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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
an army had the Rhine for a base; its line of operations ran from Cologne and from Coblentz upon Luxemburg and Namur; Wellington had Antwerp for a base, and for a line of operations, the short route to Brussels. The sudden attack of Napoleon on Fleurus decided Blucher to receive battle parallelly to the English base, and not to his own, for which he did not appear to trouble himself. This was pardonable, because strictly he could always hope to regain Wesel or at least Nimeguen, and in the laign of 1794 began badly, as has already been said; it was the force of circumstances which led to the strategical movement of the army of the Moselle upon the Sambre, and not a premeditated plan; for the rest this movement decided the success at Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium. In 1795, the French committed such great faults, that they were imputed to treason; the Austrians, on the contrary, better directed, by Clairfayt, Charteler and Schmidt, than by Mack and the Prince of Coburg, proved
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
r his centre in order to sustain his wings. But as a general thing, a false attack, in order to hold the centre and a grand effort upon a single extremity, would be especially the most favorable against such a convex line. The French took it at Fleurus in 1794, and succeeded, because the Prince of Coburg, instead of attacking in force the centre, or a single extremity, divided his efforts upon five or six divergent rays, and especially upon the two wings at the same time. It was nearly in theer in echelons upon a wing will always be oblique (pl. 2, fig. 10,) now I have seen more than one combat thus disposed in echelons. As for the other figures traced upon the same plate, it could not be contested that at Essling, as well as at Fleurus, the general disposition of the Austrians was concave, and that of the French convex. But those two orders may form parallel lines as well as two right lines: now these orders would be systematically parallel if no part of the line were not mor
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 6: logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. (search)
very brief, and cloudy weather might make them sometimes uncertain: meanwhile as the vocabulary of similar reports could be reduced to a score of phrases, for which it would be easy to have conventional signs, I think that the mode should not be despised, though even we should be obliged to send the duplicate of its transmissions, by officers capable of well rendering verbal orders. We would always gain rapidity thereby. A trial of another nature was attempted in 1794, at the battle of Fleurus, where General Jourdan employed an aeronaut for reconnoitering and making signals of the movements of the Austrians. I do not know whether he had occasion to congratulate himself on this trial, which was not again renewed, although it was pretended at the time that it had assisted in the victory, which I very much doubt. It is probable that the difficulculty of having an aeronaut all ready to make his ascension at the moment when it should be opportune, that of observing well what passes
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of a battle of the offensive defense: battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805. (search)
tely. With astonishing rapidity he concentrated his forces near Charleroi, and, on the 16th of June, found himself and army in the quarters of Blucher, who, however, had managed to assemble the greater part of his forces, about 80,000 men, near Fleurus and Ligny — leaving, in this position, his base of operation on the Rhine, to form a junction with Wellington, who was assembling his troops, that very day, near Quatre-Bras, distant about seven miles from Fleurus. Napoleon had sent Marshal NFleurus. Napoleon had sent Marshal Ney, with about 40,000 combatants, to attack the forces already at Quatre-Bras, while he himself, with the main body, 65,000 men, attacked the army of Blucher. Ney, having advanced very late, found the forces at Quatre-Bras too strong, and was obliged to retreat. In the mean time, Napoleon had defeated the Prussians, and forced them to leave the battle-field. Double mistakes were made this day. Ney, at Quatre-Bras, was already in the rear of Blucher; Napoleon ordered him to leave this pos
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
's centre. (Figure 21.) The concave order may be used with advantage in certain cases, and in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battle of Cannae, the English at Crecy and Azincourt, and the Austrians at Essling, in 1809. (Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to attack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the passage of a river. The Romans formed this order at the battle of Cosilinum; the French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at Essling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic in 1813, and at Brienne in 1814. (Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequently employed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both wings. At Dresden, Napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this was owing to peculiar circumstance
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 11: army organization.—Artillery.—Its history and organization, with a brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of Projectiles, &c. (search)
oubt, the sinews of an army; but if it were required to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery, its good quality would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. In the first campaigns of the wars of the Revolution, what France had in the greatest perfection was artillery; we know not a single instance in which twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by the bayonet. In the affair at Valmy, at the battles of Jemmapes, Nordlingen, and Fleurus, the French had an artillery superior to that of the enemy, although they had often only two guns to one thousand men; but that was because their armies were very numerous. It may happen that a general, more skilful in manoeuvring, more expert than his adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain successes during a part of a campaign, although his artillery may be far inferior to that of his opponent; but on the critical day of a general engagement, his inferiority in point of m
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 14: field-engineering.—Field Fortifications.—Military Communications.—Military Bridges.—Sapping, Mining, and the attack and defence of a fortified place (search)
rranged with scarp and counterscarp, galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. Such works hold an intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification. As examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the manner of organizing them, the reader is referred to the celebrated battle of Fontenoy, in 1745, where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of Marshal Sax e enabled the French to repel, with immense destruction, the attacks of greatly superior numbers; to the battle of Fleurus, in 1690, where the Prince of Waldeck exposed himself to a most disastrous defeat by neglecting the resources of fortification and other indispensable precautions; to the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709, where Marshal Villars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed the passage between the woods of Sars and Laniere, exposed himself to a disastrous defeat; to the operations of 1792, where General Custine, by neglecting to intrench the heights that covered Bingen, as the engin
ompanion named Romain were killed. They had employed, in conjunction with a hydrogen-balloon, a montgolfiere or fire-balloon below it, and on reaching a considerable hight, the expansion of the gas caused it to flow downward directly upon the fire, inflaming the whole apparatus, which was speedily consumed, precipitating the aeronauts to the earth. Balloons were introduced into the French armies at an early period during the wars of the Revolution, and were used at the battles of Liege, Fleurus, 1794, and at the sieges of Maintz (Mayence) and Ehrenbreitstein, where they were found particularly useful, as only by such means could operations in the elevated citadel be observed. The French armies are attended with a new species of reconnoitering engineers, whose duty it is to do everything relative to the preparation and use of balloons. The person who mounts in the balloon is furnished with paper and pencils of different colors. The marks are made according to a system agreed
(see Railway-signal). Fig. 5080 is a signal to be placed on curves, tunnels, or sidings. An adjustable book on the cab of the locomotive strikes a trigger on a wayside post and sets a signal in advance. Reconnoissances by signal-parties have been made by means of balloons on several occasions, the balloon in each case being what is called captive, that is, being held by a rope to limit the ascension and prevent its escape. Railway-signal. The first occasion was at the battle of Fleurus, in 1794, when the French used it to ascertain the position and evolutions of the Austrians. It was fired at by the Austrians, but allowed to ascend out of range. A captive balloon was again made use of by the French at Solferino, 1859. A third use of balloons in this species of service was with the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsular campaign, and perhaps in other fields of action. The search for the lamented Sir John Franklin gave rise to many ingenious schemes for signaling t
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 28. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), A Confederate airship. (search)
will go out of use. The new mode of travel will be more pleasant, for there will be no dust, and, by rising higher, as necessity may require, the happy traveller may keep cool. Travelling in the air by means of balloons is not of very remote date. The first successful experiments in this line were made in France, about 1783, when the balloon sailed across the Seine and a part of Paris, remaining in the air twenty-five minutes. A balloon was used for military observation at the battle of Fleurus, fought in 1794. A great deal concerning aerostation can be found in books and newspapers, but there is one experiment that seems to have escaped the notice of the curious In the winter of 1864-‘65, General Robert E. Lee and his army were defending Petersburg, Va. The troops were stretched out along the lines perhaps at the rate of one to every one hundred yards. McGowan's Brigade held the works not far from battery forty-five (or the Star Fort), and near where the great dam was bu