George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army
George Gordon Meade, Ed.

[317] I fear, they have left it too late, and that the day has gone by for any terms to be granted them except complete submission! Either one extreme or the other will have to come to pass—the day for compromise, for a brotherly reconciliation, for the old Union, in reality as well as name, has passed away, and the struggle must be continued till one side or the other is exhausted and willing to give up. Peace-oh, what a glorious word, and how sweet and delightful would its realization be to me! And if such is the case, how desirable for thousands and thousands of others, who have not gained, as I have by war, distinction and fame!

Since writing to you the President of the United States has visited our camp and reviewed our corps. I had the distinguished honor of accompanying him to the battle-field, where General McClellan pointed out to him the various phases of the day, saying here it was that Meade did this and there Meade did that; which all was very gratifying to me. He seemed very much interested in all the movements of Hooker's corps. I do not know the purport of the President's visit, but I think it was to urge McClellan on, regardless of his views, or the condition of the army. I think, however, he was informed of certain facts in connection with this army which have opened his eyes a little, and which may induce him to pause and reflect before he interferes with McClellan by giving positive orders. For instance, the following, confidentially written: I prepared a statement, showing that Hooker's corps on paper was thirty-one thousand five hundred strong; that of this number there were present for duty only twelve thousand, and of these, a numerical list, made on the day of the battle, after we came out of action, showed only seven thousand. Hence, while the United States were paying, and the authorities at Washington were relying and basing their orders and plans on the belief that we had thirty-one thousand five hundred men, facts showed that we had in reality, on the field fighting, only nine thousand. As to the seven thousand that came out of the fight, we should add some two thousand killed and wounded in it. It would take too much time to explain this apparent paradox. Suffice it to say, it results from a serious evil, due to the character and constitution of our volunteer force, and from the absence of that control over the men, which is the consequence of the inefficiency of the officers commanding them—I mean regimental and company