Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3.
Henry Coppee , LL.D., Ed.

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[332] the remnants of those corps which had not yet found their way to that place. These soldiers, who up to that time had fought so valiantly, and who, for the most part, counted more than one brilliant victory in their record of service, had lost all confidence in their chief, and even in themselves. It required the protection of the guns of Vicksburg and the sight of the works which they had been taught to consider impregnable—it needed, above all, the presence of the eight or ten thousand fresh troops that Pemberton had left there—to restore order to this shattered army. The garrisons of Haines' Bluff, of Snyder's Mill, and of Warrenton were immediately recalled, with all the materiel that could be removed; the heavy artillery posted in these detached works was abandoned; and on the morning of the 18th, Pemberton, with all his troops, shut himself up inside of the vast fortifications constructed around Vicksburg. His forces, including the sick and a very small number of wounded—for those of Champion's Hill had all remained on the battlefield—amounted to thirty-three thousand men.

Toward noon on the 18th, while he was apportioning his soldiers among the lines of works he would have to defend, he received a despatch from Johnston dated on the evening of the 17th. The latter, on being apprised of his retreat and the abandonment of Haines' Bluff, had ordered him to evacuate Vicksburg with all the troops he could take with him. This despatch completely summed up the situation in few words: ‘If Haines' Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg with its dependencies and march north-eastward.’ This order was a veritable thunderbolt for the unfortunate Pemberton. The council of war which he soon called together declared that the condition of the troops rendered the evacuation ordered by his chief impossible. Undoubtedly, in ordinary times, the thirty thousand soldiers composing the Army of the Mississippi would not have allowed themselves to be shut up by the forty-five thousand Federals who were marching against them, and we shall see that a few days only will suffice to enable