Browsing named entities in Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). You can also browse the collection for Essling (Wien, Austria) or search for Essling (Wien, Austria) in all documents.

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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
nt offers some defects, it may be affirmed nevertheless that it would also offer immense advantages to an army destined to operate on the Rhine. In fact, the inconvenience of temporary intrenched camps established on great rivers, is that they are scarcely useful except when they are found beyond the river, as we have said. Now in this case, they are exposed to all the dangers resulting from a capture of the bridges, which might place the army in the same position as that of Napoleon at Essling, and would leave it exposed to a total want of provisions or munitions, as well as to the perils of an attack by storm from which field works would not always be secure. The system of detached forts in permanent fortifications, such as has been applied at Coblentz, offers the advantage of averting these dangers, by putting the magazines under shelter of the city — situated upon the same bank as the army, and by guaranteeing the latter against an attack, at least until the establishment of
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
imself to observing it from a distance, and throw himself with the mass of his forces upon one wing only. The battle of Essling, in 1809, offers still an example of the advantage of a concave line; but it cannot be inferred that Napoleon did badly nt rays, and especially upon the two wings at the same time. It was nearly in the same convex order that they fought at Essling, as well as on the second and third days of the famous battle of Leipsig; it had, on the last occasions, the infallible o watch the moment for falling upon that of the enemy. At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line in echelon squares; at Essling, at Leipsic, at Brienne, he presented a kind of convex order nearly like that in figure 7, at Wagram we see him adopt anbat thus disposed in echelons. As for the other figures traced upon the same plate, it could not be contested that at Essling, as well as at Fleurus, the general disposition of the Austrians was concave, and that of the French convex. But those
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
This advantage will save it equally from the peril of receiving battle with the river behind, as happened to Napoleon at Essling. This is enough upon the strategic combination which should decide passages; it is time to speak of their execution. Beresina, surpassed all that had been seen until then of this kind. The first two were those which Napoleon executed at Essling and at Wagram, in presence of an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, provided with four hundred pieces of artillessed. It is necessary to do like the Duke of Vendorle at Cassano, and as did the Arch-Duke Charles on a larger scale at Essling in 1809--a memorable example, which cannot be too strongly recommended, although the conqueror did not derive from it al near compromising the army of the Sambre and Mense. The Arch-Duke Charles did as much in 1809 at the famous passage at Essling. He broke the bridge of the Danube, and brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin. There are few means of placing a brid
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
e attack will fail. Besides that, this reduced order would be advantageous only against infantry, for the column of four sections of three ranks, forming a kind of solid square, is better against cavalry. The Arch-Duke Charles was fortunate at Essling, and especially at Wagram, in having adopted this last order, which I proposed in my chapter upon the general principles of war published in 1807; the brave cavalry of Bessieres could do nothing against those little masses. M. de Wagner seemsld; the system employed at Cannae by Hannibal, could all the better find here its application, as such a mass battered by the concentric fires of an artillery equal in number, and disposed in a concave line, like that of the Arch-Duke Charles at Essling, would be much compromised. Finally, in order to avoid cutting the army in two parts, who knows if one of those movements of conversion which the author would repudiate, would not be an excellent means to oppose to his system, since it would tr
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Conclusion (search)
tions will be able but to diminish the disasters of an almost inevitable defeat. This defeat would be all the more sure when with such instruments he should have to combat an adversary, perhaps less skillful than himself, but having troops inured to war, or enthusiasts for their cause. No tactical system could guarantee the victory when the moral of the army is bad, and even when it should be excellent, victory may depend upon an incident like the rupture of the bridges of the Danube at Essling. A systematic general could prohibit columns from adopting the shallow or firing order, or else confine it to purely defensive means, in order to adopt exclusively the semi-profound columns, without being sure, nevertheless of success. These truths do not prevent the existence of good maxims of war which, with equal chances, will be able to procure victory; and if it be true that these theories could not teach with a mathematical precision what it would be suitable to do in every possib