were satisfied td the river that morning about four miles above Columbia, Cheatham in front, followed by Stewart and Johnson's division of Lee's corps. We had but little artillery, as the roads were too rough for moving it. It was about 3 or 4 o'clock when ever
Richard Montgomery (search for this): chapter 11.109
he entire army was much questioned. It had been demonstrated that Gen. Hood must either be reinforced or retreat before the advancing columns of Sherman. Reinforcements could not be supplied, and an emergency had to be met. General Thomas commanded a large force in Tennessee, which was protecting Sherman's rear and guarding his lines of communication and supplies. Should Sherman advance southward from Atlanta with Hood in front, Thomas could easily overrun Alabama and capture Selma, Montgomery and Mobile. It was determined to throw Hood's army in the rear of Sherman. and destroy the railroad, hoping thereby to draw Sherman out, leaving a portion of his army in Atlanta, and give Hood an opportunity of fighting him in detail. The movement was made, and in the main successful, except no opportunity was given for engaging Sherman's forces in detail. It was then resolved to move Hood's army into Tennessee and destroy Thomas and then take possession of Kentucky and threaten Ohio
B. F. Cheatham (search for this): chapter 11.109
commanded by Generals Stewart, S. D. Lee and Cheatham, with Forrest in command of the cavalry. Theage of Spring Hill the old rugged veterans of Cheatham's corps came marching up on our left with thethat morning about four miles above Columbia, Cheatham in front, followed by Stewart and Johnson's dd on the field on that ill-fated day that General Cheatham was ordered by General Hood to take Sprinengagement. It was not denied at the time by Cheatham's friends that he received such orders. It smony to support it, and so far as I know, General Cheatham has never denied it, or in any way questieneral Hood's statements. But I do not think Cheatham alone to blame. The General commanding the ation was such that he could not but know what Cheatham was doing. There was plenty of time, and he While the majority of the army believed General Cheatham mainly responsible for the misfortune at is that in the main his story is true. General Cheatham is still living, and surely if General Ho[5 more...]
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