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especially the cavalry, announced that the army was closely approaching the enemy.
In consequence,
General Meade placed
General Reynolds in command of the left wing, consisting of his own corps, the First, and of the Third and Eleventh Corps.
Orders were given to
General Sickles to move his corps to Emmettsburg, and the two following circulars were forwarded to each corps of the army:
Headquarters army of the Potomac, June 30, 1863.
Circular:
The
Commanding General has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on
Gettysburg.
It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies, until the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed.
Three corps, 1st, 3d and 11th, are under the command of
Major General Reynolds, in the vicinity of Emmettsburg, the 3d Corps being ordered up to that point.
The 12th Corps is at
Littlestown.
General Gregg's division of cavalry is believed to be now engaged with the cavalry of the enemy, near
Hanover Junction.
Corps commanders will hold their commands in readiness at a moment's notice, and upon receiving orders, to march against the enemy.
Their trains (ammunition trains excepted) must be parked in the rear of the place of concentration.
Ammunition wagons and ambulances will alone be permitted to accompany the troops.
The men must be provided with three-days' rations in haversacks, and with sixty rounds of ammunition in the boxes and upon the person.
Corps commanders will avail themselves of all the time at their disposal to familiarize themselves with the roads communicating with the different corps.
By command of
Major General Meade.
Headquarters army of the Potomac, June 30, 1863.
Circular:
The
Commanding General requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle.
The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe. Our failure to do so will leave us no
