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τῶν δέκα ἡμερέων: viz. the eight days specified in c. 39 and the two days specified in c. 40 supra. With ‘ten days,’ however, we reach the suspieious Hellenic ‘week,’ out of which the previons smaller items may have been extracted! A good deal had happened on the eighth, ninth, tenth, and even on the second (c. 33 supra). It is hardly credible that from the third to the eighth (at sundown) the Greeks had been allowed to occupy their (second) position absolutely unmolested, or that, if molested, as on the ninth, tenth, and twelfth (the eleventh is dropped by Hdt. from this point of view, and devoted to the conference between Mardonios and Artabazos), they could have held out, without either crossing the Asopos to do battle, or retreating to some third position, better proteeted from the cavalry. In other words, it is very unlikely that so many days elapsed in ‘the second position’ as Hdt. asserts. οὐδὲν ... τούτων is a formula; cp. 9. 121, 6. 42.
ὡς δὲ ἑνδεκάτη ἐγεγόνεε ἡμέρη, ‘when the eleventh day was come’ (not ‘was past’): sc. the eleventh day on which the two armies were facing each other ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, i.e. no doubt aceording to Hdt.'s conception ‘in the second position,’ ἐν τῆ Πλαταιίδι, ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ, cp. cc. 25, 30, 31, 36 supra. But, even if the chronological index is to be taken quite strietly, the topographical or enchorial index may admit of being stretehed a little further, so that ἐν Πλαταιῇσι should not merely equal ἐν τῇ Πλαταιίδι, but eover the ground of all the operations in Boiotia antecedent to the battle. The word, indeed, as here used, ἀντικατημένοισι ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, applies to the Persians equally with the Greeks, yet the Persians were on the other side of the Asopos, which was not even Plataian land.
πολλῷ πλεῦνες ἐγεγόνεσαν: this assertion cannot be taken to mean that the numbers given above in c. 30 had by this time been largely exceeded. Hdt. was bound in his muster-roll to give the maximal estimates, and the figures there given must be taken to cover the accessions here recorded. But the apparent inconsequence shows that strict order of time or argument cannot be assumed in Hdt.'s methods of exposition, and entitles his readers to a certain liberty of readjustment, whether in the logical or in the chronological interest.
Μαρδόνιος περιημέκτεε τῇ ἕδρῃ: for the verb cp. 8. 109; for the construction rather 4. 154. ἕδρη is a quasimilitary term; cp. ἀντικατῆσθαι above, Thuc. 5. 7. 2. But here it means perhaps little more than ‘delay’ (διατριβή, cp. διέτριψαν c. 40). ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, ‘had a conversation,’ or conference together. The parties to such a proceeding would be more or less co-ordinate (like two Roman consuls commanding different armies); nevertheless, on the present occasion, it appears that in some way or other the authority of Mardonios was superior to that of Artabazos; moreover the conference is not a private dialogue, but apparently a council of war, at which all the chief officers in the army, or armies, are present—though Hdt. is not clear or explicit on this point. How purely rhetorical or stylistic the use of the patronymic may be is clearly shown in the present case; cp. 7. 11 etc. For Gobryas cp. 7. 2, 5 etc.; for Pharnakes 8. 126.
ἐν ὀλίγοισι: cp. 4. 52.
βουλευομένων, not merely the two Persians just named, but all those present at the Council, who have two γνῶμαι laid before them, that of Artabazos, supported by the Thebans, and that of Mardonios (which probably commended itself to his Persian officers).
ἡ μὲν Ἀρταβάζου. The plan of Artabazos is to abandon operations in the field, to evacuate the fortified camp, to retire behind the walls of Thebes, and from there—whither it might be expected the Greek army would follow—to attempt by bribery and corruption the realization of the Persian hopes. This record is remarkable for several reasons. (i.) It implies that there were serious misgivings on the Persian side as to the issue of a battle. (ii.) It suggests that the forward movement of the Greeks and their occupation of the second position gave them some advantage, perhaps threatened the Persian position more directly than Hdt. appears to realize. As against this, however, it seems improbable that the tradition, so favourable to the Greeks, and especially to the Athenians, should have quite forgotten, or missed, so important a point in their favour. (iii.) Artabazos cannot be exonerated from the suspicion of viewing Mardonios with jealousy, and subordinating the Persian interest to personal schemes and rivalries. The story of his subsequent action or inaction is astounding. The technical relation between the two generals is obscure; see below; but, whatever it was, Artabazos comes badly out of the affair in the sequel, notwithstanding a pretty evident bias in his favour. (iv.) The plan proposed by Artabazos, as far as negotiations, bribery and so forth are concerned, had already been tried; cp. notes to c. 4 supra. It is said to be supported by the Thebans; it is indeed their own original idea, cp. c. 2 supra; but the time has surely gone by for it now, with the confederate army in position before them. If there was a medizing party in the Athenian camp (Plutarch Arist. 13) there was an Atticizing section on the other side of the Asopos! cp. c. 44 infra. (v.) The idea of retiring into Thebes is not a sound one, though the proposal is valuable as implying comparatively small numbers on the Persian side. Artabazos might, indeed, have acquired a respect for Greek fortifications from his own failure before Poteidaia (8. 126-9), but a siege of Thebes could hardly have been to the advantage of the besieged: the Persian cavalry would have been lost; the abandonment of the Persian camp on the Asopos was morally tantamount to a defeat. (vi.) Hdt. places this debate on the 11th day. But this date may be merely a dramatic ruse. The difference of opinion between Artabazos and Mardonios will not then first have occurred, or come to light. It was probably of longer standing. What line had Artabazos taken when the policy was originally proposed by the Thebans, c. 3 supra? Hdt. may have crystallized and misdated a long standing feud and difference of opinion. Or has Artabazos and his corps d'armée only just joined Mardonios? He has had the whole summer for his march from Poteidaia, and Mardonios has already offered battle. (vii.) At this point there are perhaps two alternatives recognizable, one or other of which Artabazos might have advocated. (a) A tactical stratagem. Mardonios himself was anxious to draw the Greeks across the Asopos: why not retire on Thebes, abandoning even the camp, with its plate and spoil, for the nonce, in order to get the Greeks across the river, and to bring about a general engagement (cp. Hannibal's ruse, Livy 22. 41 f.)? (b) A strategic coup. Artabazos may have proposed what he himself afterwards carried out, retreat, the evacuation of Boiotia, perhaps of Greece, the preservation of their two armies intaet for the king's service. Artabazos has a special loyalty to Xerxes. Events in Asia (movement of the Greek fleet, revolt of Babylon, etc.) may already have been reported at Persian headquarters in Boiotia. Such tactics or such strategy Mardonios rejected: the first might easily prove a failure; the second was failure confessed. The time for political and diplomatic manœuvring had gone. Under the circumstances, with the available evidences, one's sympathies in this debate must be with Mardonios.
ἀναζεύξαντας: cp. 8. 60; but the verb here governs π. τ. στρατόν, if the words are genuine. τὴν ταχίστην: sc. ὁδόν. The phrase suggests a longer march than just back to Thebes; but it may well be taken with ἀναζεύξαντας and = ὡς τάχιστα. Still, where was the need of hurry? τὸ τεῖχος τὸ Θηβαίων. Thebes was a walled city; cp. c. 86 infra. If the whole army was going to find accommodation in Thebes it cannot have numbered 300,000. Even 150,000 men would have strained the accommodation! But perhaps the northern Greeks were expected to go home; Artabazos himself may also have no intention of remaining in Boiotia. Thebes might have accommodated 50,000 men — Mardonios' corps d'armée—as well as its own population. The statement that there was abundance of food for man and beast (σῖτος, χόρτος） will be contradicted, within twenty-four hours, by Alexander of Makedon, c. 45 infra; but it is probably true for all that. Cp. notes ad l.
ἐσενηνεῖχθαι is of course pl. p.
διαπρήσσεσθαι: obviously of political intrigue; the active is used, not so very differently, c. 94 infra.
φειδομένους μηδενός, ‘without stint’ (Macaulay), i.e. = ἀφειδέως; cp. c. 39 supra. διαπέμπειν: distributively. Why suspeet the plate? Rather than that insert πολλά—it was no doubt of gold and silver. Cp. 3. 148, and c. 80 infra.
τοὺς προεστεῶτας: not necessarily the formally appointed magistrates, or commanders, but the political leaders; προστάται, cp. 5. 23, 49, etc.
παραδώσειν: euphemistically for προδώσειν.
ἡ αὐτὴ ἐγίνετο καὶ Θηβαίων γνώμη: (his opinion) was the same as that of the Thebans—i.e. as expressed above in c. 2. Hdt. does not mean to say that the Thebans now expressed their opinion.
ὡς προειδότος πλεῦν τι: it is rather insight than foresight, perhaps, which the phrase is meant to suggest. Μαρδονίου δέ: sc. ἡ δὲ γνώμη Μαρδονίου ἦν (ellipse, or brachylogy). It follows in orat. obliq. Hdt. apparently means to condemn it, as ‘stark, obstinate, uncompromising’—i.e. utterly devoid of reasonableness, of the spirit of compromise. On ἀγνωμοσύνη cp. c. 3 supra. πολλῷ κρέσσονα corresponds with the figures as given by Hdt. (350,000 v. 110,000), but if true of the real numbers would somewhat have mitigated the apparently ‘foolish obstinacy’ of Mardonios. If tradition had been content to state the figures of Mardonios' force more accurately, his obstinacy might have seemed less reasonable.
συμβάλλειν may be constructed with ὡς χρεὸν εἴη or such like, understood out of ἡ γνώμη ἦν, but a looser construction, or apposition, were no less idiomatic. τὴν ταχίστην = ὡς τάχιστα: sc. συμβολήν, ὁδόν, or sim.; cp. l. 8 supra.
ποριορᾶν: i.e. pati, cp. 7. 16. τά τε σφάγια ... ἐᾶν χαίρειν: this sentiment sounds, and is intended to sound, very impious and shocking, though as coming from a Persian it might be less offensive than in the mouth of a Greek; but then, Mardonios should not have had recourse to Hellenic divination if he was going to flout it in this fashion! χ. ἐᾶν, cp. c. 45 infra, 4. 112 supra.
βιάζεσθαι: vim inferre auspiciis, Baehr; permittere ut victimae sibi vim afferant, Matthiae: the one taking the verb as deponent trans., the other as passive. Both uses are found: Soph. Antig. 66 “βιάζομαι τάδε” (pass.), Thuc. 8. 53. 2 “τοὺς νόμους βιασάμενος” (as here τὰ σφάγια). So also with personal object. In a rather different sense, which might however work here, Thuc. 4. 11. 4 “βιαζομένους τὴν ἀπόβασιν”, 7. 72. 3 βιάσασθαι ... τὸν ἔκπλουν. Stein notes that ἐκβιάζεσθαι would have been clearer.
νόμῳ τῷ Περσέων: i.e. it was not the Persian custom to submit military tactics to the chances of divination. There is something of a problem here. Persians were probably as superstitious, to say the least of it, as Greeks. The (apparent) absence of the Magi in the army of Mardonios is remarkable. He himself is represented as the special fautor of Greek religion. He here appears in the character of a ‘freethinker,’ like Claudius Pulcher in 249 B.C. before the battle of Drepana; cp. Suetonius, Tib. 2.
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