[5]
Everything of which we have in us the desire is pleasant, for desire is a
longing for the pleasant.
Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational. I call irrational all those
that are not the result of any
assumption.1 Such are all those which are called natural; for
instance, those which come into existence through the body—such as the
desire of food, thirst, hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular;
the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in a word, with touch,
smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due to our
being convinced; for there are many things which we desire to see or acquire
when we have heard them spoken of and are convinced that they are pleasant.
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1 There is no consideration or “definite theory” （Jebb, Welldon） of the results that may follow. The desires arise without anything of the kind; they simply come.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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