hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in descending order. Sort in ascending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Fitzhugh Lee 368 4 Browse Search
Phil Sheridan 358 0 Browse Search
Lewis Grant 329 1 Browse Search
Charles Griffin 316 0 Browse Search
Warren 298 44 Browse Search
Ayres 260 2 Browse Search
Philip Sheridan 252 0 Browse Search
Meade 183 21 Browse Search
Crawford 181 1 Browse Search
Five Forks (Virginia, United States) 156 0 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, The Passing of the Armies: The Last Campaign of the Armies.. Search the whole document.

Found 224 total hits in 62 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
W. H. Powell (search for this): chapter 3
ht the total loss in the Corps up to 18,000,--this being almost a thousand more than two thirds of the bright faces that crossed the Rapidan in the starlight of that May morning, now gone down to earth, or beneath it,--and yet no end! Colonel W. H. Powell in his History of the Fifth Corps, published since the above was written, gives this total loss as 17,861. It does not appear whether he takes into account the losses of the Corps in the assault of June 18th on the salient covering the Norfolk Railroad and the Jerusalem Plank Road. Owing to the casualties among commanders, the action of that day has never been adequately reported. Colonel Powell had no data on which to base a just account of the overture of Forts Sedgwick and Mahone,--surnamed by the performers Fort Hell and Fort Damnation. Glance now at the record of the whole army. Those treated in the field hospitals up to the end of October were officially reported as numbering 57,498, and to the end of December, 68,8
ac at the opening of Grant's campaign, as shown by the consolidated morning reports of May 4, 1864, was 97,162. In the Annual Report of Secretary Stanton, November 22, 1865, this total is stated as 120,384. He evidently takes the number as borne upon the rolls in his office, which by no means always agrees with the field lists of those present for duty equipped, the absent on leave or detail, or otherwise, being usually at a high percentage of the total. The careful compilation of Adjutant-General Drum made from official field returns at this time gives the number present for duty equipped at 97,273-in remarkable agreement with the figures taken in the field. Compare the admirable showing of that clear-headed officer, General A. A. Humphreys, Virginia Campaign, Appendix, p. 409. The number of men available for battle in the Fifth Corps at the start was 25,695. The character of the fighting in this campaign may be shown, however dimly, by citing here the report of our Corps fiel
allegiance to principle than even their attachment to McClellan, whose personal popularity in the army was something marvelous. The men voted overwhelmingly for Lincoln. They were unwilling that their long fight should be set down as a failure, even though thus far it seemed so. The fact that this war was in its reach of meaningsary to reverse the maxim of public law, and subordinate civil rights to military rules. Evil-minded people were trying to make our men believe that Grant and Lincoln were making this long delay in front of Petersburg in order to secure their continuance in office. But this was an outrage upon those noble characters, and an in too ready a compromise with the forces that had brought on the war, and so the winnowings of life and death must go on till the troubles be sifted to the core. Lincoln's proclamation, though looked upon by our old-school officers as unadvised and unwarranted by the Constitution, had sent thoughts wider and higher than the range
John Stanton (search for this): chapter 3
nly reliable facts. The number of men of all arms present for duty equipped in the Army of the Potomac at the opening of Grant's campaign, as shown by the consolidated morning reports of May 4, 1864, was 97,162. In the Annual Report of Secretary Stanton, November 22, 1865, this total is stated as 120,384. He evidently takes the number as borne upon the rolls in his office, which by no means always agrees with the field lists of those present for duty equipped, the absent on leave or detaihould not be interfered with from Washington. That gave him more freedom and discretion than any of his predecessors. He had somehow, with all his modesty, the rare faculty of controlling his superiors as well as his subordinates. He outfaced Stanton, captivated the President, and even compelled acquiescence or silence from that dread source of paralyzing power,--the Congressional Committee on the conduct of the war. The Government and the country had to exercise patience,--with us no do
Joe Johnston (search for this): chapter 3
his position. It was a curious element in the situation that the astute Confederate General Joe Johnston should come in north of Sherman and interpose his army between Sherman's and ours. This sort currents of conjecture and apprehension. Disquieting rumors came across the picket lines that Johnston was coming up to strike our flank and rear, and thus between his army and Lee's we should be caught in the jaws of a leviathan. But we believed Sherman would give Johnston something else to do. We were more troubled by the rumor that Lee, presuming on our inertness, was preparing to make a masention by feints in front while he should withdraw his main army, pass around our left and join Johnston, knock Sherman out, then turn back and attend to the sick lion of the Army of the Potomac. Gra evidently anxious lest Lee should manage to get away from our front and effect a junction with Johnston for some bold stroke. That would be a shame for us. We would far rather fight, even if unsucce
ity of the French Emperor, and the nobility of England with difficulty held back from recognizing the Southern Confederacy through the moral courage of John Bright aid the royal wisdom of the Queen and Prince Consort of England. The impatience of the North is perhaps to be pardoned for the reason of its impelling motive; but it demanded of General McClellan impossibilities. And these were created quite as much by forces in his rear as by those in his front. As for Grant, he was like Thor, the hammerer; striking blow after blow, intent on his purpose to beat his way through, somewhat reckless of the cost. Yet he was the first one of our commanders who dared to pursue his policy of delay without apology or fear of overruling. He made it a condition of his acceptancy of the chief command that he should not be interfered with from Washington. That gave him more freedom and discretion than any of his predecessors. He had somehow, with all his modesty, the rare faculty of contr
blow was well delivered; but a series of shortcomings, for which it must be said neither the men nor their immediate commanders were responsible, brought all to nought. Successive assaults on the enemy's lines were made as corps after corps extended leftward; but gallant fighting left little to show but its cost. Especially did we hold in mind the last of these made by the Fifth Corps on the second day, when an assault was ordered, by my fine veteran Brigade on the strong entrenchments at Rives' Salient commanding the important avenue of communication, the Norfolk Railroad and Jerusalem Plank Road. By this time it was too late; all Lee's army were up and entrenched. We encountered a far outnumbering force of veteran troops well entrenched and a cross-fire of twenty guns in earthworks planted with forethought and skill. Desperate valor could accomplish nothing but its own demonstration. Our veterans were hurled back over the stricken field, or left upon it-I, too, proud witness
Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 3
tance had been peculiarly intimate and deep, and we had for them a strong personal regard. The causes were wide apart, but the manhood was the same. We had occasion to observe their religious character. More free thought and wider range of code no doubt prevailed in our Northern army; but what we are accustomed to call simple, personal piety was more manifest in the Confederate ranks than in ours. Not presuming to estimate the influence of particular cases of higher officers, like Stonewall Jackson or General Howard, making prominent their religious principles and proclivities, but fully recognizing the general religious character of most of the officers and men from our Northern homes, it must be admitted that the expression of religious sentiment and habit was more common and more earnest in the Confederate camp than in ours. In one thing we took the touch of elbow. It was no uncommon incident that from close opposing bivouacs and across hushed breastworks at evening voice
McClellan (search for this): chapter 3
vote showed how much stronger was their allegiance to principle than even their attachment to McClellan, whose personal popularity in the army was something marvelous. The men voted overwhelmingly y thousand men never rose. The development of this campaign led many to compare Grant with McClellan. They marched their armies over much the same ground, with much the same result. Only McClelMcClellan was brought to Washington; Grant was permitted to remain at City Point and the Appomattox. The rumor ran that McClellan had also proposed to cut across the James and around Lee's flank. Many stMcClellan had also proposed to cut across the James and around Lee's flank. Many still believed in his soldiership, but broader elements now entered into the estimate. Something in the nature of the man and something in his environment caused his failure. With great organizing poNorth is perhaps to be pardoned for the reason of its impelling motive; but it demanded of General McClellan impossibilities. And these were created quite as much by forces in his rear as by those i
rusalem Plank Road. Owing to the casualties among commanders, the action of that day has never been adequately reported. Colonel Powell had no data on which to base a just account of the overture of Forts Sedgwick and Mahone,--surnamed by the performers Fort Hell and Fort Damnation. Glance now at the record of the whole army. Those treated in the field hospitals up to the end of October were officially reported as numbering 57,498, and to the end of December, 68,840. Report of Surgeon McParlin, Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac. Some of these, no doubt were cases of sickness, a no less real casualty; but taking the ratio of one fifth the wounded as indicating the number of the killed outright, we reach a total of 59,000 men killed and wounded in this campaign up to October 31, 1864. This is to take no account of the missing, --a list governed by no law of ratios, but determined by the peculiar circumstances of each battle; always a list sad to contemplate, made up
1 2 3 4 5 6 7