previous next

[35a]

Socrates
Of drink, or of being filled with drink?

Protarchus
Of being filled, I suppose.

Socrates
The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled.

Protarchus
That is very plain.

Socrates
Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt before?

Protarchus
It cannot be done. [35b]

Socrates
And yet he who desires, desires something, we say.

Protarchus
Of course.

Socrates
And he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, and that is emptiness, but he desires fulness.

Protarchus
Yes.

Socrates
Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness.

Protarchus
Yes, obviously.

Socrates
But it cannot be the body, for that is empty.

Protarchus
True.

Socrates
The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it, [35c] which it must do by means of memory; for what other means could it employ?

Protarchus
No other, I should say.

Socrates
And do we understand the consequences of this argument?

Protarchus
What are the consequences?

Socrates
This argument declares that we have no bodily desire.

Protarchus
How so?

Socrates
Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body.

Protarchus
Yes, certainly.

Socrates
And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions.

Protarchus
Certainly. [35d]

Socrates
And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us towards the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul.

Protarchus
Quite right.

Socrates
So the argument denies utterly that the body hungers or thirsts or has any such affection.

Protarchus
Very true.

Socrates
Let us consider a further point in connection with those very affections. For I think the purpose of the argument is to point out to us a state of life existing in them. [35e]

Protarchus
Of what sort of life are you speaking, and in what affections does it exist?

Socrates
In the affections of fulness and emptiness and all which pertain to the preservation and destruction of living beings, and I am thinking that if we fall into one of these we feel pain, which is followed by joy when we change to the other.

Protarchus
That is true.

Socrates
And what if a man is between the two?

Protarchus
How between them?

Socrates
Because of his condition, he is suffering, but he remembers the pleasures the coming of which would bring him an end of his pain; as yet, however, he does not possess them. Well then, shall we say that he is


Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

load focus Greek (1903)
hide Places (automatically extracted)

View a map of the most frequently mentioned places in this document.

Download Pleiades ancient places geospacial dataset for this text.

hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: