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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

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Vosges (France) (search for this): chapter 1
ate thus the part which the populations were to take in the controversy, would not put them entirely out of the pale of the laws of nations, and would place just limits to a war of extermination? For my part, I shall answer affirmatively, and in applying this, mixed system to the questions above propounded, I would guarantee that fifty thousand French regular troops, supported by the national guards of the East, would have an easy affair with that German army which should have crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to fifty thousand men by a host of detachments, it would have, on arriving near the Meuse, or in the Argonne, more than a hundred thousand men on its back. It is precisely in order to succeed in this juste milieu, that we have presented as an invariable maxim, the necessity of preparing for the army good national reserves; a system which offers the advantage of diminishing the expenses in time of peace, and of assuring the defense of the country in case of war. This system is
Bavaria (Bavaria, Germany) (search for this): chapter 1
engages in them, but if they arise from imperious and inevitable circumstances, they must at least be remedied, by seeking to oppose means or alliances capable of establishing a certain ponderation of the respective forces. The great coalition against Louis XIV, caused, as we have said, by his projects upon Spain, took, nevertheless, its origin in the preceding aggressions which had alarmed all his neighbors. He could oppose to leagued Europe only the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who himself was not slow to increase the number of the coalitionists. Frederick sustained war against the three most powerful monarchies on the continent, with the support alone of subsidies from England, and of fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different small States; but the division and feebleness of his adversaries were his best allies. Those two wars, like that sustained by the Emperor Alexander in 1812, were almost impossible to
Russia (Russia) (search for this): chapter 1
e principles of the art. It will be admitted, for example, that a war against France, Austria or Russia, could not be combined like a war against the Turks, or any Oriental nation, whose brave but undglish Company in India is no otherwise explained. Interior interventions do not always succeed; Russia owes in part the development of her greatness to that which her sovereigns knew how to bring intentured under the walls of Konigsberg, having Austria in his rear, and the whole mass of the Russian empire before him. If Austria had caused a hundred thousand men to debouch from Bohemia upon the Odus among the Scythians, Crassus and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, finally, Napoleon in Russia, furnish bloody testimony to those truths. It must be owned, nevertheless, the mania for conquey undertaken two, and even three frightful wars at once, those with Spain, with England and with Russia; but yet did he support himself in the latter, with the concurrence of Austria and of Prussia, w
Sweden (Sweden) (search for this): chapter 1
in counting on the support of the English squadrons! The result of those absurd calculations was a frightful disorder, from which France extricated herself as by a miracle. Napoleon is then in a manner the only one of modern sovereigns who has voluntarily undertaken two, and even three frightful wars at once, those with Spain, with England and with Russia; but yet did he support himself in the latter, with the concurrence of Austria and of Prussia, without speaking even of Turkey and of Sweden, upon which he counted with too much confidence, so that this enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has generally been believed, judged according to the turn of affairs. It is seen from what precedes, that there is a great distinction to be made between a war undertaken against a single State, in which a third should come to take a part by means of an auxiliary corps, and two wars conducted simultaneously at the most opposite extremities of a country, against two powerful natio
Brandenburg (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 1
ipulated treaties, you are but an accessory, and the operations are directed by the principal power. When you intervene by coalition and with an imposing army, the case is different. The military chances of those wars are various. The Russian army, in the Seven Years War, was, in reality, an auxiliary of Austria and France; it was, however, a principal party in the north, until the occupation of Old Prussia by its troops; but when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army into Brandenburg, then it no longer acted but in the Austrian interest; those troops, thrown far from their base, were at the mercy of a good or bad manoeuvre of their allies. Such remote excursions expose to dangers, and are ordinarily very delicate for the general of an army. The campaign of 1799, and of 1805, furnished sad proofs of this, which we shall recall in treating of those expeditions under the military aspect, (art. 30.) It results from these examples, that those remote interventions oft
Borodino (Russia) (search for this): chapter 1
ted, however, that there may be a great difference in the nature of the operations that shall be undertaken, according to the divers chances to be run. For example, two hundred thousand French wishing to subject Spain, aroused against them as one man, would not manoeuvre like two hundred thousand French wishing to march upon Vienna, or any other capital, there to dictate peace (1809); and they would not do the guerillas of Mina the honor to combat them in the same manner that they fought at Borodino. This, in reply to Major Proketsch, who, despite his well known erudition, believed himself able to sustain that the policy of war could have no influence upon its operations and that war should always be made in the same manner. Without going so far for examples, could it be said that the two hundred thousand French of whom we have just spoken, ought equally to march upon Vienna, whatever should be the moral condition of the governments, and of the population between the Rhine and the I
France (France) (search for this): chapter 1
rick II, profiting by a war of Austria against France, evokes old parchments, enters Silesia by mainl be admitted, for example, that a war against France, Austria or Russia, could not be combined likeed to the ruin of Napoleon; the other replaced France in the relative situation to Spain which she oof the Greeks with those of the conquerors, as France knew how to do with the people of Alsace, the des, in the Thirty Years War, and Philip II in France, had in the, country an auxiliary more powerfu of those fortresses, that they wanted neither France, nor its places, nor its brave army, and had ms system is nothing else than that employed by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by athey are only family quarrels. The history of France in the time of the League, will be a lasting ltants of Germany, and by Elizabeth to those of France; a support dictated according to him by a wisether object than the division or subjection of France to his influence, to the end of dismembering h[7 more...]
Verona (Italy) (search for this): chapter 1
ion. Arbiter between two hostile interests, Ferdinand blindly threw himself into the arms of that one of the parties which affected a great veneration for the throne, but which counted to make the most of the royal authority for its own profit, without troubling itself about future consequences. Society remained divided into two hostile camps, which it would not have been impossible to calm and to bring together in course of time. Those camps have come anew to blows, as I had predicted at Verona in 1823; a great lesson, from which it appears for the rest, that no person is disposed to profit in this beautiful and too unhappy country, although history is not wanting in examples to attest that violent reactions are, no more than revolutions, proper elements for constructing and consolidating. God grant that there may result from this frightful conflict, a throne strong and respected, equally free of all factions, and supported upon a disciplined army as well as the general interests
Belgium (Belgium) (search for this): chapter 1
orth there would be no wars but those of conquest, and that all those legitimate, but secondary wars, which have for object only the maintainance of the political equilibrium, or the defense of public interests, should be banished for ever. Otherwise, what means would there exist of knowing when and how it would be suitable to excite a national war? For example, if a hundred thousand Germans passed the Rhine, and penetrated into France with the primitive object of opposing the conquest of Belgium by this power, but with no other project of ambition against it, would it be necessary to raise en masse, all the population of Alsace, of Lorraine, of Champagne, of Burgundy, men, women and children, to make a Saragassa of every little walled town, and thus to bring about through reprisals the murder, pillage, and burning of the whole country? If this be not done, and the German army occupy those provinces at the end of certain successes, who will answer that it do not then seek to approp
England (United Kingdom) (search for this): chapter 1
a for conquest was not always the only motive of the conduct of the latter; his personal position, and his struggle with England urged him to enterprises, the evident object of which was to come out victorious in this struggle; love of war and its hrick sustained war against the three most powerful monarchies on the continent, with the support alone of subsidies from England, and of fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different small States; but the division and feebleness of his adversaries we of modern sovereigns who has voluntarily undertaken two, and even three frightful wars at once, those with Spain, with England and with Russia; but yet did he support himself in the latter, with the concurrence of Austria and of Prussia, without smenaced them. For instance, the double hand to hand struggle of Napoleon in 1809, with Austria and Spain, sus tained by England, was much more grave for him, than if he had had to do only with Austria, assisted by any auxiliary corps whatever, fixe
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