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Colonel William Preston Johnston, The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston : His Service in the Armies of the United States, the Republic of Texas, and the Confederate States., Chapter 29: the retreat from Bowling Green. (search)
ations for aggression and resistance, and perceived that no warning could stir the Southern people to a just sense of their danger, he beheld calamity coming as the clouds gather for the burst of the hurricane, and, with almost prophetic vision, saw his army forced back to the Cumberland, and beyond to the southern frontier of Tennessee. Colonel Frank Schaller, of the Twenty-second Mississippi, an educated soldier, who published during the war, at Columbia, South Carolina, an edition of Marmont's Spirit of military institutions, with valuable annotations pertinent to the times, illustrates Chapter III. of Part IV. of that work, which describes the picture of a general who answers to all the requirements of the command, by a review of the life and character of General Johnston. Colonel Schaller has for several years been Professor of Modern Languages at the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee. He begins his brief but appreciative memoir as follows : Two foreign o
The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure), Life in Pennsylvania. (search)
en, we hurled the whole Federal army back, crippling and demoralizing it, with trifling loss to our own troops; and Chancellorsville as an instance of an offensive battle, where we dislodged the Federals, it is true, but at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen such victories would have ruined us. It will be remembered that Stonewall Jackson once said that we sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position. They always fail to drive us. I reminded him, too, of Napoleon's advice to Marmont, to whom he said, when putting him at the head of an invading army, Select your ground, and make your enemy attack you. I recall these points, simply because I desire to have it distinctly understood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but to so maneuvre that the enemy should be forced to attac
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg. (search)
men, we hurled the whole Federal army back, crippling and demoralizing it, with trifling loss to our own troops; and Chancellorsville as an instance of an offensive battle, where we dislodged the Federals, it is true, but at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen such victories would have ruined us. It will be remembered that Stonewall Jackson once said that we sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position; they always fail to drive us. I reminded him, too, of Napoleon's advice to Marmont, to whom he said, when putting him at the head of an invading army, Select your ground and make your enemy attack you. I recall these points simply because I desire to have it distinctly understood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensivs battle, but to so manceuvre that the enemy should be forced to attack
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3., Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania. (search)
allow me to handle my corps so as to receive the attack of the Federal army, I would beat it off without calling on him for help except to guard my right and left, and called his attention to the battle of Fredericksburg as an instance of defensive warfare, where we had thrown not more than five thousand troops into the fight and had beaten off two-thirds of the Federal army with great loss to them and slight loss to my own troops. I also called his attention to Napoleon's instructions to Marmont at the head of an invading army. A few days before we were ready to move General Lee sent for General Ewell to receive his orders. I was present at the time and remarked that if we were ever going to make an offensive battle it should be done south of the From a photograph taken after the War. General Robert E. Lee. Potomac — adding that we might have an opportunity to cross the Rappa-hannock near Culpeper Court House and make a battle there. I made this suggestion in order to
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
which consisted in basing himself upon the belt of fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, opening to the allies the road to Paris. It is certain that had Mortier and Marmont been able to join him, and he had had fifty thousand men more, this project would have been followed by the most decisive results, and put the seal to his brilliaom the Roman States to the environs of Verona. In 1805, the corps of Ney and Augerau alternately played this part in Tyrol and in Bavaria, as well as Mortier and Marmont around Vienna. Napoleon, marching to the war of 1806, formed such reserves on the Rhine; Mortier used them for subjecting Hesse. At the same time second reser; every one knows how they succeeded. It is otherwise with tactical movements, made by flank in presence of the enemy. Ney was punished for this at Dennewitz; Marmont at Salamanca, and Frederick the Great at Kollin. Meanwhile, the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great at Leuthen, become so celebrated in the annals of the art, was
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
by falling upon the isolated centre, and surrounding afterwards that left, thrust between the lakes of Tellnitz and Melnitz. Finally, it is known how Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a manoeuvre nearly similar, because the left of Marmont, which wished to cut him off from the route to Portugal, ]eft a gap of half a league, from which the English general profited for beating that wing stripped of its support. The narratives of ten wars which I have published, are full of simila For the general who attacked at Stockach a mass of sixty thousand men with four little masses, isolated and unable to second each other, would not have known how to profit by the two extended movements attempted against him. In the same manner, Marmont was unlucky at Salamanca, in having to struggle against an adversary whose best acknowledged merit was a tried and rapid tactical coup d'oeil; before the Duke of York or More he would probably have succeeded. Among the turning manoeuvres whic
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
known by what prodigies he rallied it, and triumphed in the five glorious days of Abensberg, of Siegenburg, of Landshut, of Eckmuhl, and of Ratisbon, which repaired the faults of the miserable logistics of his chief of the staff. We shall terminate these citations by the events which preceded and accompanied the passage of the Danube, before Wragram; the measures for causing to arrive at a given point on the island of Lobau, the corps of the Viceroy of Italy coming from Hungary, that of Marmont coming from Styria, and that of Bernadotte coming from Linz, are less astonishing still than the famous resolution or imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated the details of the passage and of the formation in the plains of Enzersdorf, in the presence of a hundred and forty thousand Austrians, and of five hundred pieces of artillery, as though it had been a military fete. All those masses were found united on the island the evening of the 4th of July, three bridges were throw
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
necessitate. The grand army at Boulogne, which we have just cited, is the most evident proof of it. It seemed that its perfect organization should have secured it from every possible vicissitude. The centre under Marshal Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, the reserve under Lannes, presented a regular and formidable battle corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those of the guard and of the united grenadiers. Besides that, the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, detached to the right, and that of Augereau detached to the left, were disposable for acting upon the flanks. But from the passage of the Danube at Donauwert, all was disordered; Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the main body was dislocated, part to the right, a part to the left, so that this fine order of battle became useless. It will ever be difficult to give an organization at all stable; meanwhile events are not always as complicated as those of 1805
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of battle with center and one wing reinforced: battle of Wagram, July 6, 1809. (search)
This left for the Austrian center and left wing but 70,000 men, against which Napoleon had concentrated nearly twice that number. The length of his front for center and left wing was about 11,000 yards, the accumulation of forces amounting, therefore, to from 11 to 12 men for every yard. Massenas's corps, with Bernadotte's, is opposite to Aderklaa. Oudinot's corps, with Lannes's, is opposite to Baumersdorf. Davoust, with his corps, is opposite to Neusiedel. Eugene, Wrede, and Marmont are in advance of Rahsdorf, in third and fourth lines of battle. On the left of the center, a battery of 100 guns forms the communication between the center and the left wing. This battle can also serve as an example of a convex and concave order of battle; it shows well the danger of the convex order. If the Austrians force the left wing of the French, they find themselves at once in rear of the whole army. In this case, however, this operation could not be executed with the nece
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Logistics. (search)
be so made that, from resting, the troops can quickly join and form in line of battle. In camping, the tents should be disposed so that each battalion, brigade, division, etc. can form from its camp at once in line or in order for marching; advanced guards, posts, and pickets should be disposed, and the distances from the main body should be calculated the same as for columns in marching — that is, that the army should have time to assemble and form for battle. The disposition for camps will be found in all army regulations; and this, as well as the cantoning of troops, being the special mission of the officers of the general staff, it would be useless to say more here concerning it. I trust that this summary will suffice to give the reader a general but a clear idea of the great operations of war. For special study, the works of General Jomini, Ternay, Frederick II., Archduke Charles, Loyd, Clausewitz, the Memoirs of Napoleon, Marshal Marmont, etc. etc. should be consulted
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