Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 27.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

[293] in his Georgia campaign. Why could he not see that a campaign of almost identical conditions had been forced on him? If he was compelled to fall back from the Wilderness to Petersburg, it was because Grant had limitless resources at a moment's command, while every man who fell out of his own ranks was gone forever and none to be found in his, place. If the retreat from the Wilderness to Petersburg was a military necessity, what were the changed conditions to arrest at Petersburg the policy of retreat and pursuit of the same two armies? Did not General Lee see that the defence of Petersburg for a few months must terminate in the destruction of his army? Did he not suggest to the government a true military avoidance of such a catastrophe by pursuing with the Army of Northern Virginia the same general strategy that General Johnston adopted with the Army of the Tennessee? I put the plain question to Vice-President Stephens, while he was defending Petersburg in view of Johnston's retreat before Sherman, namely: ‘Who of our generals is the greatest in your eyes?’ The reply came promptly: ‘I am decidedly of the opinion that General Joseph Johnston has the clearest understanding of any of the military policy necessary to final success. In this I prefer him.’ I have always regretted that opinion of Mr. Stephens, because I have never been content to believe that the defence of Petersburg was the generalship of Lee as a feature of his strategy.

When we come to institute parallels between the generals of our armies—one in Virginia and the other in the more Southern States—we encounter the resistance of President Davis or his government to all. That feature of our history is, for sentimental reasons, thus far suppressed. General Lee's greatness is apparent in the fact that, whatever his grievance, he never permitted the civil government to become openly at war with him. The two Johnstons, Beauregard, Hardee, Forrest, etc., and nearly all the civil leaders—Stephens, Toombs, Yancey, Wigfall, Rhett, etc.—were far from terms of peace with the President or with the War Department.