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XVI.
the army of the Potomac under Burnside and Hooker.
Gen. Burnside reluctantly, and with unfeigned self-distrust, succeeded
1 to the command of the Army of the Potomac.
The devotion to
McClellan of its principal officers, and of many of their subordinates, was so ardent that any other commander must have had a poor chance of hearty, unquestioning support; and
Burnside would gladly have shrunk from the ordeal.
Having no alternative, however, but disobedience of orders, he accepted the trust, and immediately commenced preparations for a movement of his forces down the
Rappahannock to
Fredericksburg, which he had selected as on the proper as well as the direct line of operations from
Washington against
Richmond: masking his purpose, for a few days, by menacing an advance on
Gordonsville.
Lee soon
2 penetrated his real design, and commenced a parallel movement down the south bank of the river; while
J. E. B. Stuart, raiding
3 across at Warrenton Springs, entered
Warrenton just after our rear-guard had left it, obtaining ample confirmation of his chief's conclusions; whereupon, the residue of
Longstreet's corps was moved rapidly eastward.
Meantime,
Gen. Sumner's advance had reached
4 Falnouth, and attempted to cross to
Fredericksburg, but been easily repulsed; the bridges being burned and our pontoons — owing to a misunderstanding between
Gens. Halleck and
Burnside, each of whom conceived that the other was to impel their dispatch from
Washington — did not start so early as they should have done, and then experienced detention from bad roads.
and grounded vessels on the way: so that they did not reach
Falmouth till after most of
Lee's army had been concentrated on the heights across the river, ready to dispute its passage.
Fredericksburg was summoned
5 by
Gen. Sumner: the authorities replying that, while it would not be used to assail us, its occupation by our troops would be resisted to the utmost.
Most of the inhabitants thereupon abandoned the place, which was occupied by
Barksdale's Mississippi brigade, sharp-shooting from behind houses; while
Lee's engineers pressed the fortification of the heights behind it, and
Wade Hampton dashed
6 across the river above, raiding up to
Dumfries and the
Occoquan, capturing 200 cavalry and a number of wagons; and a like dash across was made below
Port Royal, in boats, by part of
Beale's regiment; taking some prisoners.
Our gunboats having steamed up the river so far as
Port Royal,
D. H. Hill assailed
7 them with cannon, and compelled them to retire; when he proceeded to fortify the right bank, so as to prevent their return.
The
Rappahannock, above
Port Royal, being generally narrow, with high bluffs often approaching it, now on one side, then on the other,
Lee decided that he could not prevent its
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passage at points where the river was fully commanded from its bluffs on the north, while a considerable intervale adjoined it on the south; but the tenacity with which
Fredericksburg was held by sharp-shooters compelled
Burnside to dislodge them by bombardment from the
Falmouth bluffs, whereby considerable damage was done to the buildings, though less than might naturally have been expected.
What with firing on it from either side, however, and the often wanton devastations of our soldiers, it was ultimately reduced to a state of general dilapidation.
Our army being at length in position along the north bank,
Burnside
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commenced
8 throwing over pontoons to
Fredericksburg; also at a point nearly two miles below.
The Engineer corps had laid the upper pontoon two-thirds of the way, when daylight exposed them to the fire of the enemy's sharp-shooters, which drove them off; and the work was completed by the 7th Michigan, who had 5 killed and 16 wounded, including
Lt.-Col. Baxter.
Supported and followed by the 19th and 20th Massachusetts, they speedily finished the job, having dashed across the river in boats;
9 taking 35 prisoners. We lost 300 in all in laying our pontoons and clearing the city of the enemy.
Gen. Franklin, on our left, encountered less resistance — the make of the land being there favorable to us — and laid his pontoons without loss.
Possession of both banks being thus secured, two other pontoons were laid at either point, and our army mainly pushed across during that and the following days.
10 The next was that chosen for the assault on the
Rebel position; whose strength, though under-estimated by
Burnside, was known to be very considerable.
Lee's army, fully 80,000 strong, was stretched along and behind the southern bluffs of the
Rappahannock from a point a mile or so above
Fredericksburg, to one four or five miles below.
At its right, the bluffs recede two miles or so: the
Massaponax here falling into the
Rappahannock; the ground being decidedly less favorable to the defensive.
It was organized in two grand corps, whereof that of
Stonewall Jackson held the right; that of
Longstreet the left.
A. P. Hill commanded the left advance of
Jackson's corps; which was confronted by
Franklin's grand division, about 40,000 strong.
On our right, or in and before
Fredericksburg, were the grand divisions of
Hooker and
Sumner, numbering at least 60,000.
But, while 300 Rebel guns were advantageously posted on every eminence and raked every foot of ground by which they could be approached, our heavy guns were all posted on the north side of the river, where their fire could rarely reach the enemy; while they made some havoc among our own men until
Burnside silenced them.
The weather had been cold, and the ground was frozen ; but an
Indian Summer mildness had succeeded, which filled the
valley of the Rappahannock with a dense fog, covering for a time the formation of our columns of assault; while a portion of our guns were firing wildly and uselessly; but at length a bright sun dispelled the mist, and, at 11 A. M.,
Couch's division, on our right, emerging from among the battered buildings, moved swiftly to the assault.
Braver men never smiled at death than those who climbed Marye's Hill that fatal day; their ranks plowed through and torn to pieces by Rebel batteries even in the process of formation ; and when at heavy cost they had reached the foot of the hill, they were confronted by a solid stone wall, four feet high, from behind which a Confederate brigade of infantry mowed them down like grass, exposing but their heads to our bullets, and these only while themselves firing.
Never did men fight better or die, alas!
more fruitlessly than did
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most of
Hancock's corps, especially
Meagher's Irish brigade, composed of the 63d, 69th, and 88th New York, the 28th Massachusetts, and the 116th Pennsylvania, which dashed itself repeatedly against those impregnable heights, until two-thirds
11 of its number strewed the ground; when the remnant fell back to a position of comparative safety, and were succeeded as they had been supported, by other brigades and division,; each to be exposed in its turn to like pitiless, useless, hopeless slaughter.
Thus
Hancock's and French's corps were successively sent up against those slippery heights, girdled with batteries, rising, tier above tier, to its crest, all carefully trained upon the approaches from
Fredericksburg; while that fatal stone wall — so strong that even artillery could make no impression on it — completely sheltered
Barksdale's brigade, which, so soon as our charging columns came within rifle-shot, poured into their faces the deadliest storm of musketry.
Howard's division supported the two in advance; while one division of
Wilcox's (9th, late
Burnside's) corps was detached to maintain communication with
Franklin on our left.
Hooker's grand division was divided, and in good part sent to reenforce
Franklin; while
Hooker himself, believing the attack hopeless, required repeated and imperative orders from
Burnside to induce him to order an advance; but
Humphreys's division was at length thrown out from
Fredericksburg, and bore its full part in the front attack, losing heavily.
And thus the fight was maintained till after dark — assault after assault being delivered by divisions advancing against twice their numbers, on ground where treble tile force was required for the attack that sufficed for the defense; while a hundred Rebel cannon, posted on heights which our few guns on that side of the river could scarcely reach, and could not effectually batter, swept our men down from the moment that they began to advance, and while they could do nothing but charge, and fall, and die. And when night at length mercifully arrested this fruitless massacre, though the terraces and slopes leading up to the
Rebel works were piled with our dead and our disabled, there was no pretense that the
Rebel front had been advanced one foot from the ground held by it in the morning.
We had reason enough for sorrow, but none for shame.
Franklin, on our left, beside his
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own 40,000 men, was reenforced, the night before, by two divisions (
Kearny's and
Hooker's own) from
Hooker, raising his command nearly to 55,000.
At least half our entire force across the river was thus with
Franklin on the left, where the main attack manifestly should have been made, and where
Burnside appears to have purposed that it should have been made.
But it was after 7 A. M. of the fatal day when
Franklin received his orders; which, if they were intended to direct a determined attack in full force, were certainly very blindly and vaguely worded,
12 whereas, a military order should be as precise and clear as language will allow, and as positive as the circumstances will warrant.
it is very certain that a Massena or a Blucher could have found warrant in that order for attacking at once with his entire corps, leaving
Hooker's men to defend the bridges and act as a reserve; but, if hot work is wanted of a Franklin, it should be required and prescribed in terms more peremptory and less equivocal.
He asserts that he expected and awaited further orders, which he never in terms received; at least, not till it was too late to obey them with any hope of success.
Franklin's grand division consisted of the two corps of
Reynolds (16,000) and
W. F. Smith (21,000), with cavalry under
Bayard, raising it nearly or quite to 40,000.
At 9 A. M.,
Reynolds advanced on the left;
Meade's division, in front, being immediately assailed by Rebel batteries (
J. E. B. Stuart's) on his left flank, which compelled him to halt and silence them.
At 11 A. M., he pushed on, fighting; while one of
Hooker's divisions in reserve was brought across, and
Birney's and
Gibbon's divisions were moved up to his support.
Reynolds's corps being thus all in line of battle,
Meade again gallantly advanced into the woods in his front; grappling, at 1, in fierce encounter, with
A. P. Hill's corps, crushing back the brigades of
Archer and
Lane, and, forcing his way in between them, took some 200 prisoners. Here, in attempting to rally
Orr's rifles, which had been disorganized, fell
Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg,
13 mortally wounded.
But the enemy rallied all their forces;
Early's division, composed of
Lawton's,
Trimble's, and his own brigades, which, with
D. H. Hill's corps, had arrived that morning from
Port Royal, after a severe night-march, and been posted behind
A. P. Hill, rushed to the front; and
Meade's division, lacking prompt support,
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was overwhelmed and driven back, with heavy loss, to the railroad, which they had crossed in their advance, where they made a brief stand, but were again hurled back by an impetuous, determined Rebel charge, losing many prisoners.
Meade had already called for aid: and
Gen. Gibbon had advanced on his right, and one of
Birney's brigades on his left, whereby the enemy were checked and repulsed;
Col. Atkinson, commanding
Lawton's brigade, being here wounded and taken prisoner.
Meade's division fell back, having lost 1,760 men this day out some 6,000 engaged; having, of its three Brigadiers,
Gen. C. F. Jackson killed, and
Col. Wm.
t.
Sinclair severely wounded.
Maj.-Gen. Gibbon, on his right, was also wounded and taken off the field; whereupon, his division fell back also.
Sickles's division of
Hooker's men, which had followed
Birney's to the front, took the place of
Gibbon's; but
Smith's corps--21,000 strong — was not sent in, and remained nearer to
Fredericksburg, not determinedly engaged throughout the day. Yet, even
Reynolds's and
Stoneman's corps (the latter composed of
Birney's and
Sickles's divisions) showed so strong a front that
Stonewall Jackson did not venture to assume the offensive till nightfall; when a very brief experience convinced him that he might better let well alone.
14
The advance of
Reynolds's left was for some time retarded by
Stuart's cavalry, holding the extreme Rebel right, whose battery opened a most annoying cross-fire on our infantry as it advanced from the
Rappahannock.
The 9th New York was first sent to take this battery, but failed — taking to their heels instead; when a brigade was brought up by
Gen. Tyler, and charged with no better success.
A third charge was stopped by the deadly fire of the
Rebel battery; when more troops were brought up on our side, and the enemy at length flanked and gradually crowded back to the
Massaponax; but they still maintained a bold front, and kept up the contest till nightfall; having succeeded in diverting from
Reynolds's main attack in front a force which he could ill afford to spare.
Our losses on this bloody day were not less than 15,000 men; though the number returned as actually killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, foots up but 13,771--as follows:
| Killed. | Woun'd. | Miss'g. | Total. |
Hooker's grand division | 327 | 2,469 | 748 | 3,548 |
Franklin's grand division | 338 | 2,430 | 1,531 | 4,679 |
Sumner's grand division | 480 | 4,159 | 855 | 5,494 |
Engineers | 7 | 43 | 100 | 50 |
| | | | |
Total | 1,152 | 9,101 | 3,234 | 13,771 |
Not one of these died more lamented than
Maj.-Gen. George D. Bayard, commanding our cavalry on the left, who was struck by a shell and mortally wounded; dying that night.
But 28 years old, and on the
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eve of marriage, his death fell like a pall on many loving hearts.
Lee at first reported his losses at “about 1,800 killed and wounded” --one of those preposterous misrepresentations to which commanders on either side were too prone.
His actual loss, as embodied in the detailed reports of
Longstreet and
Jackson, was over 5,000,
15 and may probably be fairly estimated at 6,000, including 500 unwounded prisoners.
He claims to have taken 900 prisoners and 9,000 small arms, but no guns.
Thus closed what the exulting correspondent at
Lee's headquarters of
The Times (
London) calls “a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the
American Republic.”
Not so, O owl-eyed scribe!
but rather one of those days of bloody baptism from whose regenerating flood that Republic was divinely appointed to rise to a purer life, a nobler spirit, a grander, more benignant destiny!
It would be incredible on any testimony less conclusive than his own
16 that
Gen. Burnside, on the very heel of this prodigal.
horrible carnage, resolved to attack again next day, and on the very point where the enemy's lines had been proved impregnable at a cost of 10,000 men. Another butchery as fruitless and still more demoralizing would doubtless have been incurred, but for the timely and forcible remonstrance of stern old
Sumner — who never kept out of a fight when there was a shadow of excuse for going in — and who protested, backed by nearly every General in the army, against such suicidal madness.
Burnside finally gave way, and thus probably saved the 9th corps (of old, his own) from useless, inexcusable sacrifice.
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The two armies stood facing each other throughout the 14th and 15th:
Lee strengthening his defenses and awaiting a renewal of the attack;
Burnside at length deciding to withdraw all but
Hooker's corps across the river, and continue to hold
Fredericksburg; but this he finally gave up, on
Hooker's representation that he should be unable to hold the town; and decided to recross his entire army during the night of the 15th ; which was quietly effected without serious loss.
A few of our desperately wounded, a few pickets, and considerable ammunition, were left by us in
Fredericksburg; but
Franklin did not lose a man; and not one gun was abandoned as a trophy of this ill-starred advance on
Richmond.
Our pontoons were all taken up and brought off; the
Rebels next day reoccupying
Fredericksburg and their side of the river; and thenceforth pickets and sharp-shooters fired across the stream, whenever any temptation to a shot was afforded, with as business-like an air as though the
Rappahannock had always been the boundary of two hostile empires, over which no armed force had ever ventured.
Lee has been blamed for not following up his advantage; and it is just possible that he might have made something by a tremendous bombardment of the town while still crowded with our decimated, disheartened troops — possibly by a sudden, determined assault upon it, or upon
Franklin's wing, with the great body of his army.
But how could he know at once how severely we had suffered?
And, even if he
did know, would it have been wise to rush his men upon our batteries, as ours had been rushed upon his?
Jackson had decided against this, when in the flush of his success; and he decided wisely.
To push forward their men till under the fire of our heavy guns, commandingly posted on our side of the
Rappahannock, would lave been to imitate
Burnside's blunder; and they had not 15,000 men to spare.
17
General Burnside's errors in this movement were errors of judgment only; and these were nobly redeemed by his subsequent conduct and bearing.
Though he had accepted the chief command with unfeigned reluctance and self-distrust, and keenly felt that he had not been fairly treated in the matter of the pontoons, and that
Franklin had not done his best in the hour of trial, he excused others and took all the blame on himself.
In his report to
Gen. Halleck,
18 he says:
But for the fog, and tile unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy 24 hours to concentrate his forces in his strong position.
we should almost certainly have succeeded ; in which case, the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than it we had crossed at the places first selected.
As it was, we came very near success.
Failing in accomplishing the mail object, we remained in order of battle two days--long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his stronghold to fight me with his infantry — after which, we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, without the loss of men or property.
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As the day broke, our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade — note the least demoralization or disorganization existed.
To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe every thing.
For tile failure in the attack, I am responsible; as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible.
To the families and friends of the dead, I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies; but for the wounded, I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and final recovery.
The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible.
But
General Burnside's usefulness as commander of the Army of the Potomac was at an end. Officers and soldiers alike felt that he had sadly misjudged in ordering an assault on the bristling heights south of
Fredericksburg — still more,in seeking to repeat that assault after the bloody, calamitous experience of the 13th--and the popularity of
McClellan was immensely strengthened and widened by that disastrous repulse.
Whatever his faults, “Little Mac” had ever been careful of the lives of his men; and this fact was now remembered to his credit.
Had the army been polled for the choice of a commander at any time during the month following our withdrawal from
Fredericksburg, it is probable that
McClellan would have had a decisive majority, and morally certain that
Burnside's supporters would have proved a still more indubitable minority.
The latter, however, had no idea of sitting down under his defeat.
While the
Rebel chiefs were congratulating each other that the Army of the Potomac had been paralyzed, at least for the Winter, he was planning a fresh and determined advance on
Richmond.
Within a fortnight after his bloody repulse, he ordered
19 rations cooked, wagons packed, and every thing made ready for a general movement; intending to make a feint above
Fredericksburg, but to cross at the
Sedden House, six or seven miles below; while 2,500 cavalry, with 4 guns, crossing at
Kelly's ford, were to raid across the
Virginia Central, the
Lynchburg and the
Weldon Railroads, blowing up the locks on the
James River Canal; crossing the
Nottoway, and reporting to
Gen. Peck, in command at
Suffolk; while several other flying expeditions were to distract the enemy's attention and deceive him as to the significance of the general movement.
He had just given
20 the initial impulse to this combined movement, when a telegram from the
President arrested it; and, repairing at once to
Washington,
Gen. B. learned that representations had been made at headquarters by certain of his subordinates, prompted and sustained by others, that, if he were permitted to proceed, in the existing temper of the army, he would inevitably incur disasters so grave as to signally belittle, if not wholly efface, those of the recent failure.
In deference to these representations, the
President had telegraphed as he did; and the
Secretary of War and the
General-in-chief, though now for the first time apprised of the clandestine communications of army officers to
Mr. Lincoln, failed even to attempt a removal of the impression
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they had made on the
President's mind.
Returning to the army,
Gen. Burnside soon ascertained that certain details of the proposed cavalry movement had transpired — in fact, he was assured by
Gen. Pleasanton that they were known among Secessionists in
Washington two or three days after his first interview with the
President — so he abandoned that movement; intending to make one somewhat different, in the course of a few days.
This new movement contemplated a crossing in force at
Banks's and at the
United States fords, above
Fredericksburg; the crossing below being also made, or at least menaced, as originally proposed: and again his preparations were perfected and his army now put
21 in motion ; when, at 10 P. M., there burst over it one of the severest and most trying storms ever experienced in that region.
Snow, driving sleet, pouring rain, a general breaking up of the roads, hitherto hard and dry, and a chaos of the elements which rendered locomotion impossible and life under the drenching sky scarcely endurable, arrested that advance at its outset, and fixed our army in the mire wherein it for hours wretchedly, sullenly, hopelessly floundered.
Daylight exposed to the enemy across the stream movements which were intended to be consummated under the cover of night: they were not foolish enough, had they been able, to squander their men and animals in attempts to assail our stalled and struggling forces; but they guarded the fords so strongly that
Burnside was glad to order his men back
to their old camps — some of which they had burned on quitting, in the confident expectation that they should nevermore need them.
Gen. Burnside, having discovered, as he believed, the officers who had paralyzed his efforts by fomenting discontent in his army, and by disheartening communications to
Washington, now prepared a
general order ( “No. 8” ), dismissing
22 them from the service; but, on the advice of a trusted friend, decided to submit it to the
President before giving it publicity or effect.
He did so; and the
President, after consultation with his official advisers, decided, instead of approving the order, to relieve
Gen. Burnside from command; which was accordingly done: the order stating that
Gen. B. was so relieved
at his own request--against which,
Gen. B. remonstrated as most unjust, pressing his demand that his resignation should be accepted instead; but he was finally persuaded to withdraw it, and agree to serve wherever his aid might be required, allowing any order to be published that might be deemed essential to the public weal.
Thus ended
23 his command of the Army of the Potomac.
During this Winter and the ensuing Spring, a number of raids were made by the
Rebel cavalry: one
24
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by
J. E. B. Stuart across the
Rappahannock to
Dumfries, where 25 wagons and some 200 prisoners were taken, and thence toward
Alexandria and around Fairfax Court House, burning the railroad bridge across the
Accotink, and returning in triumph with their spoils; another,
25 by a party of
Imboden's troopers, farther west, from the
Valley to
Romney, where the guards of a supply train were surprised and routed: 72 men, 106 horses, and 27 wagons taken and carried off; a third,
26 by
Fitz Hugh Lee, across the
Rappahannock, near
Falmouth, surprising a camp, and taking 150 prisoners, with a loss of 14 men; a fourth,
27 by
Gen. W. E. Jones, in the
Valley, routing two regiments of
Milroy's cavalry, and taking 200 prisoners, with a loss of 4 men only; while a more daring raid was made by
Maj. White, of
Jones's command, across the
Potomac at
Poolesville, taking 77 prisoners.
Lee further reports that
Capt. Randolph, of the
Black Horse cavalry, by various raids into
Fauquier county, captures over 200 prisoners and several hundred stand of arms; and that
Lt. Moseby (whose name now makes its first appearance in a bulletin) “has done much to harass the enemy; attacking him boldly on several occasions, and capturing many prisoners.”
One or two minor cavalry exploits, recited by
Lee in “
General Order No. 29,” read too much like romance to be embodied in sober history; yet such was the depression on our side in
Virginia, such the elation and confidence on the other, such the very great advantage enjoyed by Rebel raiders in the readiness of tle
White inhabitants to give them information, and even to scout in quest of it, throughout that dreary Winter, that nothing that might be asserted of Rebel audacity or Federal imbecility is absolutely incredible.
The somber cloud is lighted by a single flash, not of victory, but of humor.
In a Rebel raid far within our lines,
Gen. Stoughton, a young Vermont Brigadier, was taken in his bed, near Fairfax Court House, and, with his guards and five horses, hurried off across the
Rappahannock.
Some one spoke of the loss to
Mr. Lincoln next morning: “Yes,” said the
President; “that of the horses
is. bad; but I can make another General in 5 minutes.”
When
General Hooker assumed
28 command of the Army of the Potomac, its spirit and efficiency were at a very low ebb. Desertions were at the rate of 200 per day; soldiers clandestinely receiving citizens' clothing by express from relatives and others to facilitate their efforts to escape from a service wherein they had lost all heart.
The number shown by the rolls to be absent from their regiments was no less that 2, 9922 officers and 81,964 non-commissioned
29 officers and soldiers — many of them in hospitals, on leave, or detached on duty; but a majority, probably, had deserted.
The frequency, audacity, and success, of the
Rebel cavalry raids that Winter forcibly indicate the elation and confidence felt on one side, the apathy, born of despondency, on the other.
Superior as its
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numbers still were, it is questionable that this army was a full match, on equal ground, for its more homogeneous, better disciplined, more self-assured, more determined antagonist.
Gen. Hooker very properly devoted the two ensuing months to improving the discipline, perfecting the organization, and exalting the spirit of his men; with such success that he had, before their close, an army equal in numbers and efficiency to any ever seen on this continent, except that which
Gen. McClellan commanded during the first three months of 1861.
Its infantry was nearly, if not quite, 100,000 strong ; its artillery not less than 10,000, every way well appointed; while its cavalry, numbering 13,000, needed only a fair field and a leader to prove itself the most effective body of horsemen ever brigaded on American soil.
Horses and forage having both become scarce in the
South, there was not, and never had been, any cavalry force connected with any Rebel army that could stand against it.
Being at length ready,
Hooker dispatched
30 Stoneman, with most of his cavalry,
31 up the north side of the river, with instructions to cross, at discretion, above the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, strike
Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry brigade (computed at 2,000) near Culpepper Court House, capture
Gordonsville, and then pounce on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad near Saxton's Junction, cutting telegraphs, railroads, burning bridges, &c., thence toward
Richmond, fighting at every opportunity, and harassing by every means the retreat of the
Rebel army, which, it was calculated, would now be retiring on
Richmond.
The spirit of
Hooker's instructions is embodied in these sentences:
Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders be fight, fight, fight; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the General as the Rebel carcasses.
It devolves upon you, General, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliance of our success.
Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution, are every thing in war; and especially is it tile case with the command you have, and the enterprise on which you are about to embark.
These instructions seem to have been at once terse and perspicuous, plainly indicating what was expected, and why it was required; yet leaving ample discretion to him who was to give them effect.
Yet it is hard to repress a suspicion that irony lurks in such language, when addressed to an officer like
George D. Stoneman.
Our cavalry, carefully screening its movements from the enemy, marched two days westward, and had thrown across one division, when a rain raised the river so rapidly that this vanguard was recalled, swimming its horses ; and a succession of April storms kept the streams so full and impetuous, while the roads were rendered so bad, that a fresh advance was postponed to the 27th;
Gen. Hooker giving the order for the movement of his infantry and artillery next day.
The time was well chosen.
Long,--street, with three divisions, had been detached from
Lee's army, and was operating against
Gen. Peck below the
James; and it is not probable that
Lee had much, if any, over 60,000 men on the
Rappahannock.
True, his position at
Fredericksburg was
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very strong, as we had learned to our cost; but it might be turned, as
Hooker proceeded to show.
His army was still encamped at
Falmouth, opposite
Fredericksburg.
The 11th (
Howard's) and 12th (
Slocum's) corps moved up the river, but carefully avoiding observation from the hostile bank, so far as
Kelly's ford; crossing there the
Rappahannock that night and next morning — the men wading up to their armpits — and the
Rapidan at Germania Mills, next day, moving thence rapidly on
Chancellorsville.
The 5th (
Meade's) corps followed; crossing the
Rapidan at Ely's ford, lower down.
Meantime, the 2d (
Couch's) corps approached, so nearly as it might unobserved, to both the
United States and
Banks's fords, ready to cross when these should be flanked by the advance of the 11th, 12th, and 5th behind these fords to
Chancellorsville.
Resistance had been expected here; but none was encountered, as none worth mentioning had been above; and
Couch crossed his corps
32 at the
United States ford on pontoons, without the loss of a man.
Gen. Hooker, at
Morrisville, superintended the movement; following himself to
Chancellorsville,where he established his headquarters that night.
This important movement had been skillfully masked by a feint of crossing below
Fredericksburg; the 6th (
Sedgwick's) corps laying pontoons and actually crossing at
Franklin's, two or three miles below; the 1st (
Reynolds's) at Pollock's Mill, still lower; the 3d (
Sickles's) supporting either or both.
Sedgwick was in chief command on this wing.
The bridges were ready by daylight of the 29th; and, before daylight,
Brooks's division had crossed in boats and driven off the
Rebel pickets; while
Gen. Wadsworth in like manner led the advance of
Reynolds's division; when three pontoon bridges were laid in front of
Sedgwick, and every thing made ready for crossing in force.
Now
Sickles's (3d) corps was ordered to move
33 silently, rapidly to the
United States ford, and thence to
Chancellorsville, while part of the pontoons were taken up and sent to Banks's ford;
Reynolds, after making as great a display as possible, and exchanging some long shots with the
Rebels in his front, following, May 2d; raising
Hooker's force at and near
Chancellorsville to 70,000 men.
Sedgwick, on the other side of the
Rebel army, had his own corps, 22,000 strong; while
Gen. Gibbon's division of the 2d corps, 6,000 strong, which had been left in its camp at
Falmouth to guard our stores and guns from a Rebel raid, was subject to his order; raising his force to nearly 30,000.
Thus far,
Gen. Hooker's success had been signal and deserved.
His movements had been so skillfully masked that
Lee was completely deceived; and the passage of the
Rappahannock had been effected, both above and below him, and all its fords seized, without any loss whatever.
Never did a General feel more sanguine of achieving not merely a great but a crushing victory.
“I have
Lee's army in one hand and
Richmond in the other,” was his exulting remark to those around him as he rode up to the single but capacious brick house — at once mansion and tavern — that then, with its appendages, constituted
Chancellorsville.
But
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the order he issued thereupon evinces an amazing misapprehension of his real position and its perils.
It reads as follows:
headquarters army of the Potomac, camp near
Falmouth, Va., April 30, 1863.
It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the
Commanding General announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.
A General who has but eight days provisions at hand, and these in the haversacks of his men, with a capricious river between him and his depots, and who has been obliged to leave behind most of his heavier guns, as well as his wagons, and is enveloped in a labyrinth of woods and thickets, traversed by narrow roads, and every foot of it familiar to his enemy, while a
terra incognita even to his guides, has no warrant for talking in that strain.
Never were a few “intelligent contrabands,” who had traversed those mazes by night as well as by day, more imperatively needed; yet he does not seem to have even seasonably sought their services; hence, his
general order just recited, taken in connection with his pending experience, was destined to lend a mournful emphasis to the trite but sound old monition, “Never halloo till you are out of the woods.”
The fords of the
Rappahannock next above
Fredericksburg had been watched by
Gen. Anderson with three brigades, some 8,000 strong; but
Hooker's dispositions were so skillfully made that he did not anticipate a crossing in force until it was too late to call on
Lee for reenforcements; and he had no choice but to fall back rapidly before our advancing columns to
Chancellorsville, where a fourth brigade joined him; but, being still too weak to make head against an army, he obliqued thence five miles toward
Fredericksburg, at the point where the two roads from
Chancellorsville become one.
Here
Lee soon appeared from
Fredericksburg, with the divisions of
McLaws and the rest, of
Anderson's own.
Jackson, with those of
A. P. Hill and
Rhodes (late
D. H. Hill's), had been watching our demonstration under
Sedgwick, below
Fredericksburg; but, when
Lee heard that
Hooker had crossed in force above, he at once inferred that the movement below was a feint, and called
Jackson away toward
Chancellorsville, adding the division of
Trimble to his command and impelling him on a movement against
Hooker's extreme right; leaving only
Early's division and
Barksdale's brigade in front of
Sedgwick on our remote left, and to hold the heights overlooking
Fredericksburg, which he judged no longer likely to be assailed.
Lee had been outgeneraled in the passage of the
Rappahannock on his left, while he was watching for
Hooker on his right; but he was not disconcerted.
Leaving a very small force in his works on the
Fredericksburg heights, he pushed his main body — at least 50,000 strong — down the Gordonsville plank and lateral roads to the point, half-way to
Chancellorsville, where the old turnpike intersects the plank road; and was
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|
Chancellorsville.
Explanations:
A. Positions held by Union troops previous to the movement.
B. Positions held by Rebel troops previous to the movement.
C. Position taken and held by Union troops, April 29.
D. Small force of Rebels routed.
April 30.
E. Farthest advance made by Union forces, May 1.
F. Line which Union forces retired to and intrenched, May 1.
G. Jackson's attack on the 11th corps, May 2.
H. Position which Union forces retired to and intrenched.
May 8.
I. Heights at Fredericksburg carried by 6th corps, May 3.
J. Advanced position attained by 6th corps.
K. Interior line intrenched previous to retiring of Union forces across U. S. ford, night of May 5th.
L. Route pursued by Jackson's forces. |
here concentrated in time to watch the development of
Hookers offensive strategy.
A reconnoissance down the old pike for three miles toward
Fredericksburg having developed no hostile force,
Gen. Hooker ordered
34 an advance of
Sykes's regulars (3d division, 5th corps) on that road, followed by part of the 2d corps; the 1st and 3d divisions of the 5th corps moving on a road farther north, in the direction of Banks's ford; the 11th, followed by the 12th, being thrown out westwardly from
Chancellorsville, along the two roads, which are here, for a short distance, blended, but gradually separate.
An advance of two or three miles toward
Fredericksburg was meditated; but
Sykes had hardly traversed a mile when he met the enemy coming on, in greater force, and a sharp conflict ensued, with mutual loss; the
Rebels extending their line so as to outflank ours, while
Sykes vainly attempted to connect with
Slocum (12th corps) on his right.
Gen. Warren, who was superintending
Sykes's movement, returned and reported progress to
Hooker, who ordered
Sykes to fall back, which he did; bringing off all but a few of his wounded, and very cautiously followed by the enemy.
Thus the prestige of success, in the first collision of the struggle, was tamely conceded to the enemy; and the day closed with the woods and thickets in our front filled with Rebel sharp-shooters, and the crests of the
[
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ridges occupied by his batteries, whence he opened on our left, upon our wagons in the cleared space around the
Chancellorsville house, next morning.
35
The 3d (
Sickles's) corps, having arrived by a hard march from below
Fredericksburg, had been mainly posted in reserve near our center, while
Hooker, about daybreak, rode along his right, which he apprehended was too far extended, or not strongly posted, and which he found no wise prepared by earthworks and batteries for a flank attack; but he was assured by
Slocum and
Howard that they were equal to any emergency.
Thus our army stood still, when, at 8 A. M.,
Birney, commanding
Sickles's 1st division, which had been thrown well forward toward our right, between the 12th and the 11th corps, reported a continuous movement of Rebel forces along his front toward our right; whereupon,
Sickles, at his own suggestion, was ordered by
Hooker to push forward
Birney's division, followed by another, to look into the matter.
Birney, at 10 A. M., directed
Clark's rifled battery to open on the
Confederate wayfarers, which he did with great effect, throwing their column into disorder, and compelling it to abandon the road.
The movement being evidently continued, however, on some road a little farther off,
Sickles, at 1 P. M., directed
Birney to charge the passing column; and he did so; bridging with rails a petty creek in his front, passing over his division and two batteries, and striking the rear of the
Rebel column with such force that he captured and brought off 500 prisoners.
Sunset found him thus far advanced, holding the road over which the
Rebels were originally marching; his division formed in square, with his artillery in the center;
Barlow's brigade of the 5th corps, which had advanced to support his right, being up with him; but
Whipple's division of the 3d and one of the 12th corps, which were to have covered his left, being invisibly distant.
Soon, panic-stricken fugitives from the 11th, now almost directly in
Birney's rear, brought tidings of a great disaster.
The Rebel movement to our right, along our front — which had been either culpably disregarded by
Howard, or interpreted as a retreat of the
Rebel army on
Richmond — had culminated, a little before 6 P. M., in a grand burst of
Stonewall Jackson, with 25,000 men, on the exposed flank of that corps.
Emerging suddenly from the thick woods which enveloped that flank, and charging it from three sides, as it were, the
Rebels caught some of our men preparing their suppers, with arms stacked, and gave them no time to recover.
In a moment, the 1st division,
Gen. Devens, was overwhelmed; its commander being among the the wounded, and one-third of his force, including every General and
Colonel, either disabled or captured.
Driven back in wild rout down the
Chancellorsville road upon the position of
Gen. Schurz, it was found that his division had already retreated — perhaps fled is the apter word — and an attempt made to rally and form here proved abortive; the 17th Connecticut, which bore a resolute part in the effort, had its
Lt.-Col. killed and its
Colonel severely wounded.
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Back upon
Steinwehr's division rolled the rabble rout, in spite of
Howard's frantic exertions; and, although a semblance of organization and consistency was here maintained, the great majority of the corps poured down to
Chancellorsville and beyond, spreading the infection of their panic, and threatening to stampede the entire army.
Sickles had been preparing to strike a still heavier blow than that of
Birney, and had, to that end, obtained from
Hooker Pleasanton's cavalry, perhaps 1,000 strong, with permission to call on
Howard and
Slocum fir aid; when he was thunderstruck by tidings that
Howard's corps was demolished.
As he had heard no firing of consequence, he refused at first to credit the story; but he was soon constrained to believe it. Not only was the 11th corps gone, but the triumphant Rebels were in his rear, between him and Headquarters; so that when, recalling
Birney from his advanced position, he sent to
Hooker for his 3d division, he was informed that it could not be sent —
Hooker having been obliged to use it to arrest the progress of the enemy, and prevent their driving him from
Chancellorsville.
Sickles was in a critical position; but he had now his two divisions in hand, with his artillery — which had not been used in
Birney's advance — massed in a cleared field; where
Pleasanton, coming in from the front with a part of his force, met the rushing flood of fugitives from the right, and was told that a charge of cavalry was required to stop the enemy's advance.
(He had at most 500 men, wherewith to arrest a charge of 25,000, led by
Stonewall Jackson.) Turning to
Maj. Keenan, 8th Pennsylvania, he said, “You must charge into those woods with your regiment, and hold the
Rebels until I can get some of these guns into position.
You must do it, at whatever cost.”
“I will.”
was the calm, smiling response of the patriot, who well understood that the order was his death-warrant.
Ten minutes later, he was dead, and a good part of his regiment lay bleeding around him; but their charge had stayed the
Rebel rush, and enabled
Pleasanton to get his own battery of horse artillery into position, his guns double-shotted with canister, and trained on the ground, 200 yards distant, over which the enemy must come on. And now, clearing the field of fugitives, picking up what guns and ammunition he could from the wreck of the 11th corps, and adding these to
Sickles's, he had them all properly posted and double-shotted, and was ready for his expected visitors.
He had not long to wait.
The woods in his front were by this time full of them; darkness was falling; and some of the enemy resorted to the unworthy stratagem (quite too common on either side) of displaying a false flag, and pretending to be friends.
One of our gunners exclaimed, “General, that is our flag!”
whereupon he sent forward an aid to ascertain.
“Come on, we are friends!”
was called out; and, in another moment, the woods blazed with musketry, and the
Rebels charged out of them, rushing upon our guns; which that instant opened, and swept whole ranks of them away.
Three charges were thus made--one of them to within fifty yards of the guns — but each was repelled with great slaughter; though
Pleasanton had no infantry
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support worth naming for his batteries; and his few remaining troopers, being green recruits, were not adapted to such an emergency; yet these for a time were all the support he had.
In front of these batteries, fell
Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded — by the fire of his own men, they say;
36 but it was dark, in dense woods, and men were falling all around him from our canister and grape; so that it is not impossible that he was among them.
Prisoners taken by
Pleasanton soon afterward told him that
Jackson was mortally wounded, and mentioned other high officers as, like him, stricken down by our fire; adding that their forces were “badly cut up,” and, “as to the men, they were disorganized.”
Still, it seems probable that
Jackson fell by a fire from his own infantry, delivered in accordance) with his orders.
His loss was the greatest yet sustained by either party in the fall of a single man; though Sidney Johnston had probably military talents of a higher order.
But
Jackson's power over his men was unequaled; and it was justified by the soundness of his' judgment as well as the intrepidity of his character.
Contrary to the vulgar notion, his attacks were all well considered, and based on a careful calculation of forces; and he showed as high qualities in refusing to squander his men toward the close of the fray at
Antietam, and again at
Fredericksburg, as he did in his most brilliant charges.
Accident seemed to favor him at times, especially in his later Valley campaign; but then, accident is apt to favor a commander who is never asleep when there is anything to be gained or hoped from being awake, and who, if required, can march his men forty miles per
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day.
It is doubtful if all the advantages, including prestige, which the
Rebels gained around
Chancellorsville, were not dearly purchased by the loss of
Thomas Jonathan Jackson.
Pleasanton, no longer annoyed, proceeded with his work, getting batteries arranged, with caissons, &c., from the
debris left behind by the stampeded corps, until he had forty guns in position, and three roads built across an adjacent marsh; so that, with the support of
Sickles's infantry, he deemed his position tenable against the entire Rebel army.
Sickles, who was again in communication with
Hooker, advanced
Birney's division at midnight,
Hobart Ward's brigade in front, charging down the plank road, driving back the
Rebels, and recovering a part of the ground lost by
Howard; bringing away several of our abandoned guns and caissons.
And now, reporting in person to
Hooker, he was ordered to fall back on
Chancellorsville — the collapse of the 11th corps having rendered our force inadequate, as was judged, for the defense of so extended a front.
This order would seem to hare been unfortunate.
At daylight,
37 Sickles commenced the movement —
Birney in the rear — and was of course closely followed by the enemy, whose infantry filled the woods; but our men retired slowly and steadily, by successive formations, and left nothing to the enemy but one dismounted gun, a shattered caisson, and our dead.
Lee's army was nearly all now concentrated in
Hooker's front, and on his left flank, elated with its easy rout of the 11th corps and its general success; covered by woods, which not merely concealed its inferiority in numbers, but rendered it immaterial; while
Hooker had lost heart, by reason of
Howard's sudden disaster; and his subordinates were paralyzed by their ignorance of this region of woods and dense thickets, in which they could rarely determine whether they were confronting a regiment or a division, and in which, with 60,000 men at hand, they were never able to put in half that number so as to render them of any service.
At daylight, the
Rebels pushed forward heavy columns on their chosen points of attack, infesting our whole front with sharp-shooters, and keeping each of our corps which they had determined not to attack in constant expectation of a charge in force.
But their main effort was made from the west, by direct advance on
Chancellorsville down the plank road on the ground wherefrom
Howard had been hurled.
Never did men charge with more desperate determination, more utter recklessness of their own lives, than did that morning the
Rebels, now led by
J. E. B. Stuart (
A. P. Hill having been disabled soon after
Jackson was, in front of
Pleasanton's batteries), dashing themselves upon
Sickles's corps; whose forty guns, ably fought, tore through their close ranks with frightful carnage.
Those guns were supported by
Berry's and
Birney's divisions of their own corps; the remaining division (
Whipple's) supporting
Berry's, as
Williams's (of
Slocum's corps) supported
Birney's. Charging up to the mouths of our cannon, the
Rebels were mowed down by hundreds; but fresh regiments constantly succeeded those which had been shattered; until
Sickles, finding
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his cartridges running low, sent word to
Hooker that he could not hold his ground without assistance.
Major Tremaine, who bore this message, found the
General stunned and senseless.
A cannon-ball had just now struck a pillar of the
Chancellorsville house, against which he was leaning, and hurled him to the floor.
He was supposed by his staff to be dead or dying; so
Tremaine could get no response to
Sickles's message; and, after sending once more to headquarters in vain,
Sickles — his artillery being now out of ammunition — was obliged to recede to his second line of defenses, expecting to be sharply followed, and to be compelled to hold his ground with the bayonet.
But the enemy's formation had been so completely pulverized by our guns, and their losses had been so fearful, that half an hour elapsed before they renewed their attack.
Had a corps been promptly sent to his assistance,
Sickles believes that victory was his own.
The precious hour passed, while our army was without a head.
Gen. Couch was next in rank, and might have assumed active command during
Hooker's insensibility, but hesitated to do so. Nothing had been done to relieve
Sickles's corps of the weight of all
Jackson's force, save that French and Hancock, with two divisions of
Couch's corps,had charged the left of the
Rebel attacking force, then threatening
Meade's front, and forced it back.
But this scarcely abated the pressure on
Sickles, who was freshly assailed in his new position, and — being still nearly destitute of ammunition — was again compelled to recoil, after repelling, mainly with the bayonet, five fierce charges, and capturing eight flags.
Under
Couch's orders, our army was generally withdrawn a mile northward, or toward the
Rappahannock,leaving the wreck of the
Chancellorsville house to the enemy, whose guns had by this time reduced it to a heap of ruins.
Sickles testified, when before the
Committee on the Conduct of the
War, that only his and a part of the 12th (
Slocum's) corps were engaged when he first sent to
Hooker for help; and that, with 10,000 of the 30,000 then unengaged, he could have won a decided victory.
As it was, the fact that he lost no prisoners, while he took several hundred, and that nearly 4,000 of his 18,000 men were that day disabled, including two of his three division commanders (
Berry and
Whipple) killed, and
Gen. Mott, of the New Jersey brigade, wounded, without the loss of a gun
38 on his repeated retreats,
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save that lost at daylight, sufficiently proves that the ground we conceded was lost by reason of misfortune or bad generalship, not by lack of valor or endurance in our soldiers.
Gen. Hooker recovered his consciousness and resumed command by noon; but the fighting on this front was now nearly over:
Lee's attention being forcibly drawn to
Sedgwick, who was operating on his rear, where
Hooker had expected him to strike heavily at an early hour this morning.
Sedgwick, whose operations had hitherto been intended only to distract attention from the movement on our right, had been directed
39 by
Hooker to cross at
Fredericksburg, and advance forthwith on the road to
Chancellorsville, demolishing any force that might attempt to bar his progress, until he should fall upon
Lee's rear, simultaneously with an attack by
Hooker on his front, and thus crush him between them.
How hazardous such attempts at concerted attack on a great army from opposite and distant points are, was not now to be first learned.
The order found
Sedgwick already across the river, but at a point two or three miles below the city.
Gen. Warren, who was sent by
Hooker, after the stampede of the 11th corps, to urge
Sedgwick to evince all possible alacrity, found him, at 3 A. M. of the eventful
Sunday, just getting his corps in motion, and explained to him
Hooker's critical position and the necessity for prompt action in this quarter.
The night was clear; there was a full moon; and it would not have been impossible to march a corps from
Sedgwick's pontoons to
Chancellorsville between midnight and 6 A. M., had there been nothing in his way. But there was a serious obstacle — to wit,
Lee's army; some portion of which was in
Sedgwick's immediate front, and opened a straggling fire on the heads of his columns so soon as he commenced his march; and at daylight he was just entering
Fredericksburg, instead of approaching
Chancellorsville.
By this time,
Gibbon had laid a pontoon, and was crossing into the city, raising
Sedgwick's force to nearly 30,000 men. Meanwhile, the
Rebel troops in this quarter had been concentrating on Marye's hill, where they had several guns in position; while a canal covering their left, with the bridges all taken up, increased the difficulty of carrying the hill by assault.
One attempt to clear the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of the hill was repulsed; and it was nearly 11 A. M.,
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before
Sedgwick had completed such dispositions as he deemed requisite to storm the heights; when, advancing resolutely, those heights were quickly carried;
Gen. Howe's (2d) division forming three storming columns, under
Gen. Neill and
Cols. Grant and
Seaver, and carrying
Cemetery hill under a heavy fire of artillery, pushing thence to Marye's hill, which was likewise carried with little loss; our columns having scarcely been checked in their advance: the
Rebel force (the 19th and 20th Mississippi, under
Barksdale) being too light.
Among the trophies of this success were 200 prisoners, some guns, camp equipage, &c.
Having reformed his brigades,
Sedgwick, leaving
Gibbon at
Fredericksburg, moved out on the
Chancellorsville road on the track of
Barksdale, following him three or four miles to Salem church, where the
Rebels halted and began to fight in earnest; being joined by
Wilcox, who had fallen back from Banks's ford.
The position was strong, its flanks well covered by woods, and repeated attempts to carry it proved abortive.
By this time (5 P. M.),
Lee — the fighting around
Chancellorsville being over — had thrown
McLaws this way, with orders and men to stop
Sedgwick's progress; and they did it. The fight continued till dark; but the enemy were on high ground, and held it;
McLaws now taking command against us, with his force continually augmenting.
Being the assailants, we of course lost the greater number; and our men lay down on their arms, with little hope of forcing their way through to
Hooker on
that line, especially since he gave no signs of vitality, and afforded no promise of vigorous cooperation.
Morning broke;
40 and
Sedgwick's position was fast becoming critical.
The enemy were not only in force on his front, but were feeling around his left, and even back to the heights above
Fredericksburg.
He was not strong enough to fight the whole Rebel army; yet, should
Hooker remain torpid, that luxury was just ahead.
He received several dispatches from his chief during the day, evincing a very unsettled frame of mind: one, written early in the morning, saying, “You must not try to force the position you attacked at 5 P. M. Look to the safety of your corps ;” another, dated 11 A. M., saying, “If it is practicable for you to maintain a position on the south side of the
Rappahannock, near Banks's ford, do so ;” and another, dated fifty minutes later:
If the necessary information can be obtained to-day, and, if it shall be of the character the commanding General anticipates, it is his intention to advance upon the enemy to-morrow.
In this event, the position of your corps on the south bank of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the General could desire.
It is for this reason that he desires that your corps should not cross the Rappahannock.
While
Hooker was thus hesitating and vacillating,
41 the
Rebels were acting.
No longer dreading an offensive
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from his side, they concentrated largely upon his isolated lieutenant; reoccupying the
Fredericksburg heights, and, striking him in flank, pushed him down toward the river, and, during the night, over it, at Banks's ford, with heavy loss — hardly less than 5,000 men.
42
Sedgwick being now out of the way,
Lee was at liberty to turn with all his force on
Hooker, who still remained within his hasty earthworks between
Chancellorsville and the
Rappahannock.
But the
Rebels had been marched and fought till they were exhausted, and had been fearfully slaughtered in their reckless rushes on our batteries on Sunday.
They may have been willing to repeat that madness; but
Lee manifestly was not. The day passed with little skirmishing and no serious fighting; and, at evening,
Hooker called a council of corps commanders, which decided nothing; but he determined to recross that night, and did so, utterly unmolested.
He states that he brought back one gun more than he took over, and judges that he inflicted greater injury than he received.
That is probably an overestimate: since he admits a total loss, while across the
Rappahannock, of no less than 17,197 men — as follows:
Sedgwick's (6th) Corps, | 4,601 |
Slocum's (12th) Corps, | 2,883 |
Couch's (2d) Corps, | 2,025 |
Reynolds's (1st) Corps, | 292 |
Sickles's (3d) corps, | 4,089 |
Howard's (11th) corps, | 2,508 |
Meade's (5th) corps, | 699 |
Cavalry, &c. | 150 |
He adds that a Rebel surgeon at
Richmond stated the loss of their side in these struggles at 18,000
43 and it is significant that no official statement of their losses was ever made, and that
Pollard is silent on the subject.
It is quite probable that, while the prestige of success was wholly with the
Rebels, their losses were actually more exhausting than ours.
And the violent storm and consequent flood which attended and covered
Hooker's recrossing, setting some of his pontoons adrift and threatening to separate him from his resources, is cited on one side to explain his retreat, and on the other to excuse
Lee's failure to molest it.
Hooker, his army having returned to their familiar camping-ground on the north of the
Rappahannock, issued
44 a congratulatory order, wherein he says:
The Major-General commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected,
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the reasons are well known to the army.
It is sufficient to say they were of a character not to be foreseen nor prevented by human sagacity or resources.
In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents.
In fighting at a disadvantage, we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our country.
Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interest or honor may demand.
It will also be the guardian of its own history and its own honor.
By our celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the rivers was undisputed, and, on our withdrawal; not a Rebel ventured to follow.
The events of last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army.
We have added new luster to its former renown.
We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments, and, wherever we have fought, have inflicted heavier blows than we have received.
We have taken from the enemy 5,000 prisoners, 15 colors; captured and brought off 7 pieces of artillery; placed hors de combat 18,000 of his chosen troops; destroyed his depots filled with vast amounts of stores; deranged his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation.
We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle.
Lee issued a kindred order next day; in which, with at least equal justice and modesty, he says:
With heartfelt gratification, the General commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men, during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged.
Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock.
While this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon to return our grateful thanks to the only Giver of victory, for the signal deliverance he has wrought.
It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the troops unite on Sunday next in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due His name.
Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, the brave soldiers who have fallen in defense of their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example.
The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one [Jackson] to whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success.
The operations of our cavalry, under
Stoneman and
Averill, had been ill-judged, feeble, and inefficient as well could be.
Averill, who was on the right, went out to Culpepper Court House, and thence to the
Rapidan; where he remained, attempting nothing and achieving it, till an order from
Hooker reached
45 him, directing his return to the north side of the
Rappahannock; which was obeyed with alacrity.
Stoneman himself pushed down by Louisa Court House and
Yanceyville to Thompson's Cross-Roads, on the
South Anna; having meantime sent
Col. Wyndham with a detachment to
Columbia, on the
James, where a little damage was done and more attempted to the
James and Kanawha Canal.
Gen. Gregg, with the 1st Maine and 10th New York, was impelled eastward, to destroy the railroad bridge on the
Fredericksburg road at
Ashland; but proved unequal to the task, and contented himself with burning two or three turnpike bridges; falling back upon
Stoneman.
Col. Judson Kilpatrick was sent, with the
Harris Light, to cut the railroads leading northwarda from
Richmond still nearer that city, and struck
46 the
Fredericksburg road at
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Hungary, cut it, pressing thence to the
Virginia Central road, near
Meadow Bridge, doing there a little mischief; and thence pushing north-eastward across the
Pamunkey near
Hanover, and the
Mattapony at
Aylett's, to
King and Queen Court House, and thence south-eastwardly to our lines
47 at
Gloucester Point, on
York river.
Lt.-Col. B. F. Davis, 12th Illinois, had meantime passed
48 down the
South Anna to
Ashland, where he tore up some rails and captured a train of sick, whom he paroled, and crossed thence to
Hanover Station on the
Central, which was fractured, and considerable Confederate property destroyed.
Davis then pushed down to within seven miles of
Richmond, where he bivouacked that night, and set his face next morning toward
Williamsburg on the
Peninsula; but was stopped and turned aside by a Rebel force at
Tunstall's Station, near
White House; moving thence northward until he fell in with
Kilpatrick near
King and Queen Court House, and escaped with him to
Gen. King's outpost at
Gloucester Point.
Stoneman, with
Gregg and
Buford, turned back
49 from
Yanceyville, recrossing the
Rapidan at
Raccoon ford, and the
Rappahannock at
Kelly's ford.
50
Attempts were made to represent
Stoneman's movement as successful, when it was in fact one of the most conspicuous failures of the war, though it might and should have been far otherwise.
His force, if held well together, was sufficient to have severed for at least a week all connection by rail or telegraph between
Lee and
Richmond, riding right over any array of cavalry that could have been sent against it, and cutting the
Fredericksburg road at or above its junction with the
Central; as, below that point, cutting one of those roads, even permanently, was of little use; since communication between
Richmond and
Fredericksburg might be maintained by either.
By keeping his entire force in hand, and thus going where and as he would,
Stoneman might have destroyed the principal bridges on both roads, rendering them impassable for weeks; and brought away thousands of able-bodied negroes, mounted on as many serviceable horses.
As it was, by dissipating his forces, he rendered them too weak at most points to effect any thing, and kept them running from the enemy instead of running after them; thus giving to his expedition the appearance rather of a furtive raid on smoke-houses and henroosts than that of an important movement in a great war. The few little gaps made in the railroads by his detachments were easily and quickly closed; while the 300 horses and mules he brought away would not half replace the horses broken down by his men — mainly in keeping out of the enemy's way.
While
Hooker was preparing for and executing his movement across the
Rappahannock,
Longstreet, with a large force, was aiming a similar blow at the extreme left of our position in
Virginia; where
Gen. John J. Peck held the little village of
Suffolk, with a force ultimately increased to 14,000 men, aided by three gunboats on the
Blackwater.
Suffolk being an important railroad junction, covering the landward approaches
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367]
to
Norfolk, and virtually commanding that portion of
North Carolina which lies east of the
Chowan, had been occupied and fortified for the
Union not long after the recovery of
Norfolk, and a fight had occurred
51 at
Kelly's Store, eight miles south of it, between a Rebel force under
Gen. Roger A. Pryor and a Union expedition under
Gen. M. Corcoran, wherein both sides claimed the advantage.
Our loss was 24 killed and 80 wounded.
Pryor reports that his loss “will not exceed 50;” among them
Col. Poage, 5th Virginia, and
Capt. Dobbins, killed.
Suffolk was never seriously threatened till the
Spring of 1863, when
Longstreet advanced
52 against it with a force which
Peck estimates at 40,000: 24,000 (three divisions) having been drawn from
Lee's army; while
D. I. Hill had brought a full division from
North Carolina.
There was sharp fighting during the ensuing week, but the advantages of shelter and of naval cooperation on our side overbalanced that of superior numbers; and every attempt to break through our rather extended lines was decidedly repulsed.
A Rebel battery having been planted near the west branch of the
Nansemond, it was stormed and carried by
Gen. Getty, with the 8th Connecticut and 89th New York, aided by
Lt. Lamson and our gunboats: 6 guns and 200 prisoners being the net profit.
Still,the siege was prosecuted, with no decided success, until May 3d; when
Longstreet gave it up and drew off-doubtless under orders given by
Lee when he seemed most in need of help on the
Rappahannock.
Peck estimates the
Rebel loss during the siege at 2,000 men; while ours was inconsiderable.