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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.) 18 0 Browse Search
Benjamnin F. Butler, Butler's Book: Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benjamin Butler 14 0 Browse Search
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia. 14 0 Browse Search
George P. Rowell and Company's American Newspaper Directory, containing accurate lists of all the newspapers and periodicals published in the United States and territories, and the dominion of Canada, and British Colonies of North America., together with a description of the towns and cities in which they are published. (ed. George P. Rowell and company) 12 0 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: September 19, 1864., [Electronic resource] 8 0 Browse Search
L. P. Brockett, The camp, the battlefield, and the hospital: or, lights and shadows of the great rebellion 8 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 11. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 4 0 Browse Search
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army. 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 2 0 Browse Search
The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure) 2 0 Browse Search
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ong; all the rest are common dirt or sand roads, over which it is almost impossible to travel. What artillery in the world could have advanced the morning after Malvern Hill? Rain poured in torrents, and cavalrymen could scarcely force their horses into a fast walk through the immense quantities of mud; as for the infantry, they manfully trudged along, knee-deep in mire. In Europe warfare is carried on differently. It usually happens there that the combatants meet in large plains, like Marengo, Austerlitz, Waterloo, and other places I have visited; and had it so chanced that our engagements were fought in such places, the war would have been long since decided. Our artillery are certainly not to blame for being behind time; the infantry marched too fast, and were hurried forward at the rate of thirty miles a day. Our youth seem predisposed in favor of artillery service; at one time nothing else was thought of in the whole South but artillery! artillery! That spirit, said Robi
f a French army, completely disciplined, and bent on glory. They wanted their general to fight on every occasion, and win more glory. If he didn't go on winning glory he was not the man for them. The consequence was that Napoleon, who was quite as fond of glory as his men, fought battles whenever he could get at the enemy, and as his armies were thoroughly disciplined, with splendid equipments, and plenty of provisions and ammunition, he was able to follow up his successes, as he did at Marengo and Austerlitz, and get the full benefit of them. Lee is in a very different situation from Napoleon. This is an army of volunteers, who did not come into the field to gain glory, but to keep the Yankees from coming further South. They have no disposition to rebel and get rid of General Lee if he does not feed them on a dish of glory every few weeks. They are not as well organized as they ought to be, and are badly equipped, provisioned, and ammunitioned. With such an army it is unr
The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure), A campaign with sharpshooters. (search)
d Wilcox was at an end for that time. The day seemed irretrievably lost, and so it would have been except for the arrival of other troops. Moving rapidly through the entwining trees and matted undergrowth, in all haste to find the rear, we caught the gleam of bayonets in front of our disordered and plunging mass, and soon saw the dauntless mien and heard the steady tread of Longstreet's Corps, marching up to the relief, under the composed direction of Old Pete himself. Like Dessaix at Marengo, he arrived just in time to win a victory. While some of the broken troops of Heth and Wilcox joined in the advance with Longstreet's column, others straggled back to the point at which they were first engaged the night before. The sharpshooters moved across the road, near by certain batteries of Poague's artillery, which had been planted on a slight plateau on the left of the road, and was at this time crowded with troops. General Hill and General Lee both occupied this position; the la
He adds: Ere the war closed the valley of Virginia was ravaged with a cruelty surpassing that inflicted on the Palatinate two hundred years ago. That foul deed smirched the fame of Louvois and Turenne, and public opinion, in what has been deemed a ruder age, forced an apology from the Grand Monarque. Yet we have seen the official report of a Federal General wherein are recounted the many barns, mills, and other buildings destroyed; concluding with the assertion that A crow flying over the Valley must carry his own rations. In the opinion of the admirers of the officer making this report, the achievement, on which it is based, ranks with Marengo. Moreover, this same officer, many years after the close of the war, denounced several hundred thousands of his fellow-citizens as banditti, and solicited permission to deal with them as such. May we not well ask whether religion, education, science, and art combined have lessened the brutality of men since Wallenstein and Tilly?
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. (search)
as forming his plan of invasion. Neither from history nor experience have I been able to learn that the fighting of a regular army is influenced by locality or country. I have been taught to believe that quality to be derived from its commander. It was not discovered that Federal troops fought better at Boonesboroa, Sharpsburg and Gettysburg than they did at Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg. Could the French troops have fought better in France than they did at the Pyramids, Marengo or Austerlitz? or did the English display less valor in Spain or in the Crimea than they would have done in England under their favorite leaders? 3d. The way in which the fights of the second of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. 4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the second, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by t
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Advance sheets of Reminiscences of secession, war, and reconstruction, by Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor. (search)
agone. That foul act smirched the fame of Dubois and Turenne and public opinion, in what has been deemed a ruder age, forced an apology from the grand monarque. Yet we have seen the report of a Federal General, wherein is recounted the many barns, mills, and other buildings destroyed, concluding with the assertion that a crow flying over the Valley must take rations with him. In the opinion of the admirers of the officer making this report the achievement on which it is based ranks with Marengo. Moreover, this same officer (Lieutenant-General Sheridan), many years after the close of the war, denounced several hundred thousands of his fellow-citizens as banditti, and solicited permission of his Government to deal with them as such. May we not pause and reflect whether religion, education, science, and art combined have lessened the brutality of man since the days of Wallenstein and Tilly? Gettysburg. Of most of the important battles of the war I have written except of Shilo
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
r merit and their zeal. In time of war, the order of the register ought on the contrary to be suspended, or reduced at least to a third of the promotions, leaving the other two-thirds to actions of eclat, and to well established services. Superiority of armament may augment the chances of success in war; it does not of itself gain battles, but it contributes to it. Every one recollects how the great inferiority of the French in artillery came near becoming fatal to them at Eylau, and at Marengo. It is recollected also, what the French heavy cavalry have gained in adopting the cuirass, which it had so long repulsed; each one knows finally, of what advantage is the lance; doubtless lancers as foragers are no better than hussars; but charging in line is a very different affair; how many thousands of brave horsemen have been victims of the prejudice they had against the lance, because it constrains a little more in carrying than the sabre! The armament of armies is still susceptib
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
n, and the crotchet left upon the extremity of the enemy, preserves always one's communications with the base Cd; it is.the exact application of the manoeuvres at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. When the theatre of war shall not be adjacent to the sea, it will always be limited by a great neutral power, which will guard its frontiers anemy, if not a good line of defense, at least spaces vast enough for escaping the results of a well combined strategic manoeuvre. Thus, the splendid operations of Marengo, Ulm and Jena, could not have had such results upon a theatre as extended as that of the war with Russia in 1812, because the army, cut off from its principal linrstood. For example, if Napoleon, in 1800, after having passed the St. Bernard, had marched direct by Turin upon Asti or Alexandria, and had received battle at Marengo, without being assured previously of Lombardy and the left bank of the Po, he would have been cut off from his line of retreat more completely than Melas was from
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
camp; moreover, the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the line of retreat of the Allies. At Marengo, if Napoleon himself is to be trusted, the oblique order which he took in resting his right upon Castel Ceriolo, saved hear all the more astonishing that Napoleon, as we have just said, has himself boasted of having applied with success, at Marengo, this same order the existence of which he denies. If we took the oblique system in the absolute sense which General f Engen with four companies of the 58th regiment, and it is known what the 9th Light and the cavalry of Kellerman did at Marengo. will be then, at the decisive moment of the battle, the problem which every skilfull general will apply himself to resoe difficult, for, in order to premeditate them, it is necessary to know precisely the situation of the hostile camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, at Eylau, there were a kind of surprises, but these were in reality only unexpected attacks to which this na
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
by infantry and much artillery, at least at a certain distance. It was seen at Waterloo how much it cost the French cavalry for having acted against this rule, and the cavalry of Frederick experienced the same fate at Kunersdorf. We may, nevertheless, find ourselves called upon to engage the cavalry alone; but, in general, a charge upon a line of infantry which should already be found engaged with the adverse infantry, is that from which we could expect the most advantages; the battles of Marengo, of Eylau, of Borodino, and ten others, have proved this. Meanwhile there is a case in which the cavalry has a decided superiority over infantry; it is when there falls a beating rain or snow, which wets the arms and deprives the infantry of its fire; the corps of Augereau had a cruel proof of it at Eylau, and the left of the Austrians experienced the same fate at Dresden. Great charges are also executed with success against infantry, when we should have already succeeded in shaking i
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