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Chapter 14:
The causes which produced the dissatisfaction at
City Point and
Washington, over the apparent slowness of
General Thomas at
Nashville, can now be clearly traced.
They sprung directly from the telegrams of
General Sherman, overestimating the forces he had left to take care of
Hood.
General Grant and the authorities at the
Capital looked upon
Hood's northward advance with alarm.
Sherman had been repeatedly notified that he must leave an ample force with
Thomas to enable this officer to hold the line of the
Tennessee.
He as often replied that he had fully complied with these directions.
General Grant naturally became solicitous lest
Hood, if not attacked, should pass around
Thomas, invade
Kentucky, and possibly reach the
North.
As a result of this anxiety and-unjust dissatisfaction, an order was given for the removal of
Thomas, which order, however, was not executed in consequence of his battle and victory.
As has been seen,
Sherman thus refers to this matter:
Yet Thomas remained inside of Nashville, seemingly passive, until General> Hood had closed upon him and had intrenched his position. * * * *
‘At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was covered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested on the defensive.
Thus matters stood at Nashville while we were closing down on Savannah in the early part of December, 1864; and the country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seeming passive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one time considered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going to Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be at City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily for the
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latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and thus escaped so terrible a fate.’
The full correspondence relating to this subject is not only interesting, but it throws much new light upon
General Sherman's account of the movements connected with the March to the
Sea.
General Thomas was in
Nashville directing the concentration of his army.
General Schofield was in command at the front.
The great object was to hold
Hood back until all available forces could be united to meet him, and the remount of the cavalry accomplished.
Under these circumstances, and a week before the advance of
A. J. Smith's troops arrived at
Nashville, the enemy had reached
Columbia, and his large force of cavalry under
Forrest was becoming very active.
At this time the correspondence between
General Thomas and the authorities at the
East began, and continued until the battle was fought.
Its opening dispatch was as follows:
* * * * Do not let
Forrest get off without punishment.
The answer gave strong reasons for not implicitly obeying this order, and, together with the telegrams which succeeded it, shows the real condition in which
General Sherman left
Thomas:
Your dispatch of 4 P. M. yesterday just received.
Hood's entire army is in front of
Columbia, and so greatly outnumbers mine at this time that I am compelled to act on the defensive.
None of
General Smith's troops have arrived yet, although they embarked at
St. Louis on Tuesday last.
The transportation of
Generals Hatch's and
Grierson's cavalry was ordered by
General Washburne I am told, to be turned in at
Memphis, which has crippled the only cavalry I had at this time.
All of my cavalry was dismounted to furnish horses to
Kilpatrick's division, which went with
General Sherman.
My
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dismounted cavalry is now detained at
Louisville, awaiting arms and horses.
Horses are arriving slowly, and arms have been detained somewhere
en route for more than a month.
General Grierson has been delayed by conflicting orders in
Kansas, and from
Memphis, and it is impossible to say when he will reach here.
Since being placed in charge of affairs in
Tennessee, I have lost nearly fifteen thousand men discharged by expiration of service and permitted to go home to vote.
My gain is probably twelve thousand perfectly raw troops.
Therefore, as the enemy so greatly outnumbers me, both in infantry and cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive.
The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against
Hood, and if
Forrest can be reached he shall be punished.
After
General Schofield's fight of yesterday, feeling convinced that the enemy very far outnumbered him both in infantry and cavalry, I determined to retire to the fortifications around
Nashville until
General Wilson can get his cavalry equipped.
He has now but about one-fourth the number of the enemy, and consequently, is no match for him. I have two iron-clads here, with several gun-boats, and
Commodore Fitch assures me that
Hood can neither cross the
Cumberland, nor blockade it. I, therefore, think it best to wait here until
Wilson can equip all his cavalry.
If
Hood attacks me here he will be more seriously damaged than he was yesterday.
If he remains until
Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him, and will move against him at once.
I have
Murfreesboro strongly held, and therefore feel easy in regard to its safety.
Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, and Elk River bridges have strong garrisons.
The President feels solicitous about the disposition of
Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period, ‘until
Wilson gets equipments.’
This looks like the
McClellan and
Rosecrans strategy of do nothing, and let the enemy raid the country.
The President wishes you to consider the matter.
If
Hood is permitted to remain quietly about
Nashville, we will lose all the roads back to
Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the
Tennessee River.
Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies.
Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster's employes, citizens, etc.
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With your citizen employes armed you can move out of
Nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing.
After the repulse of
Hood at
Franklin it looks to me that instead of falling back to
Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy, but at this distance may err as to the method of dealing with the enemy.
You will suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if
Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefore, every possible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no peace.
Your two telegrams of 11 A. M. and 1:30 P. M. to-day are received.
At the time
Hood was whipped at
Franklin I had at this place but about five thousand (5,000) men of
General Smith's command, which, added to the force under
General Schofield, would not have given me more than twenty-five thousand (25,000) men. Besides,
General Schofield felt convinced that he could not hold the enemy at
Franklin until the five thousand could reach him. As
General Wilson's cavalry force also numbered only about one-fourth that of
Forrest, I thought it best to draw the troops back to
Nashville and await the arrival of the remainder of
General Smith's force, and also a force of about five thousand (5,000), commanded by
General Steedman, which I had ordered up from
Chattanooga.
The division of
General Smith arrived yesterday morning, and
General Steedman's troops arrived last night.
I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive if I had more cavalry, and will take the field anyhow as soon as the remainder of
General McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which I hope it will in two or three days.
We can neither get reenforcements nor equipments at this great distance from the
North very easily, and it must be remembered that my command was made up of the two weakest corps of
General Sherman's army, and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade, and the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with many delays which have enabled
Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition.
I earnestly hope, however in a few more days I shall be able to give him a fight.
Is there not danger of
Forrest's moving down the
Tennessee River where he can cross it?
It seems to me, while you should be getting up your cavalry
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as rapidly as possible to look after
Forrest,
Hood should be attacked where he is.
Time strengthens him, in all probability, as much as it does you.
Your telegram of 6:30 P. M., December 5, is just received.
As soon as I get up a respectable force of cavalry I will march against
Hood.
General Wilson has parties out now pressing horses, and I hope to have some six or eight thousand cavalry mounted in three days from this time.
General Wilson has just left me, having received instructions to hurry the cavalry remount as rapidly as possible.
I do not think it prudent to attack
Hood with less than six thousand (6,000) cavalry to cover my flanks, because he has under
Forrest at least twelve thousand (12,000). I have no doubt
Forrest will attempt to cross the river, but I am in hopes the gun-boats will be able to prevent him. The enemy has made no new developments to-day.
Breckinridge is reported at
Lebanon with six thousand (6,000) men, but I can not believe it possible.
This statement did not give satisfaction, and the following order for an attack was telegraphed:
Attack
Hood at once and wait no longer for a remount for your cavalry.
There is great danger in delay resulting in a campaign back to the
Ohio.
This was acted upon, but
General Thomas protested against the wisdom of the order:
Your dispatch of 4 P. M. this day received.
I will make the necessary disposition and attack
Hood at once, agreeably to your orders, though I believe it will be hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my service.
You remember that when
Steele was relieved by
Canby he was ordered to
Cairo to report to this department.
What shall be done with him?
The order superseding
Rosecrans by
Dodge has been issued.
Thomas seems
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unwilling to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was any but hazardous.
If he waits for
Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last horn.
Please direct
General Dodge to send all the troops he can spare to
General Thomas.
With such an order he can be relied on to send all that can properly go. They had probably better be sent to
Louisville, for I fear either
Hood or
Breckinridge will go to the
Ohio River.
I will submit whether it is not advisable to call on
Ohio,
Indiana, and
Illinois for sixty thousand men for thirty days. If
Thomas has not struck yet he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to
Schofield.
There is no better man to repel an attack than
Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to take the initiative.
If you wish
General Thomas relieved give the order.
No one here will, I think, interfere.
The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one here, so far as I am informed, wishes
General Thomas removed.
The enemy has not increased his force on our front.
Have sent gun-boats up the river above
Carthage.
One returned to-day and reported no signs of the enemy on the river bank from forty miles above
Carthage to this place.
Captain Fitch, United States Navy, started down the river yesterday with a convoy of transport steamers, but was unable to get them down, the enemy having planted three batteries on a bend of the river between this and
Clarksville.
Captain Fitch was unable to silence all three of the batteries yesterday, and will return again to-morrow morning, and with the assistance of the
Cincinnati, now at
Clarksville, I am in hopes will now be able to clear them out. So far the enemy has not materially injured the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad.
Your dispatch of yesterday received.
It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the
Cumberland, and are scattered.
Why not attack at once?
By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or
Hood, can beat to the
Ohio.
If you think necessary call on the
Governors of States to send a force into
Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river.
You clearly never should cross, except in rear of the enemy.
Now is one of
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the fairest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy.
If destroyed he can never replace it Use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing from one end of the land to the other.
Your dispatch of 9 P. M. just received.
I want
General Thomas reminded of the importance of immediate action.
I sent him a dispatch this evening, which will probably urge him on. I would not say relieve him until I hear further from him.
Your dispatch of 7:30 P. M. is just received.
I can only say, in further extenuation why I have not attacked
Hood, that I could not concentrate my troops, and get their transportation in order, in shorter time than it has been done, and am satisfied I have made every effort that was possible to complete the task.
Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy.
If you wait till
General Wilson mounts all his cavalry you will wait till doomsday, for the waste equals the supply.
Moreover, you will be in the same condition that
Rosecrans was last year—with so many animals that you can not feed them.
Reports already come in of a scarcity of forage.
Your dispatch of 10:30 A. M., this date, is received.
I regret that
General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my delay in attacking the enemy.
I feel conscious that I have done everything in my power to prepare, and that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this.
And if he should order me to be relieved I will submit without a murmur.
A terrible Storm of freezing rain has come on since daylight, which will render an attack impossible till it breaks.
The next step was a dispatch from
General Grant, ordering that
General Thomas should be relieved:
Dispatch of 8 P. M. last evening, from
Nashville, shows the enemy scattered
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for more than seventy miles down the river, and no attack yet made by
Thomas.
Please telegraph orders relieving him at once, and placing
Schofield in command.
Thomas should be ordered to turn over all orders and dispatches, received since the
battle of Franklin, to
Schofield.
In obedience to this dispatch, according to
Halleck, the following order was drawn up in the War Department, but never issued, and no trace of it can now be found there:
War Department,
Adjutant-General's office,
Washington, December 9, 1864.
[General orders no. —.]
The following dispatch having been received from
Lieutenant-General Grant, viz.: ‘Please telegraph orders relieving him (
General Thomas) at once, and placing (General)
Schofield in command,’ the
President orders:
1. That
Major-General J. M. Schofield relieve, at once,
Major-General G. H. Thomas, in command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland.
2.
General Thomas will turn over to
General Schofield all orders and instructions received by him since the
battle of Franklin.
Your dispatch of 8:30 P. M. of the 8th is just received.
I have nearly completed my preparations to attack the enemy to-morrow morning, but a terrible storm of freezing rain has come on to-day, which will make it impossible for our men to fight to any advantage.
I am, therefore, compelled to wait for the storm to break and make the attack immediately after.
Admiral Lee is patrolling the river above and below the city, and I believe will be able to prevent the enemy from crossing.
There is no doubt but
Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the river, with the view of attempting a crossing, but it has been impossible for me to organize and equip the troops for an attack at an earlier time.
Major-General Halleck informs me that you are very much dissatisfied with my delay in attacking.
I can only say I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you should deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit without a murmur.
Orders relieving
General Thomas had been made out when his telegram of this P. M. was received.
If you still wish these orders telegraphed to
Nashville they will be forwarded.
[191]
General Thomas has been urged in every possible way to attack the enemy; even to giving the positive order.
He did say he thought he should be able to attack on the 7th, but he did not do so, nor has he given a reason for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice to an officer who has done so much good service as
General Thomas has, however, and will, therefore, suspend the order relieving him until it is seen whether he will do anything.
Your dispatch of 1 P. M. to-day is received.
I have as much confidence in your conducting the battle rightly as I have in any other officer, but it has seemed to me you have been slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs to convince me otherwise.
Receiving your dispatch to
Major-General Halleck of 2 P. M. before I did the first to me, I telegraphed to suspend the order relieving you until we should hear further.
I hope most sincerely that there will be no necessity of repeating the order, and that the facts will show that you have been right all the time.
If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the
Ohio, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find.
Let there be no further delay.
Hood can not stand even a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores.
If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and most of his army.
I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved.
Delay no longer for weather or reenforcements.
Your dispatch of 4 P. M. this day is just received.
I will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under every disadvantage.
The whole country is covered with a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the troops are able to move about on level ground.
It was my intention to attack
Hood as soon as the ice melted, and would have done so yesterday had it not been for the storm.
The following telegram shows that an attempt was made by
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General Thomas to obey implicitly the order for attack, and the reason why the movement was not made:
I have the troops ready to make the attack on the enemy as soon as the sleet, which now covers the ground, has melted sufficiently to enable the men to march.
The whole country is now covered with a sheet of ice so hard and slippery it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend the slopes, or even move over level ground in any thing like order.
It has taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position, and it has only been finally effected with imminent risk and many serious accidents, resulting from the numbers of horses falling with their riders on the road.
Under these circumstances, I believe that an attack at this time would only result in a useless sacrifice of life.
On the 13th of December
General Logan, then at
City Point, was ordered to proceed to
Nashville, and informed by
General Grant that he was to take command of the Army of the Cumberland, relieving
General Thomas, provided no movement had taken place upon his arrival at
Nashville; and, further, that he (
Grant) would leave in a few days to assume command of the forces around
Nashville and fight a battle.
The order to
General Logan was as follows:
[special orders no. 149.]
I.
Major-General John A. Logan, United States Volunteers, will proceed immediately to
Nashville, Tennessee, reporting by telegraph to the
Lieutenant-General his arrival at
Louisville, Kentucky, and also his arrival at
Nashville, Tennessee. * * * *
By command of
Lieutenant-General Grant.
It has been seriously apprehended that while
Hood, with a part of his forces, held you in check near
Nashville, he would have time to cooperate against other important points, left only partially protected.
Hence,
Lieutenant-General Grant was anxious that you should attack the rebel forces in your front, and expresses great dissatisfaction that his order has not been carried out. Moreover, so long as
Hood occupies a threatening position in
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Tennessee,
General Canby is obliged to keep large forces on the
Mississippi River to protect its navigation, and to hold
Memphis,
Vicksburg, etc., although
General Grant had directed a part of these forces to cooperate with
Sherman.
Every day's delay on your part, therefore, seriously interferes with
General Grant's plans.
On the 14th
General Grant himself left
City Point for
Nashville to assume command, but was met at
Washington by the news of
Thomas' victory.
Your telegram of 12:30 M. to-day is received.
The ice having melted away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning.
Much as I regret the apparent delay in attacking the enemy, it could not have been done before with any reasonable prospect of success.
Attacked enemy's left this morning, drove it from the river, below city, very nearly to Franklin pike, distance about eight miles. * * * *
The body of the above dispatch contains a lengthy account of the movements.
I was just on my way to
Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from
Van Duzen, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further.
Push the enemy now, and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed.
Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up
Hood's army, and make it useless for future operations.
Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country, as the enemy has done.
Much is now expected.
Your dispatch of this evening just received.
I congratulate you and the army under your command for to-day's operations, and feel a conviction that to-morrow will add more fruits to your victory.
[194]
This army thanks you for your approbation of its conduct yesterday, and begs to assure you that it is not misplaced.
I have the honor to report, etc. [Here follows a second report in detail.]
On reaching
Louisville,
General Logan learned that
Thomas had made a successful move, and in reporting to
General Grant, requested that he might be ordered back to his command:
Have just arrived.
Weather bad; raining since yesterday morning.
People here jubilant over
Thomas' success.
Confidence seems to be restored.
I will remain here to hear from you. All things going right.
It would seem best that I return to join my command with
Sherman.
In reply to this,
General Grant telegraphed an order directing
Logan to report to
General Sherman.
Immediately after the congratulatory dispatches, and while every effort was being made to press
Hood's retreat,
General Thomas was appealed to by
Halleck to ‘capture or destroy
Hood's army in order that
General Sherman can entirely crush out the rebel military power in all the
Southern States.’
Permit me, General, to urge the vast importance of a hot pursuit of
Hood's army.
Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your men for a few days will submit to any hardships and privations to accomplish the great result.
If you can capture or destroy
Hood's Army
General Sherman can entirely crush out the rebel military force in all the
Southern States.
He begins a new campaign about the first of January, which will have the most important results if
Hood's army can now be used up. A most vigorous pursuit on your part is, therefore, of vital importance to
General Sherman's plans.
No sacrifice must be spared to obtain so important a result.
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195]
To this
General Thomas replied at length and with spirit:
Your dispatch of 12 M., this day, is received.
General Hood's army is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army to pursue another.
We can not control the elements, and you must remember that, to resist
Hood's advance into
Tennessee, I had to reorganize and almost thoroughly equip the force now under my command.
I fought the battle of the 15th and 16th instants with the troops but partially equipped; and, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather and the partial equipment, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond
Duck River, crossing two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from position to position, without the aid of pontoons, and with but little transportation to bring up supplies of provisions and ammunition.
I am doing all in my power to crush
Hood's army, and, if it be possible, will destroy it. But pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over mud roads completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child's play, and can not be accomplished as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the enemy, the department remembers that
General Sherman took with him the complete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect, as regards ammunition, supplies, and trasportation, leaving me only two corps, partially stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken with him, to oppose the advance into
Tennessee of that army which had resisted the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi on
Atlanta, from the commencement of the campaign till its close, and which is now, in addition, aided by
Forrest's cavalry.
Although my progress may appear slow, I feel assured that
Hood's army can be driven from
Tennessee, and eventually driven to the wall by the force under my command.
But too much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially when they have the task of destroying a force, in a Winter's campaign, which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers in
Spring and
Summer.
In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust
Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the rebellion.
I have seen to-day
General Halleck's dispatch of yesterday, and your reply.
It is proper for me to assure you that this department has the most unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor, and determination to employ to the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and destroy the enemy.
No department could be inspired with more profound admiration
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196]
and thankfulness for the great deeds which you have already performed, or more confiding faith that human effort could do no more, and no more than will be done by you and the accomplished and gallant officers and soldiers of your command.
On the same day
General Grant telegraphed:
You have the congratulations of the public for the energy with which you are pushing
Hood.
I hope you will succeed in reaching his pontoon bridge at
Tuscumbia before he gets there.
Should you do so, it looks to me that
Hood is cut off. If you succeed in destroying
Hood's army, there will be but one army left to the so-called Confederacy, capable of doing us harm.
I will take care of that, and try to draw the sting from it, so that in the
Spring we shall have easy sailing.
You have now a big opportunity, which I know you are availing yourself of. Let us push and do all we can before the enemy can derive benefit, either from the raising of negro troops on the plantations or white troops now in the field.
Two dispatches properly close this correspondence:
With great pleasure I inform you that for your skill, courage, and conduct in the recent brilliant military operations under your command, the
President has directed your nomination to be sent to the Senate as a
Major-General in the United States Army, to fill the only vacancy existing in that grade.
No official duty has been performed by me with more satisfaction, and no commander has more justly earned promotion by devoted, disinterested, and valuable services to his country.
To which
General Thomas, then in the field directing the pursuit of
Hood, replied:
headquarters Department of the Cumberland, McKANES' Church, Tenn.
Hon. E. M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.
I am profoundly sensible of the kind expressions of your telegram of December 24th, informing me that the
President had directed my name to be sent to the Senate for confirmation as
Major-General United States Army, and beg to assure the
President and yourself, that your approval of my services is of more value to me than the commission itself.
[
197]
In the succeeding July,
General Grant in that portion of his final report which related to the campaign about
Nashville, made the following manly acknowledgment that the result had vindicated
General Thomas' judgment:
‘Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.
This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky.
I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there.
After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters there in person.
Reaching Washington City, I received General Thomas' dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed.
I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled.
I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.’
General Sherman himself, after introducing into his book several passages that he has for years suppressed, and which severely reflected upon
General Thomas' action before
Nashville, closes his consideration of the subject with these more generous words:
‘Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought in front of Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so nobly fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully given in his own official reports, long since published.’
