Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 29
Rev. Canon Roberts, Ed.

---

.The Roman commanders, L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, were determined not to let the war spread through any remissness on their part. [2] They united their forces and marched with their combined strength through the Ausetanian territory, inflicting no injury on either the hostile or the peaceable districts, until they came to where the enemy was encamped. They fixed their own camp at a distance of three miles from that of the enemy, and sent envoys to persuade him to lay down his arms. [3] When, however, the Spanish horse attacked a party of foragers, cavalry supports were at once hurried up from the Roman outposts, and a skirmish took place without any special advantage to either side. [4] On the morrow the whole of the Spanish army marched under arms and in battle formation to within a mile of the Roman camp. [5] The Ausetani formed the centre, the Ilergetes were on the right and the left was made up of various nameless tribes. Between the wings and the centre open spaces were left, wide enough to allow of the cavalry charging through when the right moment arrived. [6] The Roman line was formed in the usual way, except that they so far copied the enemy as to leave spaces between the legions for their cavalry also to pass through. [7] Lentulus, however, saw that this disposition would be of advantage to that side only who were the first to send their cavalry through the wide gaps in the opposing line. [8] Accordingly he gave the military tribune, Servius Cornelius, orders to send his cavalry at full speed through the openings. [9] He himself, finding that his infantry were making no progress, and that the twelfth legion, who were on the left, opposed to the Ilergetes, were beginning to give ground, brought up the thirteenth legion who were in reserve to their support. [10] As soon as the battle was restored in this quarter he rode up to L. Manlius, who was at the front encouraging his men and bringing up assistance wherever it was required, and pointed out to him that all was safe [11??] on his left and that S. Cornelius, acting under his orders, would soon envelop the enemy with a whirlwind of cavalry. [12] He had hardly said this when the Roman cavalry charging into the middle of the enemy threw his infantry into confusion, and at the same time barred the passage for the Spanish horse. [13] These, finding themselves unable to act as cavalry, dismounted and fought on foot. When the Roman commanders saw the enemy's ranks in disorder, confusion and panic spreading and the standards swaying to and fro, they appealed to their men to break up the enemy while thus shaken and not let them re-form their line. [14] The barbarians would not have withstood the furious attack which followed had not Indibilis and his dismounted cavalry placed themselves in front to screen the infantry. [15] There was very violent fighting for some time, neither side giving way. The king though half dead kept his ground till he was pinned to the earth by a javelin, and then those who were fighting round him were at last overwhelmed beneath showers of missiles. [16] A general flight began and the carnage was all the greater because the troopers had no time to recover their horses, and the Romans never relaxed the pursuit until they had stripped the enemy of his camp. [17] 13,000 Spaniards were killed on that day and about 1800 prisoners taken. Of the Romans and allies a little more than 200 fell, mainly on the left wing. [18] The Spaniards who had been routed on the field or driven out of their camp, dispersed amongst the fields, and finally returned to their respective communities.