The Confederate loan.
--In the year 1860 our townsman,
John Mitchell,
Esq., being at the time in
Paris, wrote a letter to a Charleston paper, the object of which was to prove that "Cotton was not
King," and that the reliance placed upon it to force a recognition from the
Western Powers, especially
Great Britain, was slender and precarious.
He stated that, in his opinion, one great object of the war with
China, then just concluded, was undertaken mainly with a view to open the cotton trade with the
valley of the Yang-tse Kiang and its dependencies — a district several times larger than the whole cotton region of the
United States, swarming with an industrious population, willing and anxious to work at wages incredibly low, and adapted by soil and climate to the production of the very articles which formed the staples of Southern exportation.
He suggested that as soon as this trade could be developed that region would be a most formidable rival of the
South in the cotton trade, and that as
Great Britain had long felt the inconvenience of depending on a single country for her supply, she would spare no pains to promote the cultivation of the plant in this new quarter.
This view of the case was, at the time, quite new to us; and was the occasion of several articles in this paper, in which we endeavored to give it all the weight which we thought it certainly deserved.
Mr. Mitchell, however, and we after him, left entirely out of view one consideration, which has since proved to be of the utmost importance.
The
English and
French were able to take
Pekin, but they were not able to make the Chinese exchange commodities, or take anything for their goods but silver.
If the
English Government really designed to develop the cotton trade of the Yang-tse-Kiang to the extent of erecting the region which it waters into a rival of
Texas and the
Mississippi valley, it failed from this circumstance, and must continue to fail until it shall have conquered the country and introduced a system of exchanges very different from any that exists there now. Cotton
might have been king, in spite of
China, although in reality it never was.
Our Congress and our
Secretary of the Treasury, possessed with the idea that the imperial plant already possessed the prerogative and the splendor that is its birthright, neglected to adopt the only measures by means of which it could assert its right to the diadem.
They stood up to their very knees in gold, and they turned from it in disdain, to substitute for it an irredeemable paper.
We see the result in the deluge of assignats which overwhelms the country — in the enormous inflation of prices — in the scarcity and dearness of the necessaries of life — in the rabid thirst for gain which has maddened the inhabitants of the whole land — in the progressive depreciation of the currency — in the discontent of all classes — in the reluctance with which producers part with their commodities, and, above all, in the bills which are maturing in our Legislature against the various mal-practices which the state of the currency has fostered.
The mischief has been don; it is now the part of wisdom not to waste time in grieving over that which is already beyond the reach of remedy, but to apply the best and speediest means of cure which may yet be within our power.
The inflation of the currency and its consequent reduction in value lies at the bottom of all the evils of which we complain.
Extortion, traffic in gold, the scarcity and high price of provisions, are mere symptoms of the disease which is consuming the vitals of the
Republic. --They will never disappear, nor can they be more than temporarily alleviated, until the body financial be "purged to its sound and pristine health." Until the volume of the currency be restored to something like a due proportion to the enduring capacity of the country, whose wants it is intended to supply, these evils can no more be eradicated than shoots from the Upas can be prevented from springing up while the main trunk is permitted to retain its position in the earth.
Many propositions for effecting this desirable object have been presented.
They are most of them good, and as they are none of them antagonistic, we see no reason why they should not all be tried.
But, of all others, the scheme which this paper had the pleasure of first announcing, but which no person connected with it had the honor of originating, appears to us to be the best, the simplest, and the easiest of execution.
We allude, of course, to the
Confederate loan, based upon the same principles with the
National loan, which saved
France from bankruptcy at a time when her submersion appeared inevitable.
We have before the country and the world the cotton loan, based upon good security, and commanding the approbation of the most astute financiers.
Its bonds are offered at 150, a great mistake, we think, since they are almost sure to fall below that point in the end, and since it by no means consists with the dignity of the
Confederate States to have their bonds disposed of as a horse jockey disposes of a spavined gelding — putting a high price upon it, and leaving a wide margin for a fall.
Since the object is to withdraw as many outstanding Treasury notes as possible from circulation, it would be far better to go into market with them, as we go with other stock, and sell them for what they will bring.
But a Confederate loan, such as that we propose, would dispose of them all at par, for there would be no sales at second hand to bring down the price.
In order that this scheme should work effectually, it would be absolutely necessary that the
President should embrace it heart and soul.
As we have said on a former occasion, he has never yet appealed to the people in vain, and there is no reason to believe that the appeal in question would not be as effective as any he has hither to made.
Were he to issue his proclamation calling upon all his fellow-citizens to come forward to the assistance of their country, and were that appeal followed up by influential and eloquent citizens in all quarters, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that the bonds would all be taken up within a very short time.
We trust that he may be induced to try the experiment.
