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e hundred muskets; from these, however, his reserves were to be deducted, which, he said, would reduce the force in the trenches to fifteen thousand five hundred men. Although Pemberton said that he had only eighteen thousand five hundred men at this time, he surrendered thirty-one thousand nearly seven weeks later, and received no reenforcements in the mean while. Stevenson was put on the right, his troops reaching from the Warrenton road to the railroad, a distance of nearly five miles; Forney had the line between the railroad and the Graveyard road; and Smith, with his own troops, and some remnants of Loring's fugitive command that had straggled back into Vicksburg, had the extreme left, from the Graveyard road to the river on the north. Bowen was held in reserve, ready to strengthen any portion of the line most threatened. In addition to the guns on the water-front, one hundred and two pieces of artillery of different calibre, principally field, were placed in position on the
Stevenson (search for this): chapter 9
y eighteen thousand five hundred men at this time, he surrendered thirty-one thousand nearly seven weeks later, and received no reenforcements in the mean while. Stevenson was put on the right, his troops reaching from the Warrenton road to the railroad, a distance of nearly five miles; Forney had the line between the railroad and y swept at many points by direct and cross fires from the enemy's line. In Logan's division, John E. Smith's brigade, supporting Leggett's, was on the road, and Stevenson in the ravines and on the slopes to the south; all moved forward under cover of a heavy artillery fire. Their order of battle, however, was weak, from the nats checked by the cross-fire of artillery commanding the road, and it soon became apparent that nothing favorable could be expected from efforts in this quarter. Stevenson, however, was somewhat protected by the uneven ground, and, although compelled to advance into a reentrant of the enemy's line, he had a better opportunity to as
rks here followed the line of the ridge, running nearly north and south; they were about two miles from the river, and three hundred and twenty-nine feet above low-water mark. They were strongly constructed, and well arranged to sweep the approaches in every direction. The road follows the tortuous and uneven ridge separating two deep ravines, and was completely swept at many points by direct and cross fires from the enemy's line. In Logan's division, John E. Smith's brigade, supporting Leggett's, was on the road, and Stevenson in the ravines and on the slopes to the south; all moved forward under cover of a heavy artillery fire. Their order of battle, however, was weak, from the nature of the ground—columns of regiments not greater than platoon front, battalions by the flank, in columns of fours, or regiments in single line of battle, supported by troops in position, and covered by skirmishers. Notwithstanding the bravery of the troops, they became broken and disorganized by
sharpshooter would show his head and quickly discharge his piece. A line of select skirmishers was placed to keep these down. As on the 19th, Sherman's main attack was along the Graveyard road. Blair was placed at the head of this road, with Tuttle in support, while Steele was left to make his attack at a point in his own front, about half a mile further to the right. The troops were grouped so that, as far as the ground would allow, the movement might be connected and rapid. The Graveya to join him, and that McPherson and Sherman would renew their assaults by way of a diversion in his favor. Sherman and McPherson, accordingly, made their advance, which was prompt and vigorous. Sherman now put into battle Mower's brigade, of Tuttle's division, which had as yet been in reserve, while Steele was hotly engaged on the right, and heavy firing was going on, all down the line on Sherman's left. Mower's charge was covered by Blair's division, deployed on the hillside, and the arti
Hugh Ewing (search for this): chapter 9
and boards to cross the ditch. This party was followed closely by Ewing's brigade; Giles Smith and Kilby Smith's brigades bringing up the rstorming party dashed up the road, at the double quick, followed by Ewing's brigade, the Thirtieth Ohio leading. Five batteries, of six piecburrowed in the earth to shield themselves from a flanking fire. Ewing being thus unable to carry this point, the next brigade, Giles SmitSmith was deployed on the offslope of one of the spurs, where, with Ewing's brigade, it kept up a constant fire against any object that preses could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific fire which Ewing had encountered, but that Giles Smith had got a position more to thlazing sun to reach the enemy's stronghold; but, like the column of Ewing, they became hopelessly broken up into small parties, and only a fe valley between had been cleared and cultivated; it was wider near Ewing's right, and exposed, for threequarters of a mile, to a plunging fi
ent heavy cannonade on land front Sherman assaults with Blair and Steele's divisions troops reach the parapet, but are repelled Ransom's aunterscarp. The rebel fire was hot, and the national loss severe. Steele's division, on Sherman's extreme right, was not close enough to att was placed at the head of this road, with Tuttle in support, while Steele was left to make his attack at a point in his own front, about half, as he showed himself along the parapet or in the rifle-trench. Steele's artillery had been placed in position on the abandoned outworks oe the same as in the assault on Sherman's left. The main effort of Steele's right was directed against a water-battery, at the mouth of a cregade, of Tuttle's division, which had as yet been in reserve, while Steele was hotly engaged on the right, and heavy firing was going on, all ng party, and remained, but the column was shattered and repelled. Steele, too, passed through a scathing fire—clouds of musket-balls descend
J. H. Wilson (search for this): chapter 9
r results of the assault comparison with assaults in European wars. The ground on which the city of Vicksburg stands is supposed by some to have been originally a plateau, four or five miles long and about two miles wide, and two or three hundred feet above the Mississippi river. The official report of engineer operations at the siege of Vicksburg, by Captains Prime and Comstock, U. S. Engineers, and the manuscript memoir, already referred to, of Lieutenant (now Brevet Major-General) Wilson, have furnished most of the details of engineer operations for this and the following chapter. This plateau has been gradually washed away by rains and streams, until it is transformed into a labyrinth of sharp ridges and deep irregular ravines. The soil is fine, and when cut vertically by the action of the water, remains in a perpendicular position for years; and the smaller and newer ravines are often so deep that their ascent is difficult to a footman, unless he aids himself with his ha
e trenches to fifteen thousand five hundred men. Although Pemberton said that he had only eighteen thousand five hundred men at this time, he surrendered thirty-one thousand nearly seven weeks later, and received no reenforcements in the mean while. Stevenson was put on the right, his troops reaching from the Warrenton road to the railroad, a distance of nearly five miles; Forney had the line between the railroad and the Graveyard road; and Smith, with his own troops, and some remnants of Loring's fugitive command that had straggled back into Vicksburg, had the extreme left, from the Graveyard road to the river on the north. Bowen was held in reserve, ready to strengthen any portion of the line most threatened. In addition to the guns on the water-front, one hundred and two pieces of artillery of different calibre, principally field, were placed in position on the land side, and details of men were set to work strengthening the fortifications. All cattle, sheep, and hogs belongin
Mc Pherson (search for this): chapter 9
ordinary gallantry, his corps had accomplished quite as much as either Sherman or McPherson's, but, like all the troops along the line, it was repelled disastrously. The fact that a dozen men, at one place, got inside the rebel lines and were killed, and that elsewhere, others reached the ditch and were captured, was magnified by him into the capture of a fort. His repeated calls for assistance cost the army hundreds of lives. See Appendix, for official letters of Generals Sherman and Mc Pherson, concerning this assault. Three thousand national soldiers were killed or wounded in this disastrous fight; and the army was now made sadly sure that over ground so rough, and so much obstructed, with formations necessarily so weak, it could not hope to carry Vicksburg by storm. But the quality of the troops was proven. There was no murmuring, no falling back, no symptom of demoralization. Detachments remained, till nightfall, close up to the advanced positions reached during the da
Joseph Johnston (search for this): chapter 9
Chapter 8: Land defences of Vicksburg Johnston orders Pemberton to evacuate Pemberton determines to hold out position of Grant feed his army, he could surely hold out till another force, under Johnston, could be collected for his relief. But, as soon as Johnston leJohnston learned that Pemberton had been driven into Vicksburg, he dispatched to that commander: If Haine's bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value,r than the southern side, in order to prevent any junction between Johnston's army and the garrison, before Grant could make an assault, as we In addition to these tactical considerations, it was known that Johnston was at Canton, with the troops that had escaped from Jackson, reend gather up, in all its territory, would doubtless soon be sent to Johnston's support. In a short time he might be strong enough to attack Grion of Vicksburg, on the contrary, would enable Grant to turn upon Johnston and drive him from the state; to seize all the railroads and pract
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