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Kirby Smith (search for this): chapter 35
een and unheard, yet felt by that morbid prescience which comes in the supreme crises of life. The trans-Mississippi was now absolutely cut off from participation in the action of the eastern Confederacy; almost equally so from communication with it. Still that section held its own, in the warfare peculiar to her people and their situation. Quick concentrations; sharp, bloody fights-skirmishes in extent, but battles in exhibition of pluck and endurance — were of constant occurrence. Kirby Smith --become almost a dictator through failure of communicationadministered his department with skill, judgment and moderation. Husbanding his internal resources, he even established — in the few accessible ports, defiant of blockade — a system of foreign supply; and Kirby Smithdom --as it came to be called-was, at this time, the best provisioned and prepared of the torn and stricken sections of the Confederacy. Note has been made of the improvement of Federal cavalry; and of their raids<
such good judgment as to be within reach of any new combination of Bragg — from whom he was now cut off-or, failing that, to keep his rear open through Virginia, to Lee's army. Meantime, Grant massed troops in Chattanooga, sufficient in his judgment to crush Bragg; and, learning of the latter's detachment of Longstreet's corps,treet-said thoughtful critics-then are combination and suicide convertible terms! Neither was public feeling much cheered by the aspect of the war in Virginia. Lee and Meade coquetted for position, without definite result; the former-weakened by Longstreet's absence-striving to slip between Meade and Washington; the latter aiming to flank and mass behind Lee, on one of the three favorite routes to Richmond. The fall and winter wore away with these desultory movements; producing many a sharp skirmish, but nothing more resultful. These offered motif for display of dash and military tact on both sides; that at Kelly's Ford, on the Rapidan — where the Fed
Jeff Davis (search for this): chapter 35
against itself; for the worse than weak Congress — which had formerly been as a nose of wax in Mr. Davis' fingers-had now turned dead against him. With the stolid obstinacy of stupidity it now refusehip of Mr. Foote--who wasted the precious time of Congress in windy personal diatribes against Mr. Davis and his pets --nothing was done to combine and strengthen the rapidly sundering elements of Cowithin itself; still Mr. Foote blew clouds of vituperative gas at President and Cabinet; still Mr. Davis retained, in council and field, the men he had chosen. And daily he grew more unpopular with . Strong and open expression was made of the popular wish for General Bragg's removal; but Mr. Davis refused — as ever — to hear the people's voice, in a matter of policy. He retained General Br enemy and our own errorsthere came general bad augury from the panic of Missionary Ridge Mr. Davis had visited Bragg's army, after the howl that went up on his failure to press Rosecrans. On h<
George G. Meade (search for this): chapter 35
retreat and destruction. If these tactics meant the detaching of Longstreet-said thoughtful critics-then are combination and suicide convertible terms! Neither was public feeling much cheered by the aspect of the war in Virginia. Lee and Meade coquetted for position, without definite result; the former-weakened by Longstreet's absence-striving to slip between Meade and Washington; the latter aiming to flank and mass behind Lee, on one of the three favorite routes to Richmond. The fallMeade and Washington; the latter aiming to flank and mass behind Lee, on one of the three favorite routes to Richmond. The fall and winter wore away with these desultory movements; producing many a sharp skirmish, but nothing more resultful. These offered motif for display of dash and military tact on both sides; that at Kelly's Ford, on the Rapidan — where the Federals caught the Confederates unprepared-showing the hardest hitting with advantage on the Union side. The compliment was exchanged, by a decisive southern success at Germania Ford; but the resultless fighting dispirited and demoralized the people, while it
A. E. Burnside (search for this): chapter 35
he mountains of Virginia. Then for four months-until he dug his way out of his dungeon with a small knife-John Morgan was locked up as a common felon, starved, insulted and treated with brutality, the recital of which sickens-even having his head shave! There was no excuse ever attempted; no pretense that he was a guerrilla. It was done simply to glut spite and to make a dreaded enemy feel his captors' power. Meantime General Bragg, at Tullahoma, faced by Rosecrans and flanked by Burnside's Army of the Cumberland, was forced to fall back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans pressed him hard, with the intent of carrying out that pet scheme of the North, forcing his army down through Georgia and riddling the Cotton States. It is inessential here to recount the details of these movements. Rosecrans had a heavy and compact force; ours was weak and scattered, and Bragg's urgent appeal for men met the invariable answer, there were none. to send. For the same reason-insufficient force-Bu
Judah P. Benjamin (search for this): chapter 35
And still Congress wrangled on with Government and within itself; still Mr. Foote blew clouds of vituperative gas at President and Cabinet; still Mr. Davis retained, in council and field, the men he had chosen. And daily he grew more unpopular with the people, who, disagreeing with him, still held him in awe, while they despised the Congress. Even in this strait, the old delusion about the collapse of Federal finance occasionally came up for hopeful discussion; and, from time to time, Mr. Benjamin would put out a feeler about recognition from governments that remembered us less than had we really been behind the great wall of China. After Gettysburg and Vicksburg, came a lull in the heavier operations of the war. But raids of the enemy's cavalry were organized and sent to penetrate the interior South, in every direction. To meet them were only home guards and the militia; with sometimes a detachment of cavalry, hastily brought up from a distant point. This latter branch of se
McClernand (search for this): chapter 35
nced as bad soldiership and possible of success, only through an enemy's weakness. At this time, he was certainly not in high estimation of his own army, because of dogged disregard of loss in useless assaults; and it will be recalled that General McClernand was court-martialed for his declaration that he could not be expected to furnish brains for the whole army! The estimate of Grant's compeers is not refuted by any evidence in the War Department that, from Shiloh to Appomattox, he ever maderk of any soldiership, higher than courage and bull-dog tenacity. Even scouting the generally-accepted idea, in the army of Vicksburg and later in that of Chattanooga — that McPherson provided plans and details of his campaigns; and dismissing McClernand's costly taunt as mere epigram-this was the accepted estimate of General Grant's tactical power. But he inaugurated his command at Chattanooga with boldness and vigor. He concentrated 25,000 troops in the town; opened his communications; a
hickamauga the might have been once more popular discontent General Grant judged by his compeers Longstreet at Knoxville Missionary Ridr loss of the battle; and, in mid-October, he was superseded by General Grant. Like all popular heroes of the war, Grant had become notedGrant had become noted, rather through hard-hitting than strategic combination. His zenith was mounted on the capture of Vicksburg; a project which northern gener be expected to furnish brains for the whole army! The estimate of Grant's compeers is not refuted by any evidence in the War Department tha costly taunt as mere epigram-this was the accepted estimate of General Grant's tactical power. But he inaugurated his command at Chattano keep his rear open through Virginia, to Lee's army. Meantime, Grant massed troops in Chattanooga, sufficient in his judgment to crush B that Bragg and he had affected combinations now, which would leave Grant only the choice between retreat and destruction. If these tacti
power. Meantime General Bragg, at Tullahoma, faced by Rosecrans and flanked by Burnside's Army of the Cumberland, was forced to fall back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans pressed him hard, with the intent of carrying out that pet scheme of the North, fssential here to recount the details of these movements. Rosecrans had a heavy and compact force; ours was weak and scattere this day. General Bragg's friends declare that he forced Rosecrans to the position; his enemies, that Rosecrans first out-geRosecrans first out-generaled him and then laid himself open to destruction, while Bragg took no advantage of the situation. However this may b the state and the Georgia frontier, the failure to press Rosecrans at the moment left him free communication with his rear a at the North declared that loss of command should reward Rosecrans for loss of the battle; and, in mid-October, he was superarmy, after the howl that went up on his failure to press Rosecrans. On his return, the President appeared satisfied and hop
W. T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 35
ose his own line of retreat, too; and with such good judgment as to be within reach of any new combination of Bragg — from whom he was now cut off-or, failing that, to keep his rear open through Virginia, to Lee's army. Meantime, Grant massed troops in Chattanooga, sufficient in his judgment to crush Bragg; and, learning of the latter's detachment of Longstreet's corps, determined to strike early and hard. On the 25th he attacked with his whole force, in two grand columns under Thomas, Sherman and Hooker. The little southern army of less than forty thousand was judiciously posted; having advantage of being attacked. The terrible shock of the double attack was successfully repulsed on the right by Hardee, on the left by Buckner. Broken, reeling-shattered-he was hurled back, only to form again with splendid courage. Once more checked and driven back, after desperate fighting on both sides, the Federals made a third advance with steady, dogged valor. Then constancy was rewarded
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