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Delos (Greece) (search for this): book 1, section 1214a
The manTheognis (255 f. with slight variation, quoted also inAristot. Nic. Eth. 1099a 27. who at Delos set forth in the precinct of the god his own opinion composed an inscription for the forecourt of the temple of Leto in which he distinguished goodness, beauty and pleasantness as not all being properties of the same thing. His verses are: JusticeOr 'Righteousness'; the term includes more than justice. is fairest, and Health is best, But to win one's desire is the pleasantest. Theog. 255f. But for our part let us not allow that he is right; for HappinessOr 'Well-being'; the Greek word is entirely noncommittal and does not necessarily denote a state of feeling, consciousness of welfare. is at once the pleasantest and the fairest and best of all things whatever.About every thing and every natural species there are many views that involve difficulty and require examina
500 BC - 428 BC (search for this): book 1, section 1215b
Of these the philosophic life denotes being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the political life means being occupied with honorable activities (and these are the activities that spring from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is concerned with the pleasures of the body. Owing to this, different people give the name of happy to different persons, as was said before too; and AnaxagorasThe physical philosopher, 500-428 B.C., born at Clazomenae in Ionia, taught at Athens. of Clazomenae when asked 'Who is the happiest man?' said 'None of those whom you think, but he would seem to you an odd sort of person.' But Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw that the man who put the question supposed it to be impossible to receive the appellation 'happy' without being great and beautiful or rich, whereas he himself perhaps thought that the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the
Egypt (Egypt) (search for this): book 1, section 1215b
her, many of the experiences that contain no pleasure nor pain, and also of those that do contain pleasure but pleasure of an ignoble kind, are such that non-existence would be better than being alive. And generally, if one collected together the whole of the things that the whole of mankind do and experience yet do and experience unwillingly, because not for the sake of the things themselves, and if one added an infinite extent of time, these things would not cause a man to choose to be alive rather than not alive. But moreover, also the pleasure of food or of sex alone, with the other pleasures abstracted that knowledge or sight or any other of the senses provides for human beings, would not induce anybody to value life higher if he were not utterly slavish, for it is clear that to one making this choice there would be no difference between being born a beast or a man; at all events, the ox in Egypt,
Athens (Greece) (search for this): book 1, section 1215b
losophic life denotes being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the political life means being occupied with honorable activities (and these are the activities that spring from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is concerned with the pleasures of the body. Owing to this, different people give the name of happy to different persons, as was said before too; and AnaxagorasThe physical philosopher, 500-428 B.C., born at Clazomenae in Ionia, taught at Athens. of Clazomenae when asked 'Who is the happiest man?' said 'None of those whom you think, but he would seem to you an odd sort of person.' But Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw that the man who put the question supposed it to be impossible to receive the appellation 'happy' without being great and beautiful or rich, whereas he himself perhaps thought that the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the standard of justice wi
Ionia (Michigan, United States) (search for this): book 1, section 1215b
hese the philosophic life denotes being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the political life means being occupied with honorable activities (and these are the activities that spring from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is concerned with the pleasures of the body. Owing to this, different people give the name of happy to different persons, as was said before too; and AnaxagorasThe physical philosopher, 500-428 B.C., born at Clazomenae in Ionia, taught at Athens. of Clazomenae when asked 'Who is the happiest man?' said 'None of those whom you think, but he would seem to you an odd sort of person.' But Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw that the man who put the question supposed it to be impossible to receive the appellation 'happy' without being great and beautiful or rich, whereas he himself perhaps thought that the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the stan
Sybaris (search for this): book 1, section 1216a
went on asking for what object one should choose to come into existence rather than not, he replied by saying, 'For the sake of contemplating the heavens and the whole order of the universe.' Anaxagoras therefore thought that the alternative of being alive was valuable for the sake of some kind of knowledge; but those who ascribe bliss to SardanapallusA mythical king of Assyria, proverbial for luxury, cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1295b 22. or Smindyrides of SybarisGreek colony in S. Italy. For Smindyrides, who travelled with 1000 slaves in attendance, see Hdt. 6.127, Athenaeus 5 p. 273. or some of the others living the life of enjoyment, all appear for their part to place happiness in delight; while a different set would not choose either wisdom of any kind or the bodily pleasures in preference to the actions that spring from goodness: at all events, some people choose those actions not only for the sake
460 BC (search for this): book 2, section 1223a
verything that conforms with desire is voluntary. For everything involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, as indeed Evenus says: For all necessity doth cause distress— Evenus of Paros = Theog. 472 Quoted also Aristot. Met. 1015a 28 and Aristot. Rhet.1370a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has XRH=M' A)NIARO/N); probably by the elder Evenus of Paros, fl. 460 B.C. (Bowra, Cl. Rev. 48.2). so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing is forced it is painful; but everything contrary to desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant), so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what conforms with desire is voluntary, for things contrary to and things in conformity with desire are opposite to one another. Again, all wickedness makes a man more unrighteous, and lack of self-control seems to be wicke
Paros (Greece) (search for this): book 2, section 1223a
moreover there are three subdivisions of appetition—wish, passion and desire; so that we have to distinguish these. And first we must consider conformity with desire.It would seem that everything that conforms with desire is voluntary. For everything involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, as indeed Evenus says: For all necessity doth cause distress— Evenus of Paros = Theog. 472 Quoted also Aristot. Met. 1015a 28 and Aristot. Rhet.1370a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has XRH=M' A)NIARO/N); probably by the elder Evenus of Paros, fl. 460 B.C. (Bowra, Cl. Rev. 48.2). so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing is forced it is painful; but everything contrary to desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant), so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what conforms with desire is volu
513 BC (search for this): book 2, section 1223b
n will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.The same argument applies also in the case of passion;for there appear to be control and lack of control of passion as well as of desire and what is contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a matter of force, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with passion will always be voluntary. Even HeracleitusThe natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. c. 513 B.C. His sentence ended O(/ TI GA\R A)\N XRH/|ZH| GI/NESQAI, YUXH=S W)NEI=TAI, Iamblichus, Protrepticus, p. 140. seems to have in view the strength of passion when he remarks that the checking of passion is painful; for 'It is difficult (he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish at the price of life.' And if it is impossible to do the same act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time and in respect of the same part of the act,
Ephesos (Turkey) (search for this): book 2, section 1223b
that the same person will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.The same argument applies also in the case of passion;for there appear to be control and lack of control of passion as well as of desire and what is contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a matter of force, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with passion will always be voluntary. Even HeracleitusThe natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. c. 513 B.C. His sentence ended O(/ TI GA\R A)\N XRH/|ZH| GI/NESQAI, YUXH=S W)NEI=TAI, Iamblichus, Protrepticus, p. 140. seems to have in view the strength of passion when he remarks that the checking of passion is painful; for 'It is difficult (he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish at the price of life.' And if it is impossible to do the same act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time and in respect of the sa
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