William Schouler, A history of Massachusetts in the Civil War: Volume 1

‘ [256] others fast as possible; will help General Butler to the utmost.’ On the 12th (next day), Mr. Cameron telegraphed to the Governor, ‘Despatch of yesterday received. Massachusetts has done so well in all she has promised, that she shall not be disappointed in any thing she requires from the General Government.’ This was complimentary, but it was not an answer. A few hours before the Governor received this despatch from Mr. Cameron, he received the following, dated New York, Sept. 11, from General Sherman: ‘The object of my telegram of the 10th was to ascertain if there existed any possibility of being disappointed in the time when the troops would be prepared.’ Thus when General Sherman was anxiously waiting in New York for the five regiments authorized to be raised for him in Massachusetts, and when every possible effort was being made to complete them, the Secretary of War wrote the following paper. We do not know what to call it: it is not a letter, because it is addressed to no one; it is not an order, because it is not so designated, and bears no number.

This document, in effect, gave General Butler authority over every new regiment raised, or to be raised, in New England. He was to have as many troops as he might ‘judge fit’ for his purpose; and what that purpose was no one except himself and Mr. Cameron knew. The document wholly ignored the Governors of the New-England States, the act of Congress already quoted, and, so far as this State was interested, the promise made to General Sherman that he should have three of the Massachusetts regiments then in course of formation. This was not all—indeed, it was only a small part—of the complicated, contradictory, and painfully embarrassing position under which this new state of things placed the Governor of Massachusetts. He had