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On the 12th A. P. Hill was placed in front, to cover about a mile and a half of line with his six brigades.
On the extreme right he posted 14 guns, and supported them with half of Brockenbrough's brigade.
No other position for artillery offered along the front until the left of the division was reached.
Here 12 guns were advanced north of the railroad, and 21 more were placed upon a low, open hill, south of the road some 200 yards to the left and rear, supported by Pender's brigade.
The wooded hills between these positions were held by the four remaining brigades, but no two of them connected with each other.
On the right, the other half of Brockenbrough's and Archer's brigade occupied the trenches which had been built by Hood.
Archer's left rested on a swampy portion of the wood overgrown with underbrush, and it had carelessly been assumed to be impassable.
Maj. Von Borcke, a German officer on Stuart's staff, had suggested felling it, but it was not thought worth while.
On the far side of this swamp, Lane's brigade took up the line; the gap between it and Archer's being about 500 yards.
Beyond Lane was another considerable gap to his left and rear, where Pender's brigade was supporting the 12 and 21 guns before referred to. Behind Lane, about 400 yards, was Thomas's brigade.
The remaining brigade of the division, Gregg's, was placed in the military road opposite the swamp and gap between Archer and Lane.
If we call this disposition of Hill's troops one of two lines, a third line was formed by the divisions of Early and Taliaferro — Early on the right —a short distance in rear, and a fourth one by the division of D. H. Hill in rear of that.
Burnside was losing one of the advantages of his superior force by concentrating it upon too short a front.
He was hemmed in on the left by Massaponax Creek, and was confined to a front attack.
With only a mile and a half to defend and with about 30,000 infantry in hand, covered by the woods from accurate artillery fire, Jackson was very strong.
With this understanding of the positions and forces the result might have been predicted.
The faulty disposition of A. P. Hill's division, with two gaps in his front line, would surely allow to the enemy a temporary success.
But the strong reserves close at hand were enough to restore the
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