Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 10.
Frank Moore, Ed.

Sir: Herewith I have the honor to enclose my report of events attendant upon the fall of New Orleans. Also the reports of General Smith and General Duncan, the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins and Captain Squires, and a report of the killed and wounded at these points.

Respectfuly,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: Herewith I have the honor to transmit the reports of Brigadier-Generals Duncan and Smith, with the accompanying documents, of the operations preceding and attendant upon the fall of New Orleans.

The department is fully aware, from my official correspondence and telegraphic despatches, of the exact nature of the defences erected for the protection of that city; consisting, in general terms, of an exterior line of forts and earthworks, intended to prevent the entrance of the armed vessels of the enemy, and an interior line in the immediate vicinity of the city, which was constructed almost entirely with reference to repelling any attack made by land with infantry. Where this line crossed the river below the city, it was intended to have a battery of twelve thirty-two and ten forty-two-pounders, which it was considered would enable us to drive back any small number of ships that might succeed in passing the obstructions at the forts, under the fire of their guns. But, whether sufficient or not, no more were to be had, and subsequently, at the earnest request of the naval authorities, I transferred the forty-two-pounders to the steamers Carondelet and Bienville, for service on Lake Pontchartrain, in connection [662] with Forts Pike and Macomb. Immediately after I assumed command of the department, finding that there were no guns of the heaviest calibre, I applied to Richmond, Pensacola, and other points, for some ten-inch columbiads and sea-coast mortars, which I considered necessary to the defence of the lower river, but none could be spared; the general impression being that New Orleans would not be attacked by the river, and I was therefore compelled to make the best possible defence with the guns at my disposal. Twelve forty-two-pounders were sent to Forts Jackson and St. Philip, together with a large additional quantity of powder, and being convinced that with the guns of inferior calibre mounted there we could not hinder steamers from passing, unless they could be detained for some time under the fire of the works, I pushed forward rapidly the construction of a raft, which offered a complete obstruction to the passage of vessels up the river, except through a small opening, and then only one at a time. The forts had seventy-five or eighty guns that could be brought successively to bear upon the river, were manned by garrisons of well-trained artillerists, affording a double relief to each gun, and commanded by officers who had no superiors in any service. Under these circumstances, although I feared the high water in the Spring, with the accompanying drift, would carry away the raft, yet every confidence was felt that the river would remain closed until such time as the iron-clad steamers Mississippi and Louisiana could be finished, which I was confidently informed would not be later than the first of February. The first raft constructed was not carried away by the high water and drift until the latter part of February. But with funds placed at my disposal by the citizens of New Orleans, another was placed in position in March, by the energetic labors of Colonel Higgins and others, and the position was again temporarily secure. No heavy guns had yet been received, although strenuous applications were made by me to get some from Pensacola, when that place was abandoned. The general impression of all those to whom I applied was, that the largest guns should be placed above New Orleans, not below, although I had notified the department, on the twenty-second of March, that in my judgment the fleet only awaited the arrival of the mortar vessels to attempt to pass up the river from below. By means, however, of an energetic and persevering officer, Major W. P. Duncan, Commissary of Subsistence, three ten-inch columbiads and five mortars were finally procured and brought over just in time to be put up as the firing commenced. Thinking that the enemy's troops at Isle Breton were intended to land at Quarantine and act in rear of Fort St. Philip, I ordered Colonel Sysmauski's regiment of ninety days men, armed with shot guns, to that point as a protection. I had, likewise, organized two companies of sharpshooters and swamp hunters, under Captains Mullen and Lartique, which were sent down for operation upon the enemy's vessels from the banks of the river, but the high water keeping the men day and night nearly waist deep in water, soon compelled them to abandon their positions. I will here state that every Confederate soldier in New Orleans, with the exception of one company, had been ordered to Corinth to join General Beauregard, in March, and the city was only garrisoned by about three thousand ninety day troops — called out by the Governor, at my request — of whom about one thousand. two hundred had muskets, and the remainder shot guns of an indifferent description.

The river rose rapidly in April, and soon drove out Sysmauski's regiment, which was removed to the west bank, about six miles above Fort Jackson. The whole country became one vast sheet of water, which rose in the forts and covered places heretofore safe from its encroachments. Under the tremendous pressure of this current and a storm of wind and rain, the second raft was broken away in the night of Friday, the eleventh of April, two days before the enemy first opened fire. The fourteen vessels of Montgomery River defence expedition had been ordered by the department, when completed, to be sent up to Memphis and Fort Pillow, but believing the danger of attack to be greater from below, I detained six of them at New Orleans, of which change the department was fully advised. At my suggestion, Governor Moore had also fitted up two steamers, which were sent to the forts below the city. A large number of fire-rafts were also. constructed and steered down, and two small steamers were employed for the special purpose of towing these rafts into position where they could be most effective, so as to leave the armed vessels free to operate against the enemy. I telegraphed General Beauregard to send down the iron-clad ram Manassas, and when the Secretary of the Navy ordered the steamer Louisiana to be sent also up the river, I protested through the War Department, being satisfied that we required more heavy guns below. She was eventually permitted to go down the river on Sunday, the twentieth of April, but not in a condition to use her motive power with effect.

It was hoped that, notwithstanding this, she would be able to assume a position below Fort St. Philip, discovering the location of the mortar boats, and being herself proof against direct fire, dislodge the enemy with her guns, which were of very heavy calibre. Knowing, also, that the incessant bombardment kept General Duncan closely confined to Fort Jackson, so that he could give no orders to the river defence steamers, I placed the whole under the control of Captain Mitchell, the armed steamers as well as the tugs intended to tow down the fire-rafts. I will here state, that the river defence fleet proved a failure, for the very reasons set forth in my letter to the department of the fifteenth of April. Unable to govern themselves, and unwilling to be governed by others, their almost total want of system, [663] vigilance, and discipline, rendered them useless and helpless, when the enemy finally dashed upon them suddenly in a dark night. I regret very much that the department did not think it advisable to grant my request to place some competent head in charge of these steamers. Learning, subsequently, that the Louisiana was anchored above the forts and that the firerafts were not sent down, I telegraphed Captain Mitchell, requesting him to attend to it, and afterwards called upon Commodore Whittle and entreated him to order the steamer to take the desired position below the forts. This he declined to do, but telegraphed Captain Mitchell, telling him “to strain a point to place the vessel there, if, in his judgment, it was advisable.” No change, however, was made, and in the night of the twenty-third March, I went down myself in a steamboat to urge Captain Mitchell to have the Louisiana anchored in the position indicated, also to ascertain why the fire-rafts were not sent down. A few moments after the attack commenced, and the enemy succeeded in passing with fourteen ships, as described in General Duncan's report, and the battle of New Orleans, as against ships of war, was over, I returned at once to the city, narrowly escaping capture, and giving orders to General Smith, in command of the interior lines, to prepare to make all possible resistance to the enemy's fleet at the earthwork batteries below the town, instructed Colonel Lovell to have several steamers ready to remove, as far as possible, the commissary and ordnance stores, being satisfied that the low developments at Chalmette could offer no protracted resistance to a powerful fleet, whose guns, owing to the high water, looked down upon the surface of the country, and could sweep away any number of infantry by an enfilading fire. These lines, as before remarked, were intended mainly to repel a land attack, but in a high stage of water were utterly untenable by infantry against guns afloat. It having been reported to me that a sufficient number of desperately bold men could easily be got together to board the enemy's vessels and carry them by assault, I authorized Major James to seize such steamers as might be necessary for his purpose, and to attempt it. He called for one thousand men by public advertisement, but being able to find but about a hundred who would undertake it, he abandoned the project. On the morning of the twenty-fifth the enemy's fleet advanced upon the batteries and opened fire, which was returned with spirit by the troops as long as their powder lasted, but with little apparent effect upon the enemy. The powder intended for this battery of thirty-two-pounders had been transferred by me to the steamer Louisiana a few days before, under the supposition that it would render much better service from her heavy rifles and shell guns than with a battery of light thirty-twos. For the operations at these works, you are respectfully referred to General Smith's report. The greater portion of the ordnance stores, provisions, and quarantine property, were sent from the city by rail or steamer, and a portion of the volunteers also took the cars for Camp Moore, seventy-eight miles distant on the Jackson Railroad. The greater part of the ninety-days' troops disbanded and returned to their homes. There were two or three regiments and smaller bodies of men raised for Confederate service, in the city at the time, but being entirely without arms of any kind they could be of no service, and were also ordered to Camp Moore. I adopted this course, recognizing the perfect absurdity of confronting more than one hundred guns afloat of the largest calibre, well manned and served, and looking down upon the city, with less than three thousand militia, mostly armed with indifferent shot guns. It would, in my judgment, have been a wanton and criminal waste of the blood of women and children, without the possibility of any good result, for the enemy had only to anchor one of his ships at Kenner to command the Jackson Railroad, and he could have reduced the city to ashes at his leisure, without being able to make any resistance whatever.

Why he did not occupy Kenner and cut off all exit from the city immediately, I do not understand. Presuming that he would do so, as a matter of course, I had requested Captains Poindexter and Gwathney, of the navy, to have all the steamers ready in Lake Pontchartrain, to carry the troops over to Madisonville, whence they could reach Camp Moore, A portion of them were taken over by this route. Knowing that the enemy would at once seize the Opelousas Railroad, and thus cut off the troops occupying the works on the coast of West Louisiana, I sent orders to the different commanding officers at Ports Livingston, Guiorr, Quitman, Berwick, and Chene, to destroy their guns, and taking their small arms, provisions, and ammunition, to join me at Camp Moore. Major Joy brought away the troops at the two latter forts in a very creditable manner, but those at the other works became demoralized, disbanded, and retured to New Orleans. I gave verbal instructions to Colonel Fuller to have the garrisons of Forts Pike and Macomb, battery Bienvenu, and Tower Dupre, ready to move at a moment's notice, as their posts were dependent on the city for provisions, and frequently for water. It was understood that the naval steamers, in connection with other vessels in the lake, should bring away these garrisons when called upon to do so; and after my arrival at Camp Moore, orders were given on the twenty-sixth to go for them, as I had been informed that Forts Jackson and St. Philip had been surrendered. Finding that this report was untrue, I immediately countermanded the orders, giving instructions that they should be held until further notice, but before either could reach Madisonville it was reported that the whole command was already at Covington. I advised Captain Poindexter to make his way to Mobile with his armed steamers, but he concluded to destroy them. We, however, procured from them some of the guns [664] and ordnance stores, which I ordered immediately to Vicksburg, to be put in position there.

On the twenty-fifth, Captain Bailey, of the Federal Navy, demanded the surrender of the city, and that the flags should be taken down, and the United States flag put up on the mint, custom-house, and other public buildings. To this demand I returned an unqualified refusal, declaring that I would not surrender the city or any portion of my command, but added, that feeling unwilling to subject the city to bombardment, and recognizing the utter impossibility of removing the women and children, I should withdraw my troops and turn it over to the civil authorities. This I did in compliance with the expressed opinion of all the prominent citizens around me — that it would be a useless waste of blood, without being productive of any beneficial results to the cause, for the troops to remain. Captain Bailey then returned to his ship, under escort through the city, at his own request, of two officers of my staff, Colonel Lovell and Major James, and I then. advised the Mayor not to surrender the city, nor to allow the flags to be taken down by any of our people, but to leave it to the enemy to take them down himself. This advice was followed by the city authorities; but the idea being held out in their subsequent correspondence with the Federal officers, that they were placed in a defenseless condition by the withdrawal of the troops, but for which a different course might have been pursued, I promptly telegraphed to Major James, of my staff, then in the city, offering to return at once with my whole command, if the citizens felt disposed to resist to the last extremity, and remain with them to the end. I had deliberately made up my mind, that although such a step would be entirely indefensible, in a military point of view, yet if the people of New Orleans were desirous of signalizing their patriotism and devotion to the cause by the bombardment and burning of their city, I would return with my troops and not leave as long as one brick remained upon another. The only palliation for such an act would be, that it would give unmistakable evidence to the world that our people were in deadly earnest. This determination, plainly expressed in my despatches to Major James (herewith transmitted marked A), was read by him to the Mayor, and also to the city council, in presence of one or more prominent citizens. The opinion was generally and freely expressed by the Mayor and others, that the troops ought not to return. (See report of Major James, hereunto appended, marked B.) I went to the city myself, however, on the night of the twenty-eighth of April, and in order that there might be no mistake, made the same proposition in person to the Mayor. He said he did not think it advisable for the troops to return — that such a step would only be followed by a useless sacrifice of life, without any corresponding benefit, and urged decidedly that it be not done. I, however, addressed him a letter (herewith appended, marked C) declaring my willingness to return and share a bombardment with them, and waited until the night of the twenty-ninth for an answer, but receiving none in writing returned to Camp Moore. The same proposition was made by me, in the course of the day, to several prominent citizens, but was invariably discountenanced by them.

For a week after the withdrawal of the troops I had a number of officers in the city, and kept trains running regularly, which brought out a large amount of government property and stores, as well as those of the State of Louisiana. Nearly everything was brought away except the heavy guns and some property which persons in their fright had destroyed, and everything might have been saved had not persons refused to work for my officers, fearing that they might be subjected to punishment by the enemy. Many, also, refused to work for Confederate money, which occasioned some delay and difficulty in the removal of stores. I feel gratified however, in being able to state that we brought away all the troops that would leave, and, including the property of the State, a greater amount in value than belonged to the government. What we failed to bring was from inability to get transportation. In this duty I was mainly assisted by Colonel Lovell, Major James, Major Ball, Captain Venables, and Lieutenant McDonald, to whom the government is greatly indebted for the safety of much valuable property. It was a source of great distress to me to see the result of months of toil and labor swept away in a few hours, but it was, in my opinion, mainly attributable to the following causes, which I could not by any possibility control:

1st. The want of a sufficient number of guns of heavy calibre, which every exertion was made to procure, without success.

2d. The failure through inefficiency and want of energy of those who had charge of the construction of the iron-clad steamers Louisiana and Mississippi, to have them completed in the time specified, so as to supply the place of obstructions; and, finally, the declension of the officers in charge of the Louisiana to allow her (though not entirely ready) to be placed as a battery in the position indicated by General Duncan and myself. On these last points I could only advise and suggest, as they appertained to a separate and independent department, over which I had no control whatever. (See letter of Major James, hereunto appended, marked D.)

Opened fire on the thirteenth of April, which was kept up, at intervals, for five days, when the mortars opened, and, from that time, with but a single interruption of a few hours, a bombardment was kept up for seven days and nights, which, for great rapidity and accuracy of range, has no parallel. More than twenty-five thousand shells were thrown, of which not less than one-third fell within the limits of Fort Jackson, yet the garrison held out, although wet, without change of clothing, and exhausted for [665] want of rest and regular food, with a heroic endurance which is beyond all praise. That the enemy succeeded in passing a large portion of his fleet by the forts on a dark night, under a heavy fire, is due to no fault of the garrison of the forts. They did their whole duty, nobly and heroically, and had they been seconded, as they should have been, by the defences afloat, we should not have to record the fall of New Orleans.

To the officers of my staff, who underwent months of severe and arduous labor, collecting supplies, creating resources, with the most limited means, and preparing all sorts of materials and munitions of war by ingenious makeshifts, I return my thanks. Left in the city with a small force of badly armed militia, all opportunity for distinction or glory was cut off; yet they never flagged in their zeal and devotion to the cause. When the country knows all that was done, and under what disadvantages it was accomplished, I feel confident that their verdict will do ample justice to those who shared equally in the labors of preparation, while they were denied the glory of taking part in the defence. The battle for the defence of New Orleans was fought and lost at Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

The extraordinary and remarkable conduct of the garrisons of these forts, in breaking out in open mutiny, after covering themselves with glory by their heroic defence, is one of those strange anomalies for which I do not pretend to account. The facts are recorded and speak for themselves. The causes will, probably, never be known in full.

For the detailed accounts of the bombardment of the forts, and the engagements at the time of the passage of the fleets by them and the batteries at Chalmette, you are respectfully referred to the accompanying reports of Generals Duncan and Smith. There were no batteries except at these two points, for the reason that no guns could be procured to place in them. I had frequent occasion to regret that it was found impossible to give me control of the defences afloat as well as here. A single controlling head might have made all the resources more available and efficient in working out the desired result.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

If the people are willing to stand the result, I will bring four thousand five hundred men down, as soon as I can give them arms and powder, and stay as long as a brick remains. It is their interest I am endeavoring to consult, not the safety of my men. I have nothing but infantry and two batteries of field artillery, which would be of no use against ships. I will come down myself if they wish it, and bring the men along as fast as ready. They are newly raised regiments, and are being now armed and equipped, as you know. Can begin to bring them down tomorrow, if that is the desire of the citizens. Shall I come down myself to-night? Will do so if I can be of any assistance, and leave General Smith to complete the organization, and bring down the five regiments when ready. The citizens must decide as to the consequences. I will come if it is wished, cheerfully.

I shall start down myself with an aid now, and am perfectly ready, if it is the desire of the city, to hold it to the end. It is for them to say, not me.

Sir: I have the honor to report, that while I was in the city of New Orleans, on the twenty-seventh of April, executing your orders to assist in removing the government and State property, and while the negotiations were going on between the city authorities and the Federal officers for the surrender, I was informed that the nature of the replies to the naval commander was such as to throw some censure upon yourself, for leaving them, as the Mayor styled it, without military protection.

I deemed it my duty to advise you of this immediately, the result of which was the enclosed despatches from you, offering to return with your troops, and afford them all the protection in your power, but that the responsibility of any results that might ensue must rest upon the citizens themselves. I read your despatches to the city council, which was then in session, in presence of Mr. Pierre Soule, who happened to be there at the time. That gentleman, who seemed to speak for the Mayor and council, most emphatically declared that you ought not to return with your troops, as did also the Mayor and members of the council. Several of them, however, declared that they would be glad to have you return alone, and see matters for yourself, to which effect I telegraphed you. You came to the city that evening, with a single Aide-de-Camp, and went with me to the Mayor's house, where you, in my presence, told him that the citizens should have no cause to say that they were obliged to submit for want of military protection; that you were ready and willing to bring your whole command into the city within twenty-four hours, and undergo a bombardment with them, if that was their desire, That you had withdrawn, to enable the citizens to decide the matter for themselves as it was they, and not you, who had their families and property at stake. In reply, the Mayor earnestly declined your offer, stating that you [666] had done all in your power, and that it would be a useless waste of life to bring the troops into the city. He also urged you, by all means, to retire from the city for your own safety, and subsequently asked me to persuade you to leave as soon as possible, as he would be hung if the United States authorities found you were at his house.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: When the enemy, having succeeded in passing our defences on the river with his fleet, anchored abreast the city, it was apparent that the infantry troops under my command could offer no effectual resistance, and their presence would only serve as a pretext and justification for them to open their guns upon a city crowded with women and children, whom it was impossible to remove. Under these circumstances, I determined at once to withdraw my troops, and leave it to the citizens themselves to agree upon the course of action to be pursued, in relation to the welfare of their families and property. I now beg leave to say, that if it is the determination of the people of the city to hold it at any and all hazards, I will return with my troops, and share the danger with them. That my return will be followed by bombardment, is, in my opinion, certain; but if that is the conclusion come to, I will afford all the protection in my power.

Very respectfully,

General: At your request, upon my return from Forts Jackson and St. Philip, I accompanied you to call, upon Commodore Whittle, of the navy, at his headquarters in New Orleans, for the purpose of getting that officer, if possible, to place the iron-clad gunboat Louisiana in a position below Forts Jackson and St. Philip, from which she could enfilade the position of the enemy's mortar fleet, and drive them from it, thereby relieving the forts, for a time at least, from the heavy bombardment then going on, which would allow Brigadier-General Duncan to make such repairs as were necessary, and what was equally necessary, give the garrison some rest. The position designated for the vessel to be placed in was in an eddy upon the Fort St. Philip side of the river, and under the protection of the guns of both forts, and entirely out of the line of the bombardment; and it would require a change of position of the mortar fleet to enable them to strike the vessel with shell, if she could have been struck at all. All these facts were fully explained by yourself to Commodore Whittle, and he was requested by you, by all means, to place the vessel in said position, even if she was lost, as the maintaining the position then held by your troops in the forts, without this assistance, was merely a question of time. To this earnest appeal upon your part, Commodore Whittle telegraphed to Commander Mitchell, of the fleet stationed just above the forts, “to strain a point, if in his judgment it was necessary, to comply with your request, and place the Louisiana in the position before spoken of.” As the result shows, the request of Commodore Whittle to Commander Mitchell was not complied with.

I make this statement voluntarily, in order that, if ever the question of the defences of New Orleans should arise, that you can have every evidence to show that it was not certainly the want of proper exertions on the part of the land forces which caused the fall of New Orleans..

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

I have the honor to submit the following report of the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, La., from the sixteenth to the twenty-fourth of April, 1862:

About the twenty-seventh of March I was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel E. Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, composing a part of the coast defences under my command, that the enemy's fleet was crossing the bars, and entering the Mississippi river in force. In consequence, I repaired at once to that post, to assume the general command of the threatened attack upon New Orleans, which I had always anticipated would be made from that quarter. Upon my arrival, I found that Fort Jackson was suffering severely from transpiration and backwater, occasioned by the excessive rise in the river, and the continued prevalence of strong easterly winds. Notwithstanding every effort which could be made, the water kept daily increasing upon us, partly owing to the sinking of the entire site, and to the natural lowness of the country around it, until the parade-plain and casemates were very generally submerged to the depth of from three to eighteen inches. It was with the utmost difficulty, and only then by isolating the magazines, and by pumping day and night, that the water could be kept out of them.

As the officers and men were all obliged to live in these open and submerged casemates, they were greatly exposed to discomfort. and [667] sickness, as their clothing and feet were always wet. The most of their clothing and blankets, besides, were lost by the fire hereinafter mentioned. Fort St. Philip, from the same causes, was in a similar condition, but to a lesser extent.

No attention having been previously paid to the repeated requisitions for guns of heavy calibre for these forts, it became necessary, in their present condition, to bring in and mount, and to build the platforms for the three ten-inch and three eight-inch columbiads, the rifled forty-two pounder, and the five ten-inch seacoast mortars, recently obtained from Pensacola on the evacuation of that place, together with the two rifled seven-inch guns, temporarily borrowed from the naval authorities in New Orleans. It was also found necessary to prepare the old water battery to the rear of and below Fort Jackson, which had never been completed, for the reception of a portion of these guns, as well as to construct mortar-proof magazines and shell rooms within the same.

In consequence, also, of the character of the expected attack by heavy mortars, it was deemed advisable to cover all the main magazines at both forts with sand-bags to a considerable depth, to protect them against a vertical fire.

After great exertions, cheerfully made by both officers and men, and by working the garrisons by reliefs night and day, this work was all accomplished by the thirteenth of April. No sooner had the two rifled seven-inch navy guns been placed in position, however, than orders arrived to dismount one of them immediately, and to send the same to the city at once, to be placed on board of the iron-clad steamer Louisiana. I strongly remonstrated against this removal, by telegraph, but was informed in reply that the orders were imperative, and that the gun must be sent without fail. It was accordingly sent, but with great difficulty, owing to the overflow and the other causes stated. The garrisons of both forts were greatly fatigued and worn out by these labors, performed as they were under pressure, and within sight of the enemy, and owing to the many discomforts and disadvantages we were laboring under, in consequence of high water. In the meantime I had called upon the General commanding the department, for two regiments, to be stationed at the quarantine buildings, six miles above the forts, to act as a reserve force, and to co-operate with the forts, in case of a combined land and water attack. I also asked for Captain W. G. Mullen's company of scouts and sharpshooters, to be stationed in the woods below Fort Jackson, on the right bank of the river, for the purpose of picking off the officers and men from the enemy's vessels, when assuming their several positions of attack. Captain Mullen's company, of about one hundred and twenty-five men, was sent down as requested, and stationed in part in the point of woods below Fort Jackson, and the remainder on the Fort St. Philip side, opposite the raft obstructing the river. The Chalmette regiment, consisting of about five hundred men, Colonel Sysmauskie commanding, was sent to the quarantine. A part of it was stationed there, and company detachments were placed at the head of the several canals leading from the river into the back bays of the same, to guard against a land force being thrown in launches above us.

Four steamers of the river fleet, protected, and to a certain extent made shot-proof with cotton bulk-heads, and prepared with iron prows to act as rams, viz., the Warrior, Stonewall Jackson, Defiance, and Resolute, commanded by Captains Stephenson, Philips, McCoy, and Hooper, respectively, were sent down to report to and co-operate with me. The steamers Governor Moore and General Quitman, prepared as those before mentioned, and commanded by Captains B. Kennon and A. Grant, were sent down in like manner to co-operate with the forts, and ram such vessels of the enemy as might succeed in passing. The naval authorities also sent down the C. S. steam ram Manassa, Captain Warly, C. S. navy, commanding. She was stationed a short distance above Fort Jackson, with her steam up constantly, to act against the enemy as occasion might offer. Subsequently, also, Captain F. B. Renshaw, C. S. navy, arrived in command of the C. S. steamer Jackson. The raft of logs and chains, which had formerly been placed across the river, having proven a failure, upon the rise in the stream and the constant velocity of the drift-bearing current, a new obstruction had been placed across the river, opposite Fort Jackson, by Lieutenant-Colonel E. Higgins, prior to his assumption of the command of the forts. This consisted of a line of schooners anchored at intervals, with bows up stream, and thoroughly chained together amidships, as well as stern and stem. The rigging, ratlines, and cable, were left to trail astern of these schooners, as an additional impediment, to tangle in the propeller wheels of the enemy. This schooner raft was seriously damaged by the wind storm on the tenth and eleventh of April, which parted the chains, scattered the schooners, and materially affected its character and effectiveness as an obstruction.

In addition to the wind, the raft was also much damaged by allowing some of the fire-barges to get loose and drift against it, through the carelessness of those having them in charge. A large number of these fire-barges were tied to the banks above both forts, ready at all times to be towed into the current, and against the enemy, for the double purpose of firing his ships, and to light up the river by night to insure the accuracy of our fire. My instructions to the river fleet, under Captain Stephenson (see attached document A), were to be in the stream above the raft, with such boats as had stern guns, in order to assist the forts with their fire, in case the enemy should attempt the passage, as well as to turn in and ram at all hazards, all such vessels as might succeed in [668] getting above the raft. He was also required to take entire control of the fire-barges (see attached document B), to reconnoitre the enemy above the head of the passes, and to keep a watch boat below every night, near the point of woods, to signal the approach of the enemy. The diagram will illustrate all the points referred to in this report.

The same instructions were given to Captains Kennon and Grant, and, upon his arrival, Captain Renshaw was duly informed of the arrangements made, in which he promised heartily to co-operate. While the enemy remained at the head of the passes, twenty-two and a half miles below the forts, and, subsequently, when he came up to the Jump, or Wilder's Bayou, the boats of the river fleet took turns in running down and watching his movements. For a few nights, also, at this time, one of them was kept below as a guard boat. We had telegraphic communication, besides, down to within half a mile of the Jumps, nine miles below the forts, which, together with scouts operating in the bays to the east and west of the river, in skiffs and perogues, kept us duly posted, meanwhile, of the enemy's movements below, as far down as the South-west Pass. The enemy was not, meanwhile, idle in the interim. His large vessels worked over the South-west Bar, after failing to make an entrance at Pass a l'outre, and the mortar fleet was brought up as far as the South-west Pilot Station, where the mortars were scaled and afterwards tested. From seven to thirteen steam sloops of war and gunboats were constantly kept at the Head of the Passes or at the Jump, to cover his operations below, and to prevent our observing his movements by way of the river. By gradual and regular approaches he carefully closed up the forts, day by day, and opened the attack as hereinafter detailed.

One of our reconnoitring steamers was chased and followed up by two of the enemy's gunboats as far as the point of woods below Fort Jackson, but were soon forced to retire by a few shots from our batteries. This was his first reconnoissance and our fire was not returned.

Several of the hostile gunboats again came up to make observations. They would occasionally show themselves, singly or in pairs, above the point of woods, and exchange a few shots with the forts, and then retire again behind the point. Our sharpshooters obtained a few shots on this occasion, but with very partial result, owing to the lowness of the surrounding country and the extreme rise in the river. Many of the men were up to their waists in water, and in consequence, sickness prevailed among them, and unfitted them for duty.

The enemy spent the principal part of the day in firing grape and canister, and in shelling the woods to drive them out. This was repeated the following day, the enemy not coming within range or sight of the forts, but confining himself to shelling the woods below. The sharpshooters were all driven out by this second day's firing. Our telegraphic communication below was also broken up, as the wires were removed, and many of the posts cut and torn down by the enemy.

There being no other point, above or below, where the sharpshooters could profitably act in that capacity, and as many of them were unfit for duty from exposure, I deemed it advisable to dispense with their services and send them to the city, which was accordingly done.

It being of the highest importance, however, to keep up the telegraphic communication below, Lieutenant T. J. Royster's Company, sappers and miners, Twenty-second Louisiana volunteers, volunteered his services with fifteen men of his company, to act as sharpshooters in perogues, and cover the operator in repairing the line and re-establishing the connection with the forts above, as well as to annoy the enemy. This also failed, from the great difficulty of managing the perogues effectively in the dense undergrowth of the swampy woods below, and the telegraph and the sharpshooters had to be abandoned in consequence.

The enemy brought up his whole fleet, extending the same from the Head of the Passes to the point of woods below the forts. Orders were repeatedly given to Captain Stephenson, of the river fleet, to cause the fire-barges to be sent down nightly upon the enemy; but every attempt seemed to prove a perfect abortion, the barges being cut adrift too soon, so that they drifted against the banks directly under the forts, firing our wharves and lighting us up, but obscuring the position of the enemy. In consequence, I turned the control of them, as well as the boats employed to tow them into the stream, over to Captain Renshaw, the senior naval officer present. I also directed Captains Kennon and Grant to report to him for orders, as I found great difficulty in communicating with or controlling the vessels afloat, and directed Captain Stephenson, with his four boats, to co-operate with Captain Renshaw in every possible way. These boats of the river fleet, it seemed, could not be turned over directly to the immediate command of naval officers, owing to certain conditions imposed by the Navy Department.

From half-past 7 o'clock A. M., the enemy's gunboats came round the point repeatedly for observation, but were invariably forced to retire by our fire. In the meantime he was locating the position of the mortar-flotilla, composed of twenty-one schooners, each mounting one thirteen-inch mortar and other guns, close against the bank on the Fort Jackson side, and behind the point of woods. At half-past 4 o'clock P. M., the enemy run out a gunboat and fired upon the fort, under cover of which two mortar-boats were brought out into the stream. [669] These boats opened fire upon Fort Jackson at five P. M., which was continued for an hour and a half, the enemy, under our fire, retiring behind the point of woods.

One fire-barge sent down successfully against the enemy at four o'clock A. M., which drifted in among his vessels and was fired upon by them, creating considerable movement and perturbation. During the day Captains Renshaw, Kennon, Seant, Stephenson, and Hooper passed in turn with their boats below the raft, now very much disconnected and scattered, and exchanged a few shots with the hostile gunboats and mortar-boats.

Two more abortive attempts were made to send down fire-barges against the enemy during the night.

At nine o'clock A. M., the enemy opened upon Fort Jackson with his entire mortar-fleet of twenty-one vessels, and with rifled guns from his gunboats. Fifteen of them were concealed behind the point of woods, and the other six hauled out in the stream at an angle with them (see diagram), just at the extreme range of our heaviest guns. Our fire disabled one gunboat and one mortar-boat, causing those in the stream to retire behind the cover of the woods. Generally our shots fell short for lack of elevation, and in conseqence of the inferiority of our powder compared to that of the enemy. Even our nearest gun — a ten-inch seacoast mortar — would not reach his boats with the heaviest charges. The enemy ceased firing at seven o'clock P. M., having fired this day two thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven mortar shells.

The quarters in the bastions were fired and burned down early in the day, as well as the quarters immediately without the fort. The citadel was set on fire and extinguished several times during the first part of the day; but later it became impossible to put out the flames, so that when the enemy ceased firing it was one burning mass, greatly endangering the magazines, which, at the time, were reported to be on fire. Many of the men, and most of the officers, lost their bedding and clothing by these fires, which greatly added to the discomforts of the overflow. The mortar fire was accurate and terrible, many of the shells falling everywhere within the fort, and disabling some of our best guns. I endeavored to get the naval forces to carry down fire-barges against the enemy so as to disperse it, but they were all let go above the raft, and with such a lack of judgment that they only lodged under the forts and did not reach the enemy.

(See attached document C.)

None of the boats acted as a guard-boat below the raft at night, so that in consequence the enemy sent up two launches to examine the character of the raft obstructing the river.

The mortar-fleet again opened at half-past 6 o'clock A. M., and the fire was constantly kept up throughout the day. Gunboats constantly came above the point during the day to engage the forts, but were as constantly driven back by our fire. One of them we crippled, which was towed behind the point of woods. The enemy's fire was excellent, a large portion of his shells falling within Fort Jackson. The terre-plain, parade-plain, parapets, and platforms were very much cut up, as well as much damage done to the casemates. The magazines were considerably threatened, and one shell passed through into the casemates containing fixed ammunition. One ten-inch and one eight-inch columbiad, one thirty-two and one twenty-four pounder, and one ten-inch siege mortar, were disabled in the main work. Also two thirty-two-pounders in the water battery.

Bombardment continued very regularly and accurately all night. Failures again made in sending down fire-barges.

Some rain in the morning. Bombardment constant throughout the day, with occasional shots from the gunboats around the point. Wind very high. No fire-barges sent down to light up the river or distract the attention of the enemy at night. In consequence, between eleven and twelve o'clock P, M., under cover of the heaviest shelling during the bombardment thus far, one of the enemy's gunboats came up in tire darkness and attempted to cut the chains of the raft and drag off the schooners. A heavy fire was opened upon her, which caused her to retire, but not until she had partially accomplished her purpose. The raft after this could not be regarded as an obstruction. The fire continued uninterruptedly all night.

Firing continued all day and all night without interruption. Several guns disabled. Disabled guns were repaired, as far as practicable, as often as accidents happened to them or their platforms. Fort Jackson by this time was in need of extensive repairs almost everywhere, and it was with extreme pleasure that we learned of the arrival, during the night, of the iron-clad steamer Louisiana, under the cover of whose heavy guns we expected to make the necessary repairs.

By the direction of the Major-General commanding the department, everything afloat, including the towboats, and the entire control of the fire-barges, was turned over to Captain John K. Mitchell, C. S. Navy, commanding the C S. Naval Forces, Lower Mississippi River. I also gave Captain Mitchell one hundred and fifty of our best men from Forts Jackson and St. Philip, under Lieutenants Dixon and Gaudy, and Captain Ryan, to serve a portion of the guns of the Louisiana, and to act as sharpshooters on the same vessel. In an interview with Captain Mitchell, on the morning of this date, I learned that the motive power of the Louisiana was not likely to be completed within any reasonable [670] time, and that in consequence it was not within the range of probabilities that she could be regarded as an aggressive steamer, or that she could be brought into the pending action in that character. As an iron-clad, invulnerable floating-battery, with sixteen guns of the heaviest calibre, however, she was then as complete as she would ever be. Fort Jackson had already undergone, and was still subjected to, a terrible fire of thirteen-inch mortar shells, which it was necessary to relieve at once, to prevent the disabling of all the best guns at that fort. And although Fort St. Philip partially opened out the point of woods concealing the enemy, and gallantly attempted to dislodge him or draw his fire, he nevertheless doggedly persisted in his one main object, of battering Fort Jackson. Under these circumstances I considered that the Louisiana could only be regarded as a battery, and that her best possible position would be below the raft, close in on the Fort St. Philip's shore, where her fire could dislodge the mortar-boats from behind the point of woods, and give sufficient respite to Fort Jackson to repair in extenso. This position (X on the diagram herewith sent) would give us three direct and cross-fires upon the enemy's approaches, and at the same time insure the Louisiana from a direct assault, as she would be immediately under the guns of both forts. Accordingly, I earnestly and strongly urged these views upon Captain Mitchell, in a letter of this date (copy lost) but without avail, as will be seen by his reply attached as document D.

Being so deeply impressed myself with the importance of this position for the Louisiana, and of the necessity of prompt action, in order to insure the success of the impending struggle, I again urged this subject upon Captain Mitchell during the latter part of the same day, as absolutely indispensable and imperative to the safety of New Orleans, and to the control of the lower Mississippi. My efforts were ineffectual to get him to move the boat from her original position above the forts. His reply is attached as document E, in which he is sustained by all the naval officers present having the command of vessels. I also addressed him two other notes through the day, the one in regard to sending fire-barges against the enemy, and the other relative to keeping a vigilant lookout from all his vessels, and asking for co-operation, should the enemy attempt to pass during the night. (See attached document F.)

Bombardment continued during the day and night, being at times very heavy. During the day our fire was principally confined to shelling the point of woods from both forts, and with apparently good results, as the mortar-fire was slackened towards evening. The casemates were very much cut up by the enemy's fire, which was increased at night. There was little or no success in sending down fire-barges, as usual, owing in part to the condition of the towboats Mosher, Music, and Belle Algerine, in charge of the same, explained by attached document G. This does not excuse the neglect, however, as there were six boats of the river fleet available for this service, independent of those alluded to, and fire-barges were plentiful.

The day broke warm, clear, and cloudless. No immediate relief being looked for from our fleet, the entire command was turned out to repair damages under a very heavy fire of the enemy.

The bombardment continued, without intermission, throughout the day, but slackened off about twelve o'clock M., at which hour there was every indication of an exhaustion on the part of the mortar-flotilla. Hence it became evident that the tactics of the enemy would necessarily be changed into an attack with broadsides by his larger vessels. In consequence, these views were laid before Captain Mitchell, and he was again urged to place the Louisiana at the point before mentioned, below the raft and near the Fort St. Philip bank of the river, to meet the emergency. (See attached Document H.) Captain Mitchell's reply is attached in documents E, I, J, and K, wherein he positively declines again to assume the only position which offered us every possible chance of success, and Captains McIntosh, Huger, and Warly sustain Captain Mitchell in his views of the case. Just before sundown, under a very heavy mortar-fire, the enemy sent up a small boat, and a series of white flags were planted on the Fort St. Philip bank of the river, commencing about three hundred and eighty yards above the lone tree upon that shore. This confirmed my previous views of an early and different attack from the usual mortar bombardment, especially as I presumed that these flags indicated the positions to be taken up by the several vessels in their new line of operation. As nothing was to be expected from the Louisiana, after the correspondence during the day, I could only inform Captain Mitchell of this new movement of the enemy (see attached document L), and particularly impress upon him the necessity of keeping the river well lit up with fire-barges, to act as an impediment to the enemy, and assist the accuracy of our fire in a night attack. Lieutenant Shyrock, C. S. N., Captain Mitchell's aid, came on shore about nine o'clock P. M., to inform me that the Louisiana would be ready for service by the next evening — the evening of the twenty-fourth.

I informed him that time was everything to us, and that to-morrow would, in all probability, prove too late. Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins warmly seconded my opinion, and warned Lieutenant Shyrock that the final battle was imminent within a few hours.

In regard to lighting the river, Lieutenant Shyrock stated that fire-barges would be regularly sent down throughout the night, every two hours, and as none had been sent up to that hour (9.30 o'clock P. M.), he left, informing [671] me that this matter would be attended to as soon as he arrived on board.

To my utter surprise, not one single fire-barge was sent down the river, notwithstanding, at any hour of this night. It was impossible for us to send them down, as everything afloat had been turned over to Captain Mitchell, by order of the Major-General commanding, and the fire-barges, and the boats to tow them into the stream, were exclusively under his control. In consequence of this criminal neglect, the river remained in complete darkness throughout the entire night. The bombardment continued all night, and grew furious toward morning.

At 3.30 A. M., the larger vessels of the enemy were observed to be in motion, and, as we presumed, to take up the positions indicated by the small flags planted by them on the previous evening. I then made my last and final appeal to Captain Mitchell, a copy of which is attached as document M.

The Louisiana was still in her old position above Fort St. Philip, surrounded by her tenders, on board of which was the majority of her cannoniers and crew, and the other boats of the fleet were generally at anchor above her, excepting the Jackson, Captain Renshaw, C. S. N., commanding, which had been sent the day before, at my suggestion, to prevent the landing of forces through the canals above. The McRae lay near and above the Louisiana, and the steam-ram Manassas, with her tender, remained in her constant position above Fort Jackson, both with steam up, and ready for immediate action. The enemy evidently anticipated a strong demonstration to be made against him with fire-barges. Finding, upon his approach, however, that no such demonstration was made, and that the only resistance offered to his passage was the expected fire of the forts — the broken and scattered raft being then no obstacle — I am satisfied that he was suddenly inspired, for the first time, to run the gauntlet at all hazards, although not a part of his original design. Be this as it may, a rapid rush was made by him, in columns of twos in echelon, so as not to interfere with each other's broadsides. The mortar-fire was furiously increased upon Fort Jackson, and in dashing by, each of the vessels delivered broadside after broadside of shot, shell, grape, canister, and spherical case, to drive the men from our guns.

Both the officers and men stood up manfully under this galling and fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at their longest range, with shot, shell, hot shot, and a little grape, and most gallantly and rapidly fought, until the enemy succeeded in getting above and beyond our range.

The absence of light on the river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so dense that scarcely a vessel was visible, and in consequence, the gunners were obliged to govern their firing entirely by the flashes of the enemy's guns. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's dash was successful, mainly owing to the cover of darkness, as a frigate and several gunboats were forced to retire as day was breaking. Similar results had attended every previous attempt made by the enemy to pass or to reconnoitre, when we had sufficient light to fire with accuracy and effect. The passage was of short duration, having been accomplished between three and a half A. M., and daylight, under a very rapid and heavy pressure of steam. Of the part taken in this action by the Louisiana, Manassas, and the other vessels composing the co-operating naval forces, I cannot speak with any degree of certainty, excepting that the Louisiana is reported to have fired but twelve shots during the engagement. But to the heroic and gallant manner in which Captain Huger handled and fought the McRae, we can all bear evidence. The Defiance, Captain McCoy commanding, was the only vessel saved out of the river fleet.

Shortly after daylight the Manassa was observed drifting down by the forts. She had been abandoned and fired, and was evidently in a sinking condition.

The McRae was considerably cut up in this action by shot and grape.

The Resolute was run on shore about a mile above the forts, where she hoisted a white flag, but by the prompt action of the McRae, she was prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy. She was subsequently wrecked and burned. The Warrior was run ashore and fired on the point just above Fort St. Philip.

Nothing was known by us of the movements of the Stonewall Jackson, the Governor Moore, or the General Quitman. The steamers Mosher, Music, and Bell Algerine, in charge of the fire-barges, were all destroyed. So was also the Star. The heroic courage displayed by the officers and men at both forts was deserving of a better success, especially after the fortitude which they constantly exhibited through the long tedium of a protracted bombardment, unsurpassed for its terrible accuracy, constancy, and fury.

Thirteen of the enemy's vessels, out of twenty-three, succeeded in getting by, viz.: the Hartford, Pensacola, Richmond, Brooklyn, Mississippi, Oneida, Iroquois, Cayuga, Wissahickon, Sciota, Kineo, Katahdin, and Pinola. In addition to the foregoing, and to Varuna, and such other vessels as were sunk, there were six gunboats and one frigate engaged in this action, besides the mortar-flotilla. Heavy chains were flaked along the sides of the most of these vessels as an iron-proof protection. The extent of the damage which was done to the enemy we have no means of ascertaining. The vessels which passed all came to an anchor at or below quarantine, six miles above the forts, where they remained until about ten o'clock A. M., when they all passed slowly up the river, with the exception of two gunboats left at the quarantine as a guard.

Shortly after the fleet above got under weigh, a gunboat from below made her appearance with a [672] flag of truce, and verbally demanded the surrender of the forts, in the name of Commander D. D. Porter, U. S. Navy, commanding the mortar-flotilla, under the penalty of reopening the bombardment, which had ceased shortly after the passage, in case of refusal. The demand was rejected, and the bombardment was reopened about twelve o'clock M. It continued until near sundown, when it ceased altogether. The entire mortar-fleet, and all the other vessels excepting six gunboats, then got under weigh and passed down the river and out of sight, under full steam and sail. A vigilant lookout was kept up above and below during the night, but all remained quiet. So long as the mortar-fleet remained below, the position wherein the Louisiana could render the greatest assistance to the forts was the one below Fort St. Philip hereinbefore mentioned, where the fire from her batteries could dislodge the enemy from behind the point of woods.

After the mortar-fleet had left, however, and when the enemy had got in force above the forts, the question was materially changed, in consequence of the fact that all of our heavy guns at both forts had been mounted to bear upon the lower approaches, and not on those above.

The most effective position which the Louisiana could then take as a battery, was in the bight above Fort Jackson, where her guns could protect our rear, and sweep the long reach of river above, towards the quarantine. This would still insure her safety, as she would be under the guns of both forts. This is evident by a reference to the point (Xx) on the diagram.

In several personal interviews, and by correspondence with Captain Mitchell on this date (see attached documents N, O, P, Q, and R), I requested him, during the morning of the twenty-fourth, while the mortar-fleet was below, to place the Louisiana below the raft and dislodge it; and later in the day, when the mortar-fire was nearly exhausted, to. place her in the position (Xx), above Fort Jackson, to assist in repelling an attack from the vessels above.

During the day she was in an unfit condition to assume either position, for the reasons given by Captain Mitchell in his letters to me. The intoxicated volunteers referred to were none of my men, nor did they get their liquor at the forts, as there was none on hand there during the bombardment, excepting the small supplies of hospital stores in the medical department.

No attack attempted during the day by the enemy, either from above or below. The gunboats from the quarantine and from the point of woods below occasionally showed themselves for observation, but without firing. During the day all the principal guns that would admit of it at both forts were prepared at once so as to traverse in a full circle, and bear above or below as necessity might require. Some of the twenty-four pounder barbette guns at Fort Jackson were also replaced by guns of heavier calibre, to bear on the river above.

Permission was granted by the enemy to the Confederate States Steamer McRae to proceed to New Orleans, under a flag of truce, with the wounded. Availing ourselves of the offer of Captain Mitchell, the seriously wounded of both forts were sent on board of her. As it was late when the wounded were all gotten on board, the McRae did not get off until the next morning. Still failed during the day in getting Captain Mitchell to place the Louisiana in the bight above Fort Jackson, where she could act against the enemy from above. One of the raft schooners was burned during the night to light the river, and all remained quiet.

A gunboat with a white flag dropped down from the quarantine to escort the McRae on her mission. The McRae did not again return to the forts. Four of the enemy's steamers were in sight at the quarantine at dawn. A gunboat occasionally showed herself below to reconnoitre. In the direction of Bird Island, and back of the salt works, a large steam frigate and an ordinary river steamer appeared in sight, the latter working her way up the bay behind Fort St. Philip, apparently towards the quarantine. During the day Captain Mitchell communicated with the enemy above, under a flag of truce, and learned that the city had surrendered, and that the Confederate States steam ram Mississippi had been burned by our authorities. The wreck of the floating dock or battery drifted by the forts about four o'clock P. M.

The Louisiana was not placed in the position required of her during the day, Captain Mitchell promising to put her there the next day, the twenty-seventh. Another raft-schooner burned for light, and all quiet during the night. No shots exchanged during the day.

At daylight, the steamer which had been observed the day before working her way up the back bays, was in view, immediately in the rear of Fort St. Philip, and near the mouth of the Fort Bayou. A frigate and five other vessels were also in sight towards Bird Island, one of which was seen working her way up the bay. From ten to thirteen launches were visible near the boat, back of Fort St. Philip, by means of which troops were being landed at the quarantine above us. About twelve o'clock M., one of the enemy's gunboats from below made her appearance, under a flag of truce, bearing a written demand for the surrender of the forts, signed by Commander David D. Porter, U. S. N., commanding mortar-flotilla. (See attached document S.) The forts refused to surrender. (See attached document T.) About four o'clock P. M., the French man-of-war Milan, Captain Clouet commanding, passed up to the city, after asking and obtaining permission to do so. The position of the Louisiana still remained unchanged.

So far, throughout the entire bombardment and final action, the spirit of the troops was [673] cheerful, confident, and courageous. They were mostly foreign enlistments, without any great interests at stake in the ultimate success of the revolution. A reaction set in among them during the lull of the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh, when there was no other excitement to arouse them than the fatigue duty of repairing our damages, and when the rumor was current that the city had surrendered, and was in the hands of the enemy. No reply had been received from the city to my despatches, sent by couriers, on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, by means of which I could reassure them. They were still obedient, but not buoyant and cheerful. In consequence, I endeavored to revive their courage and patriotism, by publishing an order to both garrisons, attached hereto as document U. I regret to state that it did not produce the desired effect. Everything remained quiet, however, until midnight, when the garrison at Fort Jackson revolted en masse, seized upon the guard and posterns, reversed the field-pieces commanding the gates, and commenced to spike the guns, while many of the men were leaving the fort in the meantime, under arms. All this occurred as suddenly as it was unexpected.

The men were mostly drawn up under arms, and positively refused to fight any longer, besides endeavoring by force to bring over the St. Mary's cannoniers, and such other few men as remained true to their cause and country. The mutineers stated that the officers intended to hold out as long as possible, or while the provisions lasted, and then blow up the forts and everything in them; that the city had surrendered, and that there was no further use in fighting; that the enemy were about to attack by land and water, on three sides at once, and that a longer defence would only prove a butchery. Every endeavor was made by the officers to repress the revolt, and to bring the men to reason and order, but without avail. Officers upon the ramparts were fired upon by the mutineers, in attempting to put a stop to the spiking of the guns.

I am greatly indebted to the Rev. Father Nachon for his efforts to quell the mutineers, through some of whom he learned that the revolt had been discussed among them for two days, and yet there was no one man true enough to communicate the fact to his officers. Signals also were said to have been passed between the forts during the night, and while the mutiny was at its height. Being so general among the men, the officers were helpless and powerless to act.

Under these circumstances, there was but one course left, viz.: to let those men go who wished to leave the fort, in order to see the number left and to ascertain what reliance could be placed upon them. About one-half of the garrison left immediately, including men from every company, excepting the St. Mary's cannoniers, volunteers and regulars, non-commissioned officers and privates, and among them many of the very men who had stood last and best to their guns throughout the protracted bombardment and the final action when the enemy passed. It was soon evident that there was no fight in the men remaining behind, that they were completely demoralized, and that no faith or reliance could be placed in the broken detachments of companies left in the fort.

In the mean time we were totally ignorant of the condition of affairs in Fort St. Philip,and as all of our small boats had been carried away by the mutineers, we could not communicate with that fort till the next morning. As the next attack upon the forts was likely to be a combined operation by land and water, and as Fort St. Philip was the point most threatened, from the nature of the country around it, and from the character of the work itself, with narrow and shallow ditches, and but little relief to the main work, it was self-evident that no reduction could be made in its garrison to strengthen that of Fort Jackson, even if all the men there remained true. In fact, two additional regiments had been asked for at quarantine, in anticipation of such an attack, to act as a reserve to strengthen the garrisons of both forts. With the enemy above and below us, it will be apparent at once, to any one at all familiar with the surrounding country, that there was no chance of destroying the public property, blowing up the forts, and escaping with the remaining troops. Under all these humiliating circumstances, there seemed to be but one course open to us, viz.: to await the approach of daylight, communicate then with the gunboats of the mortar flotilla below, under flag of truce, and negotiate for a surrender under the terms offered us by Commander Porter, on the 26th inst., and which had previously been declined.

A small boat was procured, and Lieutenant Morse, Post-Adjutant, sent over to convey the condition of affairs to Fort St. Philip, as well as to Captain Mitchell, on the Louisiana. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Shyrock, C. S. N., came on shore and discussed the whole question; after which they left, remarking that they would go on board, and endeavour to attack the enemy above at the quarantine, notwithstanding that reasons had been given, from time to time, for not moving this vessel into her proper position, only a few hundred yards distant. Captains Squires and Bond, Louisiana artillery, and Lieutenant Dixon, commanding the company of C. S. regular recruits, came on shore shortly afterwards from Fort St. Philip, and concurred with us that, under the circumstances, we could do nothing else than surrender, as they were not at all confident of the garrison there, after the unlooked — for revolt at Fort Jackson, although none of their men had left, or openly revolted.

For these reasons, a flag of truce was sent down to communicate with the enemy below, and to carry a written offer of surrender under the terms offered on the 26th instant. (See at. tached Document V.) This communication [674] brought up the Harriet Lane and three other gunboats opposite the fort, with white flags at the fore, white flags being displayed from the yards of the flag-masts at both forts, while the Confederate flags waved at the mast-heads. While negotiations were pending on the Harriet Lane, it was reported that the steamer Louisiana, with her guns protruding, and on fire, was drifting down the river towards the fleet. As the wreck, in descending, kept close into the Fort St. Philip shore, the chances were taken by the enemy without changing the position of his boats.

The guns of the Louisiana were discharged at random as she floated down, and the boat finally blew up near Fort St. Philip, scattering its fragments everywhere within and around the fort, killing one of our men and wounding three or four others.

Captain McIntosh, C. S. N., who had been severely wounded in the discharge of his duty on the night of the enemy's passage, and who was then lying in a tent at that fort, was nearly killed also. As far as I could learn, however, the Louisiana was fired prior to the time that the enemy's boats, with white flags, came to an anchor abreast of the forts to negotiate. She was fired in her first and original position, without any change of any kind since her arrival at the forts.

The terms of capitulation are attached hereto as Document W, in addition to which Commander Porter verbally agreed not to haul down the Confederate flag or hoist the Federal, until the officers should get away from the forts.

The officers of Fort Jackson and the St. Mary's cannoniers left about four o'clock P. M., for the city, on board of the United States gunboat Kennebeck, and arrived on the morning of the twenty-ninth in New Orleans. The officers of Fort St. Philip were sent up the next day, and all the men subsequently, within a few days, as transportation could be furnished, excepting the men who revolted on the night of the twenty-seventh, many of whom enlisted with the enemy. Upon my arrival in the city I found the enemy's vessels were lying off the town, and that no flag, excepting that of the State of Louisiana, on the City Hall, was visible upon the shore. I also learned that Flag-officer Farragut had directed it to be hauled down and the United States flag hoisted in its stead, upon the penalty of shelling the city within forty-eight hours if the demand was not complied with, and that he had warned the city authorities to remove the women and children within the time specified.

I therefore deemed it my duty to call at once upon the Mayor at the City Hall, and inform him of the fate of the forts below, which I did accordingly. Learning there, from one of his aids, that the Major-General commanding the department was still in the city, I called upon him in person, and verbally reported the main incidents of the bombardment, the passage of the enemy, and the capitulation of the forts.

I have the honor to enclose herewith the report of Lieutenant-Colonel E. Higgins, Twenty-second regiment Louisiana volunteers, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and those of the different company and battery commanders, together with the Surgeon's reports of the killed and wounded. The report of Colonel Sysmauski, commanding the Chalmette regiment at quarantine, has not been received by me, so that I am unable to report upon his operations.

I fully endorse the just praise bestowed in the enclosed reports upon the officers at both forts, and warmly return them my thanks. They all distinguished themselves by cool courage, skill, and patriotism throughout the entire bombardment, and by the patient fortitude with which they bore the several trying ordeals of water, fire, and the energetic fury of the enemy's protracted and continuous fire.

I must also bear testimony to the cheerful courage and prompt and willing obedience with which the men performed their duties throughout the bombardment, and up to the sad night when they took the rash and disgraceful step of rising against their officers, breaking through all discipline, and leading to such disastrous and fatal consequences. I can charitably account for it only on the grounds of great reaction after the intense physical strain of many weary days and nights of terrible fire, during which they were necessarily subjected to every privation from circumstances beyond our control, but which they had not the moral courage to share and sustain with their officers, all of whom were subjected to the same hardships in every particular.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding the forts, my thanks are especially due, for his indefatigable labors in preparing his heavy batteries, preparatory to the attack, almost in the face of the enemy, and for the quiet, skilful, and judicious manner in which he caused them to be fought. He was present everywhere, and did his whole duty well and thoroughly. Captain M. T. Squires, Louisiana regiment of artillery, as senior officer in charge of Fort St. Philip, under orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding, fully sustained every anticipation entertained of his gallantry, skill, and efficiency.

During the first day's bombardment, when Captain Anderson was wounded, my Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant William M. Bridges, Louisiana artillery, volunteered to command the ten-inch columbiads on the main work, and I return him my thanks for the gallant and efficient manner in which he fought them during the rest of the action.

I take great pleasure in making personal mention of my volunteer aides, Captain William Y. Seymour and Captain Y. R. Smith, for the valuable assistance which they rendered me at all times. My thanks are also due to Doctors Bradbury and Foster, who volunteered their services to assist Assistant Surgeons L. Burk and C. D. Lewis, at Forts Jackson and St. Philip [675] respectively, and most efficiently did they aid in this department. Doctor Bradbury remained at Fort Jackson until its fall, and was paroled. Doctor Foster, at my request, accompanied the wounded soldiers to the city on the Confederate steamer McRae.

Messrs. Fulda, Stickney, and Sergeant Y. R. Poindexter, Fourth Mississippi volunteers, telegraphic operators, rendered the most valuable services in keeping open our communication above and below, under the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Although we have failed in our mission of keeping the enemy's fleet from passing the forts, and have been subjected to the deep humiliation of surrendering the charge intrusted to our keeping to the enemies of our country, I must nevertheless state, in common justice to myself and those under my command, that to the very best of our ability, with the means at our disposal, our whole duty was performed faithfully, honestly, and fearlessly. If all had to be gone through with again, under similar events and circumstances, I know that we should be forced to the same results and consequences.

Great as the disaster is, it is but the sheer result of that lack of cheerful and hearty co-operation from the defences afloat, which we had every right to expect, and to the criminal negligence of not lighting up the river at night, when the danger was imminent, and the movements of the enemy absolutely known, almost to the hour of the final attack. Except for the cover afforded by the obscurity of the darkness, I shall always remain satisfied that the enemy would never have succeeded in passing Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Major: In addition to the foregoing report, I wish to add, that upon the arrival of the paroled enlisted men from Forts Jackson and St. Philip in this city, I endeavored, to the best of my ability, to see that they were properly cared for, until such time as they could be sent out of town. As far as it could be done, they were paid in part for the time due, and arrangements were also made through the City Safety Committee to have them boarded and lodged temporarily, all with the view of preventing them from going over to the enemy through distress and starvation. In this I was very much assisted by Captain M. T. Squires, and First Lieutenant L. B. Taylor, Louisiana regiment of artillery. Notwithstanding that they were thus amply provided for, scores of them have been daily going over to the enemy and enlisting since, until now there are but a very few left from either fort not in the ranks of the enemy. Although I really did think, at the time of the surrender, that some few of the men were loyal, the facts which have since come to light have perfectly satisfied me that nearly every man in both forts was thoroughly implicated and concerned in the revolt on the night of the twenty-seventh of April, with the exception of the company of St. Mary's cannoniers, composed mostly of planters.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: Keep your boats in constant readiness at all times for the enemy's approach. Should he attack, all your fleet must be kept above the raft, and such of your boats as have stern guns should lay in the middle of the stream above the raft, and without the field of our fire, and use these guns against the enemy.

Should any boat of the enemy by any means get above the raft, you must instantly ram it with determination and vigor, at all risks and at every sacrifice. All signal mast-head lights should be kept extinguished at night, or never hoisted. Trusting to your known energy, and to the great expectations anticipated of the river fleet by your friends, I have every confidence that your whole duty will be thoroughly performed.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: Keep one of your boats constantly below, night and day, opposite the wooded point, where you can watch the movements of the enemy. Signal us his approach, and the number of vessels seen coming up, and give me a copy of the signals for our government at the forts.

I wish you to take the entire control of the fire-rafts, and you will be assisted therein by the steamers Star, Algerine, and such other boats as I can procure from the city for the purpose.

Your own knowledge of the river and the currents will enable you to set them adrift at such time as your judgment warrants.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

dear Sir: Yours just receive. The fire-barge was sent down, as I supposed, by your [676] order. Captain Grant accompanied me to select a proper place to let her go. She was fired by my order, but was not aware that she was too close to the fort, but the eddy current, after firing, probably brought her into too close proximity to the fort. I regret the affair was an abortion.

Respectfully,

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of this date, asking me to place the Louisiana in position below the raft this evening if possible.

This vessel was hurried away from New Orleans before the steam power and batteries were ready for service.

Without a crew, and in many respects very incomplete, and this condition of things is but partially remedied now, she is not yet prepared to offer battle to the enemy; but, should he attempt to pass the forts we will do all we can to prevent it, and it was for this purpose only that she was placed in position where necessity might force her into action, inadequately prepared as she is at this moment.

We have now at work, on board, about fifty mechanics, as well as her own crew, and those from other vessels, doing work essential to the preparation of the vessel for battle. Under these circumstances, it would, in my estimation, be hazarding too much to place her under the fire of the enemy.

Every effort is being made to prepare her for the relief of Fort Jackson--the condition of which is fully felt by me; and the very moment I can venture to face our enemy with any reasonable chance of success, be assured, General, I will do it, and trust that the result will show you that I am now pursuing the right course.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

P. S.---The Jackson, with launch No. 3, will go up to the quarantine this afternoon, to watch the enemy, as suggested in your note this morning.

Respectfully, etc.,

General: On the receipt, last night, of your second communication of yesterday's date, asking me to place this vessel under the fire of the enemy, I consulted the commanding officers of the C. S. naval vessels present on the subject, and herewith annex a copy of their opinion, sustaining my own views on the subject.

I feel the importance of affording relief to your command as soon as possible; but, General, at the same time I feel, and I know, the importance to the safety of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the city of New Orleans, of having this vessel in proper condition before seeking an encounter with the enemy. If he seeks one, or attempts the passage of the forts before this vessel is ready I shall meet him, however unprepared I may be.

We have an additional force of mechanics from the city this morning, and I hope that by to-morrow night the motive power of the Louisiana will be ready, and in the meantime her battery will be in place, and other preparations will be completed, so as to enable her to act against the enemy. When ready, you will be immediately advised.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Two communications having this day been received from Brigadier-General Duncan (herewith attached, marked Nos. 1 and 3, and also the answer of Commander J. K. Mitchell, No. 1, marked No. 2), requesting that the Louisiana be placed in position below the raft in the river, near Fort Jackson, a consultation was held by Commander J. K. Mitchell with Commander McIntosh and Lieutenants commanding Huger and Warley, who fully sustained the views of Commander Mitchell, as expressed in his reply (marked No. 2), declining to comply with the request of Brigadier-General Duncan.

General: Your two notes of this date have been received. A fire has been ordered to be built below St. Philip, as you requested, except that it will be on the beach, and a raft will be kept ready to fire and turn adrift, as you requested, near Fort Jackson, in the event of the apprehended attack being made by the enemy to-night. I shall also direct a vigilant lookout to be kept by all the vessels, and to co-operate with you to prevent the passage of the forts at every hazard.

Your request respecting the report of the bad [677] condition of the engines of the Mosher will claim my attention as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

gentlemen: The steamers Mosher and Belle Algerine having been represented as being unfit for service, you will please to examine them carefully, without delay, and report to me in duplicate their condition. In the performance of this duty, please state the cause of any damage you may discover, with such recommendations as, in your judgment, you may deem proper.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: In obedience to your order, we have held a survey upon the steamer Belle Algerine and the tug Mosher. The latter has, we think, loosened the after-bearing of her shaft. This we can, I think, obviate in a few hours. The Belle Algerine leaks badly in the bows from two holes knocked in her, the Captain reports, while working in the raft, and also while landing guns at Fort St. Philip. This we can also remedy, and are now doing so. I trust by to-night both vessels will be serviceable.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

General: Above you will see the report on the vessels reported to you as unfit for service. I send it for your information.

Respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain : I am of the opinion that the mortar practice of the enemy against Fort Jackson must be nearly exhausted, and that there is every indication that the enemy, as the next plan of attack, is about to move his large vessels to the point of woods, and open upon us with his broadsides. One of the large vessels has already been brought up and placed in position. Should the above prove to be the case, it is imperatively and absolutely necessary that the batteries of the Louisiana should be brought into action, as well as those of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

A proper position for the Louisiana would be on the Fort St. Philip side, a short distance below the raft and close to the shore, which will give us three direct and cross-fires upon the point of attack.

Earnestly calling your attention to this subject, and as you can see from your position the movements of the enemy, you will, consequently, know when to act,

I remain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

General: I am in receipt of your letter of this date, in which you express your belief that the enemy is about to change his place of attack, and open the broadside of his larger ships on the forts, and in which you make certain suggestions as to the position to be taken by this ship.

By reference to a letter of mine to you of yesterday's date, and of (No. 1) of this date, you will be apprised of the condition of this ship. Should an attack be made as anticipated. I shall be governed by circumstances, and do all I can against the enemy.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: I enclose herewith a copy of a communication received on the twenty-first inst., from Captain Stevenson, from which you will perceive that, notwithstanding General Lovell's order to him, this letter so qualifies my authority as to relieve me from all responsibility as to the movements of the vessels of the river fleet under his command.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: I am in receipt of an order from Major-General M. Lovell, dated twentieth instant, in which I am directed to place myself and my whole command at this point under your orders. Every officer and man on the river defence expedition, joined it with the condition that it was to be independent of the navy, and that it would not be governed by the regulations of the navy, or be commanded by naval officers. In the face of the enemy I will not say more. I will co-operate with you, and do nothing without your approbation, and will endeavor to carry out your wishes to the best of my ability, but in my own way as to the details and the handling of my boats. But I expect the vessels under my charge to remain as separate command. All orders for their movements, addressed to me, will be promptly executed if practicable, and I undertake to be responsible for their efficiency when required. I suppose this is all that is intended by the order of Major-General Lovell, or that will be expected from me by you.

Respectfully yours, &c.,

Our signals should be made to assimilate at once. Captain Renshaw and myself could arrange this if you wish, as no doubt but you are greatly fatigued, and still much to do and arrange. Anything I can do, rely on it being done promptly and cheerfully.

Yours, &c.,

Captain: The enemy has just sent up a small boat, and planted a series of white flags on the Fort St. Philip side, commencing about three hundred and fifty yards above the lone tree. It is the probable position of his ships in the new line of attack which, in my opinion, he contemplates for attacking Fort Jackson with his large vessels. As you may not have seen this operation, I furnish you with the information. Please keep the river well lit up with fire-rafts to-night, as the attack may be made at any time.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: As I anticipated, and informed you yesterday, the enemy are taking up their position at the present moment, with their large ships on the Fort St. Philip shore, to operate against Fort Jackson. They are placing themselves boldly, with their lights at their mastheads. You are assuming a fearful responsibility if you do not come at once to our assistance with the Louisiana and the fleet. I can say no more.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

General: On returning to the Louisiana, I find that we have no tender on whose steam-power we can rely, and many of the volunteer troops on board of the W. Burton are intoxicated. Under these circumstances, as well as the exhausted condition of our own crew, and excessive difficulty in handling the vessel, will prevent our taking the position, at least to-day, that I proposed, and was arranged between us this forenoon.

I will, however, as you suggested in your communication, take up a position above, to protect the approaches in that direction.

Having no adequate motive power of our own, it will be an easy matter for the enemy's vessels that have it to take up such a position that our guns cannot reach him for want of elevation, or be brought to bear upon him. I will, however, do all I can to keep him back from above.

The McRae has lost her nine-inch gun; of course we cannot expect much assistance from her.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

General: Your second and third notes of this date, are at hand. We are in a helpless condition for the want of tug-boats. The W. Burton is crippled, and the Landis also, and the gunboat Defiance will not do anything for us. If she comes within my reach I will deprive her captain of his command, by force if necessary.

The anchor we have down cannot purchase, and we are afraid to ship it, to move about three hundred yards higher up, where we can be better secured.

We shall probably remain where we are, and do all we can to defeat the enemy, should he attack us again. [679]

It will be out of our power, I am afraid, to light up the bank below St. Philip to-night, or to set adrift fire-boats, as none are at hand, and they have all disappeared, apparently.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: From all we can see and learn, the enemy, with the exception of one or two gunboats, has passed up the river, so that there will be no use in changing your present position to one further above. I regret to learn the condition of the volunteer troops on board the W. Burton. This, together with the exhausted condition of your crew, will prevent your taking up the position below, which was agreed upon this morning, for the present. You may be able to take it up, however, when your crew recover from their fatigue, and when you are able to quell the irregularities of the volunteers.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: As I have no boats of any kind, I must ask of you to light up the river with fire-barges to-night, if it possibly lies in your power. The absence of light greatly impairs the accuracy and effectiveness of our fire upon the enemy.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Captain: The lower schooner will be lighted by firing her from a rowboat from Fort St. Philip at early dusk. As this light dies away the next one above will be fired, and so on, all night.

Unless you can better yourself materially, I would not advise any movement on your part from your present position, owing to all the adverse circumstances mentioned in your letter.

In regard to the Defiance, the authority over her which I formerly had has been transferred to you; but we will freely lend you any assistance which you may require in deposing her commander, or in exercising your authority over her.

Keep a vigilant lookout for another attack to-night, when we will mutually support each other, and do all that we possibly can.

Captain Squires has been directed by Colonel Higgins to furnish you such assistance as you may require.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: When I last demanded the surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, I had no positive assurance of the success of our vessels in passing safely the batteries on the river. Since then I have received communications from Flag-officer Farragut, who is now in possession of New Orleans. Our troops are or will be in possession of the prominent points on the river, and a sufficient force has been posted outside of the bayous to cut off all communications and prevent supplies. No man could consider it dishonorable to surrender, especially under these circumstances, when no advantages can arise by longer holding out, and by yielding gracefully he can save the further effusion of blood.

You have defended the forts gallantly, and no more can be asked of you. I feel authorized to offer you terms sufficiently honorable to relieve you from any feeling of humiliation. The officers will be permitted to retire on parole with their side-arms, not to serve again until regularly exchanged. All private property will be respected. Only the arms and munitions will be surrendered to the U. S. Government, and the vessels lying near the forts. No damage must be done to the defences. The soldiers also will be paroled, and be permitted to return to their homes, giving up their arms.

I am aware that you can hold out some little time longer, and am also aware of the exact condition, as reported to us by a deserter, which convinces me that you will only be inflicting on yourself and those under you unnecessary discomforts without any good result arising from so doing.

Your port has long been closed to the world, by which serious injury has been experienced by many loyal citizens. I trust that you will not lend yourself to the further injury of their interests, where it can only entail calamity and bloodshed, without any possible hope of success or relief to your forts.

Your surrender is a mere question of time, which you know is not of any extent, and I therefore urge you to meet my present proposition. By doing so you can put an end to a state of affairs which will only inflict injury upon all [680] those under you, who have strong claims upon your consideration.

I remain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: Your letter of the twenty-sixth instant, demanding the surrender of these forts, has been received.

In reply thereto, I have to state that no official information has been received by me, from our own authorities, that the city of New Orleans has been surrendered to the forces of Flag-officer Farragut, and until such information is received, no proposition for a surrender can for a moment be entertained here.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

You have nobly, gallantly, and heroically sustained, with courage and fortitude, the terrible ordeals of fire, water, and a hail of shot and shell, wholly unsurpassed during the present war. But more remains to be done. The safety of New Orleans and the cause of the Southern Confederacy--our homes, families, and everything dear to man — yet depend upon our exertions.

We are just as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as we were before the bombardment. Twice has the enemy demanded your surrender, and twice has he been refused.

Your officers have every confidence in your courage and patriotism, and feel every assurance that you will cheerfully and with alacrity obey all orders, and do your whole duty as men, and as becomes the well-tried garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Be vigilant, therefore, and stand by your guns, and all will yet be well.

Sir: Upon mature deliberation, it has been decided to accept the terms of surrender of these forts, under the conditions offered by you in your letter of the twenty-sixth instant, viz.: that the officers and men shall be paroled — officers retiring with their side-arms. We have no control over the vessels afloat.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

By articles of capitulation, entered into this the twenty-eighth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, between David D. Porter, Commander U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. Mortar Flotilla, of the one part, and Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding the Coast Defences, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, of the other part, it is mutually agreed:

First. That Brigadier-General Duncan and Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins shall surrender to the Mortar Flotilla Forts Jackson and St. Philip, the arms, munitions of war, and all the appurtenances thereunto belonging, together with all public property that may be under their charge.

Second. It is agreed by Commander David D. Porter, commanding the Mortar Flotilla, that Brigadier-General Duncan and Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, together with the officers under their command, shall be respected. Furthermore, that they shall give their parole of honor not to serve in arms against the Government of the United States, until they are regularly exchanged.

Third. It is further agreed by the Commander, David D. Porter, commanding the Mortar Flotilla, on the part of the United States Government, that the non-commissioned officers, privates, and musicians, shall be permitted to retire on parole, their commanding and other officers becoming responsible for them, and that they shall deliver up their arms and accoutrements in their present condition, provided that no expenses accruing from the transportation of the men shall be defrayed by the Government of the United States.

Fourth. On the signing of these articles by the contracting parties, the fort shall be formally taken possession of by the United States naval forces composing the mortar flotilla. The Confederate flag shall be lowered, and the flag of the United States hoisted on the flag-staffs of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

In agreement of the above, we, the undersigned, do hereunto set our hands and seals.

Sir: I have the honor to report that on Friday, the eighteenth instant, the naval force of the United States, which has been for some weeks in the river, making preparation for an attack on these forts, commenced the bombardment of Fort Jackson.

Fire from their mortar-fleet was opened at nine o'clock A. M. The force employed by the enemy against us consisted of twenty-one mortar vessels, and a fleet of about twenty-one steam vessels of war, carrying more than two hundred guns of the heavest calibre. The mortar vessels when they opened fire, were all concealed from our view save six, which took position in sight of the forts, and within our longest range. These we soon forced to retire. They joined the rest of their fleet behind the point of woods, and, concealed from view, renewed their fire.

Orders had been issued to the officers and men of my command to retire to the casemates of the forts the moment the bombardment commenced. The order being obeyed, nothing was left for us to do but receive the furious storm of shell which was hailed upon us. Our citadel was soon destroyed by fire. All the buildings around and in connection with the fort shared the same fate.

From Friday morning until the following Thursday we sustained this terrible battering. Several times during the bombardment the enemy's gunboats attempted to pass up the river, under cover of their mortar-fire, and on each occasion our batteries were promptly manned, and the enemy's advance gallantly repelled.

At half-past 3 A. M., on Thursday, it was observed that the mortar-fire was increased to an intensity of fury which had not been previously reached. At the same time a movement was observed in the steam-fleet below. Our batteries were instantly in readiness, and were at once engaged in a most terrific conflict with the enemy's fleet of fourteen steamships, which, dashing by the fort in the darkness of the night, pouring in their broadsides of shot, shell, grape, canister, and shrapnel, succeeded in getting beyond our range and in our rear. During the forenoon a demand was made by Commodore Porter, commanding the mortar-fleet, for a surrender of the forts. This proposition was promptly refused, and the bombardment was again commenced and continued until four P. M., when all firing ceased.

I enclose you the reports of company and battery commanders, also the Surgeon's report of killed and wounded. I fully endorse the encomiums of the company commanders upon the officers under their command, and feel myself bound to record my high admiration of the coolness, courage, and fortitude of all the officers of both forts.

Captain J. B. Anderson, Company “G,” Louisiana artillery, was wounded early in the conflict, while heroically fighting his guns. Notstanding his severe wound, he rendered the most gallant and efficient service to the last.

Captain W. B. Robertson, who commanded a detached work called the water battery, remained with his command during the whole of the protracted ordeal, without cover of any kind, although suffering from severe physical disease, and scarcely able, at times, to walk around his battery. He was most ably and gallantly assisted by Captain R. J. Bruce, Louisiana artillery.

First Lieutenant Eugene W. Baylor, who was in command of the 42-pounder barbette battery, and First Lieutenant Richard Agar, of the same battery, did all that gallant officers and men could do.

The officers stationed at the heaviest batteries, on the river front, were, the greater part of the time, fatigued as they were, obliged to be constantly with their detachments at their guns to prevent surprise. Lieutenants A. N. Ogden, Bevuet Kennedy, and William T. Mumford, of the Louisiana artillery, particularly distinguished themselves in this service.

Although not under my immediate command, I cannot omit to mention the devoted conduct of your aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Wm. M. Bridges, who, upon the disability of Captain Anderson, immediately volunteered his services, and took charge of the two 10-inch columbiads, and fought them night and day with ceaseless energy.

Lieutenant J. U. Gains, in command of the 32-pounder battery, on the river front, assisted by Lieutenant E. D. Woodlief, Captain S. Jones, company “I,” Louisiana volunteers, Captain F. Peter, company “I,” 22d regiment, Louisiana volunteers, fought their batteries gallantly and well. Lieutenant Thomas K. Pierson, 23d Louisiana volunteers, was killed in the thickest of the fight, while gallantly fighting his guns.

The St. Mary's Cannoniers, Captain S. O. Comay, have my warmest gratitude and admiration for their whole conduct, both in face of the enemy and in the severe and arduous fatigue duties, which they discharged, always and at all times, with alacrity and energy. They are an honor to the country, and well may their friends and relations be proud of them.

The report of Captain M. T. Squires, who was the senior officer at Fort St. Philip, is enclosed, with the reports of the other officers. Captain Squires fought the batteries of Fort St. Philip most gallantly. He was in charge of that fort during the whole bombardment. The severe work at Fort Jackson required my constant presence there. I had every confidence in the coolness, courage, and skill of Captain Squires and his officers, and most satisfactorily did they discharge their duties. I refer you to his report for the mention of the individual conduct of his officers. [682]

The floating battery “Louisiana,” the steam ram Manassas, and the Confederate steamer McRae, together with a number of vessels which had been fitted up by the Confederate and State Governments, were in the river above the forts at the time the enemy made the dash by. I am unable to state what assistance, if any, was rendered by the greater portion of these. At daylight I observed the McRae gallantly fighting, at terrible odds, contending, at close quarters, with two of the enemy's powerful ships. Her gallant commander, Lieutenant Thomas B. Huger, fell during the conflict, severely, but I trust not mortally wounded.

The Manassas I observed under weigh, apparently in pursuit of one of the vessels of the enemy, but I soon lost sight of her.

I would here observe, that I think an investigation should be demanded into the conduct of the authorities afloat, whose neglect of our urgent entreaties to light up the river during this sad night contributed so much to the success of our enemies

My adjutant, Lieutenant C. N. Morse, was indefatigable in the discharge of his important duties, which required his constant presence near my person, and has my sincere thanks.

Surgeon Somerville Burke, C. S. A., and Dr. Bradbury (who kindly volunteered his services when he became aware of the attack on the forts), were unremitting in their attention to the wounded, fearlessly exposing themselves, at all times, in the discharge of their duties.

Lieutenant Charles Warmes, ordnance officer, distinguished himself by the self-sacrificing attention to arduous and important duties. Day night he was at his post, and, by his great exertions, our magazine was saved from being flooded, the water having risen considerably above the floor.

Lieutenants Mann and Royster, of Captain Ryan's company, rendered fearless and efficient service.

Captain Ryan was with a detachment of his company, on board the Louisiana, during a portion of the bombardment, and in the fight of Thursday morning. At all times his services were most promptly rendered.

Mr. James Ward rendered me the most important services during the bombardment. In charge of the firemen, he made almost superhuman exertions during the burning of the citadel. He has my warmest gratitude.

I have the honor to remain,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: I have the honor to report, that on the morning of the twenty-seventh of April, 1862, a formal demand for the surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip was made by Commander David D. Porter, commanding United States mortar-fleet.

The terms which were offered were of the most liberal nature; but so strong was I in the belief that we could resist successfully any attack which could be made upon us either by land or water, that the terms were at once refused. Our fort was still strong. Our damage had been, to some extent, repaired. Our men had behaved well, and all was hope and confidence with the officers, when, suddenly, at midnight, I was aroused by the report that the garrison had revolted, had seized the guard, and were spiking the guns. Word was sent us, through the Sergeants of companies, that the men would fight no longer. The company officers were immediately despatched to their commands, but were driven back. Officers were fired upon when they appeared in sight upon the parapet. Signals were exchanged by the mutineers with Fort St. Philip. The mutiny was complete, and a general massacre of the officers, and a disgraceful surrender of the fort, appeared inevitable.

By great exertion we succeeded, with your influence, in preventing this disgraceful blot upon our country, and were fortunate in keeping the passion of the men in check until we could effect an honorable surrender of the forts, which was done by us, jointly, on the morning of the twenty-eighth instant.

As the facts and documents relating to this matter are in your possession, it is unnecessary for me to dwell longer on this humiliating and unhappy affair. I wish to place on record here the noble conduct of Captain Comay's company, the St. Mary's Cannoniers, who alone stood true as steel, when every other company in Fort Jackson basely dishonored their country.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Sir: I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report:

Early on the morning of Friday, the eighteenth instant, perceiving by the movements of the enemy that they were about taking up their position, the heavy guns were ordered to open upon them, to annoy them in the execution of their purpose as much as possible; but the distance being great, and the range extreme, with but very little success, the enemy taking little or no notice of our fire, only answering by a few rifle shells, at long intervals. The thirteen-inch mortar after the thirteenth round became useless, the bed giving way under it, breaking in two, and the mortar coming upon the ground. The [683] enemy retired from our sight at eight o'clock P. M., and nothing more was heard of him that night.

At an early hour of the morning of the nine-teenth instant, the enemy again took up a position identical with that of the previous, excepting that no mortar-boats were on this shore, all keeping close behind the point of woods, and opening fire upon Fort Jackson, which was allowed to continue without interruption from this side. Fearing the effect and having ascertained the exact range and distances, I determined to open upon them and draw off some of the fire to this side if possible. It was immediately done, and with partial success, three of the mortar-boats opening upon us with but little effect.

On the twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second, the fire of the enemy still continued from their mortar-boats, with an occasional shot from the gunboats. The only damage done during these days was the damaging the platform of the twenty-four-pounder gun in salient near the main magazine, the shell passing under and throwing it up, but not rendering it useless. Our fire was slow and deliberate, with no visible results more than the driving back of two of the mortar-boats, which were partially exposed around the wooded point. The fire of the enemy, although warm, well-directed, and sustained, was, for the most part, either short or very much over. Up to this time the only guns used were the columbiad battery in the main work, and the thirteen-inch mortar, disabled on the first day. In the lower water battery, one eight-inch columbiad and one seven-inch rifle gun, worked by Captain R. C. Bond's company; four ten-inch sea-coast mortars, by Captain J. H. Lamon's company. On the twenty-third, the enemy still kept up a regular fire, to which we did not reply all day. At 3 1/2 o'clock of the morning of the twenty-fourth, the men were ready, and standing at their guns, having received information that there was a movement by the enemy. No vessels were to be seen, and the first notice of an enemy nearing us was the reply to the shots from Fort Jackson, and the gunners were ordered to fire by the flashes of the enemy's guns, which was done, but the fire was entirely too high, and passed over them. Immediately after this a vessel came in sight, and they followed each other in rapid succession, seemingly in pairs, one of the two keeping back far enough to enable her to deliver her fire from her broadsides. The fire from our guns was rapid, and from the little that could be seen and heard, was accurate, but after the first discharge, the smoke almost hid them from sight, and we were again compelled to judge by the flashes of their guns. As to the effect of the fire, it is impossible to state what it was, as the darkness, aided by the smoke, rendered seeing out of the question. A three-masted propeller ran ashore, during the engagement, above the upper water-battery, and, remaining there several minutes with a fire-barge alongside, her rigging had caught fire, but was immediately extinguished. We were not able to open upon her, as one of the columbiads had been previously dismounted, and the other could not be brought to bear; besides, their hands were full with other vessels coming up, and the twenty-four-pounder in the salient of the upper water-battery, bearing directly upon her, had been broken in two near the trunnions. The vessels passed close under our guns, taking advantage of the eddy, which runs up with considerable force, and it was found impossible to get more than one or two shots at any one vessel, they passed with such rapidity.

All our guns were worked with courage, energy, and skill, excepting the upper water-battery, where some confusion arose, caused by the men not being so thoroughly drilled as they should have been. Company C, of the Confederate Recruits, Lieutenant J. K. Dixon, were fully prepared to work the guns of this battery, and would have done so with effect, but were two days before ordered on board the floating battery Louisiana, and their place was supplied by Captain Assanheimer's Company B, Twenty-fourth regiment Louisiana volunteers, who had only been drilled a few times, and Captain Massicott's Company D, Chalmette regiment, who were raw, undrilled, perfectly ignorant even of the use of the shot-guns with which they were armed, and had never been drilled at artillery. As soon as it was seen that the guns did not open, Lieutenant A. J. Quigley, with such men as could be gathered, was sent to attend to them, which was done, so far as they were concerned, to the satisfaction of that officer. The company of Confederate recruits, under Lieutenants Dixon and Blow, were detailed to report to Captain Mitchell, C. S. Navy, for duty on board the Louisiana, as per instructions dated headquarters Forts Jackson and St. Philip, April twenty-first, 1862, where they remained until the evening of the twenty-fourth instant. Captain Lartigue's company did good service as scouts and sharpshooters, manly of them being out at all times. On the night of the twenty-third, seven of them were sent to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and all returned without accomplishing anything. Two other scouts, one from Company K and the other of Company F, were out on the same mission, and had it not been from the failure of the rockets, which by an accident became wet, would have signalled their approach much sooner. As it was, the only intimation I received was the firing of one of their muskets. The following is the number of projectiles used, etc.: six hundred and seventy-five (675) eight-inch solid shot, one hundred and seventy-one (171) eight-inch shells, thirteen thirteen-inch from columbiad battery, etc., in main work; one hundred and forty-two ten-inch mortar shells from lower mortar battery, four hundred and seventy shot, shell, and grape, lower water-battery; one hundred and twenty shot, grape, and canister, from upper water-battery. Captain R [684] C. Bond, assisted by First Lieutenants Carleton Hunt and Wm. E. Ellis, and his Company K, Captain J. H. Lamon, with the assistance of First Lieutenant H. W. Fowler, with his Company C, in the lower battery, manning the forty-two and thirty-two pounders respectively; Lieutenants Lewis B. Taylor and W. B. Jones, with Company F, at the columbiad battery, and Lieutenant A. J. Quigly, with supernumeraries of Company F, taken from main work to man guns of upper water-battery, behaved with gallantry, energy, coolness, and bravery, worthy of imitation; and all, both officers and men, deserve the highest praise that could be given to any one, for the honorable part they performed during the whole time since the commencement of this trying conflict. Captain Charles Assanheimer's Company B, did their best, both his officers and men. Individual acts of heroism are numerous; but where all did so well, it would appear invidious to mention names. Suffice it to say, that were everything to be done again, or anything else required to be performed, one could ask no other privilege than to have the same men to do it — feeling satisfied it would be as well carried out as possible. The injury to the fort was slight. Of the guns, one banded seven-inch rifle was bursted by the explosion of a shell in its bore near the muzzle, and one twenty-four pounder gun was broker in two about fourteen inches in front of the trunnions, by being struck by a solid shot. An eight-inch columbiad was dismounted, but only temporarily useless, the gun being uninjured and soon remounted. The platform of one twenty-four-pounder gun was undermined by a shell, but not rendered entirely useless. One of the uprights of a forty-two-pounder gun-carriage was partly shot away, but can still be of service.

With many thanks to all officers and men for their assistance and efficient aid, and humbly bowing before the will of Almighty God,

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

	killed.	wounded.	total.
In Fort Jackson	9	33	42
In Fort St. Philip	2	4	6
Totals	11	37	48

Major: I herewith submit a report of the operations of the troops under my command at the Chalmette and McGee lines, on the approach of the enemy's vessels from Forts Jackson and St. Philip to the city of New Orleans. These interior lines of defence are constructed with special reference to an attack by land, but, terminating them on the river banks, were two batteries calculated for twelve and twenty guns respectively, and at the time of the action containing five and nine. Ten forty-two-pounders, intended for this battery, were turned over to the navy for the defence of New Orleans by water. This has been considered as depending upon the forts mentioned, which are well-constructed, permanent works, rather well armed, and far stronger than any other that could be hastily erected. With this view, all the available material, both of guns and ammunition, had been concentrated there prior to the bombardment, and during its continuance was being added to in such quantities daily as the means of the department admitted of, it being evident that the decisive struggle was there to be made. As soon, therefore, as it became certain that the large vessels of the enemy had succeeded in passing, there no longer existed a chance of preventing them from reaching New Orleans, and the short resistance made by the few guns mounted in the two batteries of the interior lines was made through a sense of duty, but without any expectation of success, the enemy numbering as many vessels, less one, as we had guns.

On the side of the river, where I was in person during the action, were stationed three companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney's battalion of sharpshooters. With the five guns on the other side were Captain Patton's company of the Twenty-second Louisiana volunteers, one company from Fort Pike, under Lieutenant Butter, one company Beauregard battery, besides two battalions of infantry collected in camp for instruction, as well as to guard the line in case of the enemy's landing and attacking by land — all under immediate command of General Buisson.

The enemy's vessels had approached to within about the fourth of a mile before we opened on them, the first gun being from Pinckney's battery, and immediately followed by several from the battery on the opposite side, and as promptly replied to from the enemy's vessels. The engagement lasted until every round of ammunition on hand was fired, both officers and men displaying a coolness and intrepidity that was gratifying, especially as regards the men, who then for the first time in their lives discharged a heavy gun. The firing on our side was spirited, perhaps a little uncertain; on the enemy's, heavy and well directed.

During the engagement their vessels gradually [685] lessened the distance, until near enough to open with grape and canister.

The ammunition being expended, and every sense of duty satisfied, permission was given to Colonel Pinckney to withdraw his command along the line of field works affording shelter, which was done deliberately, officers and men retiring together. The casualties were one killed and one wounded. The battery on the Chalmette side seemed well served, and no doubt was so, judging from the character of the officers present.

The enemy, steaming up between us and the city, prevented the retreat of the troops to that point. They were accordingly directed to gain the Opelousas Railroad and reach Camp Moore via Lafourche, or such route as might be found best. Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney has already reported with his command, but somewhat reduced in numbers.

In concluding this report, I wish particularly to call attention to the admirable assistance rendered by Lieutenants McDonald and B. M. Harrod, on engineer duty, both before and after the action. Their conduct could not have been better. Lieutenant Frost, on special duty, was also of material assistance, but in carrying out some instructions, was accidentally absent during the engagement.

Having received no report from General Buisson concerning the operations on his side of the river, I am unable to refer to them more particularly.

Respectfully submitted,