Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 34
Rev. Canon Roberts, Ed.

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The envoys were dismissed for the day without receiving any reply. The consul passed an anxious night trying to decide between the two alternatives: [2] he did not want to desert his allies nor did he want to weaken his army, a course which might possibly delay the decisive conflict, or, if it should come on, endanger his success. [3] He finally made up his mind not to part with any of his troops lest the enemy should inflict some humiliation upon him, and he decided to hold out the hope of assistance to his allies instead of actually giving it. [4] He reflected that promises have often been as effective as performance, especially in war; to the man who believes that he has help to fall back upon it is just the same as if he had it, his very belief nerves him to hope and to dare. [5] The next day he gave his reply to the envoys, and assured them that though he was afraid of weakening his force for the benefit of others, he nevertheless made more account of the critical and dangerous position they were in than he did of his own. [6] He then ordered a third of the men in each cohort to cook the food, which they were to take on board in good time, and orders were at the same time issued for the ships to be ready to sail in three days' time. [7] He told two of the envoys to report these measures to Bilistages and the Ilergetes; the third, the chief's son, he succeeded, by his affability and the presents he gave him, in keeping with him. [8] The envoys did not leave until they saw the soldiers actually on board, then, no longer feeling any doubts, they spread far and wide amongst friends and foes the news of the approach of Roman succour.